Novel architectures and strategies for security offloading by Montero Banegas, Diego Teodoro
Novel Architectures and Strategies
for Security Offloading
Departament d’Arquitectura de Computadors
Diego Montero
Advisors: Dr. René Serral-Gracià
Dr. Marcelo Yannuzzi
Department of Computer Architecture
Technical University of Catalunya
A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor in Computer Science
September 2017
to Isabel, Mireya, Josué and Pepe
. . . la familia feliz. . .
Acknowledgements
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the people and organizations who have
supported me throughout this endeavor. The uncountable challenges, experiences and
lessons I have learned, alongside the extraordinary people I have met are the most
valuable memories that will endure in my life.
This thesis realization has been possible thanks to the unconditional support and
guidance of my advisors Dr. René Serral-Gracià and Dr. Marcelo Yannuzzi. I really
appreciate your encouragement and wise advices to pursue my goals and beyond.
I would also like to thank all the former and current fellow doctoral students at
the ANA research group for their feedback, cooperation and of course friendship. My
gratitude also goes to my fellow labmates for the stimulating discussions, for the sleepless
working nights before the deadlines, and for all the fun we have had in the last four years.
Some organizations have played a key role supporting the development of this thesis. I
would like to especially thank the Secretaria de Educación Superior, Ciencia, Tegnología
e Innovación del Ecuador. I am also indebted to the Engineering Faculty of the University
of Cuenca, Ecuador.
Words can not express how grateful I am to my parents and to my sister and brother.
Their unconditional support, encouraging thoughts and empathy have deeply helped me
throughout this journey.
Diego Montero, September 2017
Abstract
Internet has become an indispensable and powerful tool in our modern society. Its
ubiquitousness, pervasiveness and applicability have fostered paradigm changes around
many aspects of our lives. This phenomena has positioned the network and its services
as fundamental assets over which we rely and trust. However, Internet is far from
being perfect. It has considerable security issues and vulnerabilities that jeopardize
its main core functionalities with negative impact over its players. Furthermore, these
vulnerabilities’ complexities have been amplified along with the evolution of Internet user
mobility and its limited support.
In general, Internet security includes both security for the correct network operation
and security for the network users and endpoint devices. The former involves the chal-
lenges around the Internet core infrastructure’s control and management vulnerabilities,
while the latter encompasses security vulnerabilities over end users and endpoint devices.
Similarly, Internet mobility poses major security challenges ranging from routing com-
plications, connectivity disruptions and lack of global authentication and authorization.
These issues have motivated this thesis, which is structured in two main parts with a
common traversal objective derived from user and device mobility. In the first part, we
address some security vulnerabilities of the Internet routing system, while in the second
part we focus more on the security protection of end users and devices.
The purpose of this thesis is to present the design of novel architectures and strategies
for improving Internet security in a non-disruptive manner. Our novel security proposals
follow a protection offloading approach. The motives behind this paradigm target the
further enhancement of the security protection while minimizing the intrusiveness and
disturbance over the Internet routing protocols, its players and users. To accomplish
such level of transparency, the envisioned solutions leverage on well-known technologies,
namely, Software Defined Networks, Network Function Virtualization and Fog Computing.
From the Internet core building blocks, we focus on the vulnerabilities of two key
routing protocols that play a fundamental role in the present and the future of the Internet,
i.e., the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and the Locator-Identifier Split Protocol (LISP).
To this purpose, we first investigate current BGP vulnerabilities and countermeasures
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with emphasis in an unresolved security issue defined as Route Leaks. Therein, we discuss
the reasons why different BGP security proposals have failed to be adopted, and the
necessity to propose innovative solutions that minimize the impact over the already
deployed routing solution. To this end, we propose pragmatic security methodologies to
offload the protection with the following advantages: no changes to the BGP protocol,
neither dependency on third party information nor on third party security infrastructure,
and self-beneficial. Similarly, we research the current LISP vulnerabilities with emphasis
on its control plane and mobility support. We leverage its by-design separation of control
and data planes to propose an enhanced location-identifier registration process of end
point identifiers, while securely validating their respective authorizations. This proposal
improves the mobility of end users with regards on securing a dynamic traffic steering
over the Internet.
On the other hand, from the end user and devices perspective we research new
paradigms and architectures with the aim of enhancing their protection in a more
controllable and consolidated manner. To this end, we propose a new paradigm which
shifts the device-centric protection paradigm toward a user-centric protection. Our
proposal focus on the decoupling or extending of the security protection from the end
devices toward the network edge. It seeks the homogenization of the enforced protection
per user independently of the device utilized. We further investigate this paradigm in a
mobility user scenario. Similarly, we extend this proposed paradigm to the IoT realm
and its intrinsic security challenges. Therein, we propose an alternative to protect both
the things, and the services that leverage from them by consolidating the security at




Internet se ha convertido en una poderosa e indispensable herramienta para nuestra
sociedad moderna. Su omnipresencia y aplicabilidad han promovido grandes cambios
en diferentes aspectos de nuestras vidas. Este fenómeno ha posicionado a la red y
sus servicios como activos fundamentales sobre los que contamos y confiamos. Sin
embargo, Internet está lejos de ser perfecto. Tiene considerables problemas de seguridad
y vulnerabilidades que ponen en peligro sus principales funcionalidades. Además, las
complejidades de estas vulnerabilidades se han ampliado junto con la evolución de la
movilidad de usuarios de Internet y su limitado soporte.
La seguridad de Internet incluye tanto la seguridad para el correcto funcionamiento
de la red como la seguridad para los usuarios y sus dispositivos. El primero implica los
desafíos relacionados con las vulnerabilidades de control y gestión de la infraestructura
central de Internet, mientras que el segundo abarca las vulnerabilidades de seguridad sobre
los usuarios finales y sus dispositivos. Del mismo modo, la movilidad en Internet plantea
importantes desafíos de seguridad que van desde las complicaciones de enrutamiento,
interrupciones de la conectividad y falta de autenticación y autorización globales.
El propósito de esta tesis es presentar el diseño de nuevas arquitecturas y estrategias
para mejorar la seguridad de Internet de una manera no perturbadora. Nuestras prop-
uestas de seguridad siguen un enfoque de desacople de la protección. Los motivos detrás
de este paradigma apuntan a la mejora adicional de la seguridad mientras que minimizan
la intrusividad y la perturbación sobre los protocolos de enrutamiento de Internet, sus
actores y usuarios. Para lograr este nivel de transparencia, las soluciones previstas
aprovechan nuevas tecnologías, como redes definidas por software (SDN), virtualización
de funciones de red (VNF) y computación en niebla.
Desde la perspectiva central de Internet, nos centramos en las vulnerabilidades de
dos protocolos de enrutamiento clave que desempeñan un papel fundamental en el
presente y el futuro de Internet, el Protocolo de Puerta de Enlace Fronterizo (BGP)
y el Protocolo de Separación Identificador/Localizador (LISP ). Para ello, primero
investigamos las vulnerabilidades y medidas para contrarrestar un problema no resuelto
en BGP definido como Route Leaks. Proponemos metodologías pragmáticas de seguridad
para desacoplar la protección con las siguientes ventajas: no cambios en el protocolo
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BGP, cero dependencia en la información de terceros, ni de infraestructura de seguridad
de terceros, y de beneficio propio.
Del mismo modo, investigamos las vulnerabilidades actuales sobre LISP con énfasis
en su plano de control y soporte de movilidad. Aprovechamos la separacçón de sus planos
de control y de datos para proponer un proceso mejorado de registro de identificadores
de ubicación y punto final, validando de forma segura sus respectivas autorizaciones.
Esta propuesta mejora la movilidad de los usuarios finales con respecto a asegurar un
enrutamiento dinámico del tráfico a través de Internet.
En paralelo, desde el punto de vista de usuarios finales y dispositivos investigamos
nuevos paradigmas y arquitecturas con el objetivo de mejorar su protección de forma
controlable y consolidada. Con este fin, proponemos un nuevo paradigma hacia una
protección centrada en el usuario. Nuestra propuesta se centra en el desacoplamiento o
ampliación de la protección de seguridad de los dispositivos finales hacia el borde de la red.
La misma busca la homogeneización de la protección del usuario independientemente del
dispositivo utilizado. Además, investigamos este paradigma en un escenario con movilidad.
Validamos nuestra propuesta proporcionando resultados experimentales obtenidos de
diferentes experimentos y pruebas de concepto implementados.
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Part I: Introduction
Chapter 1
Summary and Road Map
Internet has become an indispensable and powerful tool in our modern society. Its
ubiquitousness, pervasiveness and applicability have fostered paradigm changes around
many aspects of our lives, impacting not only the way we interact and communicate but
also entertain and work. Its evolution and worldwide adoption have reached levels far
from initially envisioned. This widespread positions the Internet as a critical asset or
service, over which we rely upon. However, Internet is far from being perfect. It has
considerable issues that might disrupt not only its core functionality but jeopardize all its
players. The increasing security issues have affected not only end users, but also crucial
Internet core systems—e.g., exploitation over the Internet resources ownership, and its
routing system.
The purpose of this thesis is to present the design of novel architectures and strategies
for improving the security of Internet in a “non-disruptive” manner. Our novel security
proposals follow an “offloading” approach. In general, Internet security includes both
security for the correct network operation and security for the network users. The former
involves the challenges around the Internet core infrastructure and its vulnerabilities.
Meanwhile, the latter encompasses the needs to secure the information on the users
devices and in transit across the Internet, as well as protect the devices of unauthorized
access. The idea behind the offloading paradigm is to propose novel architectures and
frameworks to further enhance the security protection while minimizing the intrusiveness
and disturbance over the Internet and its players. To accomplish such level of transparency,
our proposed solution leverages on well-known technologies, namely, Software Defined
Networks (SDN) [45], and Network Function Virtualization [22]. In a nutshell, the
former enables the decoupling and offloading of the control and management part from a
protocol, while the latter embeds core functions to the network through the definition
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and deployment of “network functions” over the user traffic, which are offloaded from
the end-device.
Similarly, architectures such as Edge Computing [75] and Fog Computing [11] are
leveraged to support the offloading of security protections out from the end user’s device.
These architectures propose the spread or enhancement of network edge nodes with
computing and storage capabilities. In this context, the edge of the network refers to
network nodes (e.g., points of presence) geographically distributed closer to the end users
and devices. These architectures in concordance with SDN and NFV represent a powerful
fabric for hosting and enforcing the end users’ and devices’ security applications.
This introductory chapter delineates the motivations and objectives that influenced
this work. The main contributions are described next, followed by an overview of the
manuscript structure.
1.1 Motivations
The proliferation and increasing dependence over Internet’s services and applications have
impacted and shaped our Society. The “network of networks” evolution has positioned
itself as a vital asset to our daily lives. Its development has promoted new services in a
broad variety of fields, reaching from the ways we communicate, do business, and get
entertained. On top of this, it has fostered the creation of a vast market of opportunities,
yielding a competitive environment for innovation. Its decentralized, openness, and
modular design principles have influenced its great acceptance and expansion worldwide.
Alongside, more dependency over the Internet means the requirement of higher security
protection. However, from its beginnings Internet security has been a second-class
consideration, and in some cases not considered at all. This stems from the original
design which assumed a totally trusted multi-party ecosystem. From there, securing the
network has followed an “ad hoc” feature approach.
Internet security encompasses the protection of computer and network systems from
both the damage or manipulation of information, and the disruption or forgery of its
services and infrastructure. Security is underpinned on the principles of “Availability”,
“Integrity” and “Confidentiality” (the “IAC” triad). While confidentiality consists of
restricting the access to those granted, integrity assures that the information accessed has
not been altered by an unauthorized party. Therein, availability ensures that information
and resources are available to those who need them in an appropriate time-frame.
In general, security in Internet depends on the compound security measures enforced
in each subsystem, e.g. at the Application level, or network stack layer. On top of this,








Fig. 1.1 Problem definition and motivations
any security solution proposed at any level will be far more effective and appropriate
only when all the participants involved apply them, in a collaborative approach seeking
to better secure the network as a whole.
The Internet security issues that motivated this work can be better contextualized
from the abstract overview shown in figure 1.1. These motivations come from two
perspectives, each targeting problems at different levels. On one hand, there are key
security issues over core Internet building blocks, which affect its correct functionality in
terms of network infrastructure reliability and safety. These problems have aroused as the
consequences of some Internet design principles, including the self-describing datagram
packet, the end-to-end arguments, diversity in technology, global addressing and a trusted
ecosystem [14]. The reality of today’s Internet has evolved to an interconnected world of
different stakeholders, each with different interests—possibly adverse to each other—and
with the general tendency of each party to favor theirs.
On the other hand, let us consider the perspective of an Internet user (the second
perspective as depicted in figure 1.1). For her/him/it, Internet enables the communication
with any addressable end-point within the network realm. This interconnection in the
public “wild” Internet, by default, is assumed to be insecure. Any third-party infiltrated
in the network can listen and eavesdrop the traffic information. The end points, or a
third element in between (e.g. a gateway), are in charge of securing the user connections
and the information exchanged. Thus, security at the end-points continuous to be an
evolving Internet challenge.
Following the Internet architecture, the security at the end points also consists of the
compound security mechanisms at different levels of the network stack. Starting from the
top, Internet applications implement either customized or standard security mechanisms
to protect their users communications and exchanged information. For example, secure
applications such as SSH, HTTPS, and DNSSEC lie under the Internet application layer,
which assume that Internet services are untrusted. One level down, the transport layer
security targets the security of every socket connection opened by an application (e.g.,
TLS). Meanwhile, the security at the network level protects all application traffic over an
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IP network (e.g., IPSec). Finally, the security at the link layer is specific of the employed
link technology—for example WPA security in WiFi. This per-layer security enables
the end-points and users to leverage and enforce a wide spectrum of security options
and levels, accordingly to their specific needs. An important remark, security comes at
a price, be it either extra resources’ consumption (e.g., processing, or power), or time
impact in the communications, due to its intrinsic overhead. Furthermore, thanks to
this layered approach, the security of some layers can be implemented outside of the end
points, transparent to the end users. For example, IPSec can provide security between a
pair of gateways interconnecting two private networks.
The plethora of Internet security options at the end-points foster a flexible, adaptable
framework to better secure the end users. However, it also increases the burden on the
proper selection of what type of security is required and at which level. Every security
countermeasure comes with many advantages, but also alongside with trade-offs and
impacts. All this complexity is handled at the user’s applications and operating system,
which ultimately impact over the user experience.
Now, due to the fast proliferation of massive, affordable devices (e.g., a single user
surrounded by different Internet-enabled devices, such as smart-phone, tablet, and laptop),
a new complexity vector around security has been introduced. The ultimate goal around
end user security targets the protection of the user information properly adapted to the
device used. A change of paradigm from a device-oriented security toward a user-centric
security is envisioned.
Similarly, the rapid growing of resource constrained devices with Internet capabilities
represents a complex battlefield for security threats. The Internet of Things extends
the network reach to the physical world by enabling their interaction and actuation,
even to the point of removing the human factor (e.g. initiatives like Device-to-Device
communications). These devices are designed and streamlined for a set of specific
purposes, which may entail either the generation of information (e.g. a temperature
sensor or a video camera), or the actuation over a physical element (e.g. a light-bulb
switch).
Whilst the fast proliferation of these devices foster new markets driven by the huge
amount of generated data and enhanced control and actuation over their surrounding
world, there is a major trade-off security wise. These devises may require enforcing
certain level of security protection, depending on the criticality of their function. However,
given their resource constrained nature, their security may be customized to reduce its
overhead, or require the action and protection of an external entity, e.g. this functionality
is usually undertaken by a gateway device. Thus, securing this wide universe of devices
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impose a huge challenge in terms of how to protect both the devices and the network
from a wide threat surface. These arguments support the idea to research new paradigms
of security offloading from these devices, alongside with new networking and computing
architectures capable to scale with them at the network edge.
Below, we shall further elaborate each perspective and the reasons behind that
motivated this research. Figure 1.2 depicts in a nutshell our research road-map, addressing
both perspectives detailed above, and further highlights the problems addressed at each
one, respectively.
Motivations targeting key Internet building blocks
The lack of by-design Internet security measures in some of its fundamental building
blocks, e.g., the domain-name translation service, and the inter-domain routing protocol,
have revealed mayor network service vulnerabilities with unprecedented consequences.
Take into consideration the cases of Internet outages like the Youtube service breakdown
[73], alleged Chinese Telecom traffic hijacking [47], massive routing leaks in Malaysia [8],
or the India Internet traffic hijack [9], to mention a few. These attacks have shown the
exposure of one foundational sub-system, crucial for the inter-domain network traffic
routing, i.e., the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)[71].
Some of these large-scale Internet disruptions might had been the result of either
a misconfiguration, or a direct attack targeting the hijacking of Internet traffic. For
example, in an attempt to block local access to YouTube (by local we mean nation-wide),
Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. mis-configured the BGP prefixes and routes
advertised toward its providers, leading to a massive YouTube service disruption. The
Internet routing system dynamically learned that the Pakistani ISP now owned the routes
and network resources to reach YouTube. This routing information was further spread
by its providers, as they lacked the mechanisms to filter out this “incorrect” routing
update. Thus, the Internet traffic toward YouTube was wrongly steered, overloading the
deceiving ISP’s network capacity. Ultimately, YouTube resources became unreachable
for a period of time.
The inter-domain routing protocol was logically designed as a set of trusted parties or
domains sharing routing information with each other in a totally distributed system—an
Internet player is referred as Autonomous Systems (AS). This assumption makes really
difficult for any AS to verify the shared information by its peers, enabling the spread
of both deceit route injections (by any transit AS), and the origination of unauthorized
network routes (by any AS claiming illegitimate prefix ownership). The by-product of
spreading this rogue routing information over the Internet ranges from inadvertently
attracting network traffic toward a dead end, or enabling a man-in-the middle attack. To
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Mobility
















Fig. 1.2 Overview of the Targeted Security Problems
countermeasure these problems, several security proposals based on either fully replacing
BGP, or extending it through security patches have been introduced. However, none of
them have promoted a wide adoption due to their complexity or heavyweight disruptions
over the current BGP deployment, as well as their poor incentives toward initial adopting
players. These arguments are the basis behind our proposal to enhance BGP security
causing the minimum disruption by offloading it to an external entity.
Solutions proposed by the SIDR IETF working group like the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [71], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [50], and BGP Security
(BGPSEC) [51] target to secure the BGP protocol by enabling mechanisms to validate the
Internet resource allocation and authorization verification, the correct route origination
verification, as well as the AS-path route verification. RPKI and ROA follow the offloaded
paradigm as a new external infrastructure entity is devised, which main purpose is to
cryptographically support the validation of resources authorizations. In contrast, the
BGPSEC proposes major changes that affect not only the inner protocol but also imposes
new requirements such as in-line chain verification of cryptographic signatures, alongside
with hardware upgrades. As a result, BGPSEC has faced the most resistance from the
community.
Within this context, our research interests are aligned with a not so well-defined,
policy related security issue in BGP. This security flaw is effective even when all the
previous BGP security measures are in place. The reason behind is that this vulnerability
exploits an AS’s internal routing policy by violating the exported routes announced to a
neighbor AS. This seemingly trivial problem has proven to be hard to solve, as each AS
maintains its export policies rules secret. We shall refer to this problem as “Route Leak”
and formally define it in section 4.2.
Internet is also facing major issues regarding its routing scalability. The design princi-
ple around Internet addressing considered a global addressing scheme and namespace, i.e.,
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the Internet Protocol (IP). This principle works well in a highly hierarchical, aggregative
routing abstraction, which targets the optimization of the routing table size. However,
due to new technical factors such as multi-homing, traffic engineering, mobility, as well
as the lack of security within BGP, the Internet routing table size has experimented
an exponential growth [68]. Around these factors, the mobility factor contributes to
this increase as new, more specific routing prefix advertisements are required when the
prefix owner is allowed to maintain its prefixes, independently of the Internet network
addressing hierarchy (e.g., the case when an end user owns a public IP address and
switches Internet providers). Similarly, in an attempt to prevent prefix hijacking within
BGP, some Internet autonomous systems are advertising larger, more specific prefixes
(e.g., a larger set of /24 prefixes instead of the aggregated ones).
Another problem, related to the above, stem from the semantics overload in the
Internet addressing space. Currently, an IP address represents not only the Identification
of an end-point, but also its topological Location within the network hierarchy; the former
identifies the “who”, while the latter defines the “where” (location in the addressing
network topology) in an end-to-end IP communication. This semantical-split principle
has fostered new routing proposals such as the Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol
(LISP) [23] and the Identifier/Locator Network Protocol (ILNP) [4]. These new routing
proposals introduce a clear distinction regarding this semantic overload, while keeping a
dynamic control and routing system to properly steer the traffic through the network.
Their advantages include a reduced public routing table, multi-homing, and better
support for mobility. On this work, we shall focus our research efforts over the LISP
protocol as a mobility enabler, and the security issues around its control plane.
The LISP protocol was initially designed to address the Internet routing table explosion
problem. This proposal is based on the semantic-split idea which renders two different
addressing spaces, each serving specific purposes. These two addressing spaces, referred
as routing locator (RLOC) and endpoint identifier (EID) namespaces, map the core-edge
network architecture, respectively. This inserts a level of indirection, requiring a global
biding register to tie both spaces. Whilst having two different addressing spaces allows
the stabilization of the core Internet routing table size and foster different and scalable
addressing schemes at the network edge, it comes with the challenge of maintaining a
global mapping binding register alongside with its security concerns.
Apart from its initial designed purpose, LISP has proven to be an enabler for other
factors such as multi-homing, traffic engineering and mobility within the IP networking
arena. However, this proposal has similar issues as BGP in terms of both network
resources allocation and authorization, as well as the dynamic update of locations-
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identifiers bindings. For example, the mobility use case arises different challenges from
two perspectives: a) how to verify the correct allocation and authorization of each
addressing space, and b) secure update of the addressing mappings in the global biding
register. Currently, LISP provides a simple security control plane (LISPSEC [55]) which
focuses on its functional integrity. However, the proposal lacks of security methods
to assure resource authorization, e.g., prefix ownership and dynamic authorization of
location-identifier bindings. We shall research these challenges and their similarities with
the BGP ones, previously introduced.
Motivations targeting end points and users
The proliferation of Internet and its ubiquitous access fostered by both, the advances
of Internet-capable devices and the evolution of network access technologies towards
a converged network paradigm, have positively impacted over the end users and the
services provided in general. However, new devices connected to the Internet mean more
endpoints to secure and, conversely, more targets exposed for attacks. The burden and
complexity of properly securing them and keeping the network resilient to bad players
seems to be a daunting task to overcome.
Any Internet enabled end point device may represent either a target for an attack,
or the source of an attack. The best way to protect a device, network and system from
the Internet is by unplugging it from the open network. Whereas this rather extremist
case is applied to certain critical systems, devices and networks, it is not the case for
a normal Internet user, his services and networks. Therefore, the security around the
edges of the network, which includes both the end points and inherently its users, is key
to preserve a secure Internet environment.
Internet enables the end-to-end communication paradigm, which implies that any two
end points can establish a communication channel and exchange information. Prior to
reach this level, any device first is required to join a network at the physical and link level,
either by a wired or wireless technology. This represents the first security barrier to pass
(e.g a wireless password means the network has enforced a link protection level). Now
that the device is attached to a local network, it will be able to communicate with any
other local devices attached to the same network, and to the Internet through a default
gateway. The security concerns regarding this local network access is out of the scope of
this work. This work focuses on new paradigms to provide security protection to end
points that already have Internet connectivity, or at least are attached to a network and
reach a gateway. The idea is to propose novel paradigms and architectures for enforcing
the protection for the end point at the network edge, the closest to it. The edge of
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the network might be defined as the point where a user or group of users (a network)
concentrate and share a common gateway.
Any security protection measure enforced at the end-point comes not only with
additional complexity over the end user, but also an extra burden in terms of resources
requirements (e.g., processing, storage, or data transmission)—and the consequent impact
over performance and energy efficiency, critical in the case of battery-enabled devices.
This problem not only affects end user devices such as smart-phones, tablets and laptops,
but also to a plethora of resource-constrained Internet-enabled devices in the realm of
Internet of Things (IoT).
From the perspective of end-users, there is a critical problem around having a
transversal, simple to define and manage security protection. The complexity increases
along with the number of devices normally a user employs daily. Each device poses
particular requirements regarding security protection, exposing users to the complex
hurdle of setting up device-tailored protection countermeasures. This problem is further
exacerbated when a device is shared between multiple users (e.g., a family tablet). The
setup of distinct security profiles, policies and protection rules for the different users of a
terminal is far from trivial.
End users are exposed to devices with different architectures (e.g., Intel or ARM) as
well as different capabilities and operating systems (e.g., Android, Windows, or Linux).
The appropriate protection tools may not be available for all platforms, or lack the
support for a specific one. As a result, the most common practice is to install different
security applications on the various devices—or simply rely on the default protection
means provided by the operating systems. Let us assume for a moment that users would
like to have the same security policy and exactly the same protection level enforced
on all of their devices. To achieve this goal, the user would need to understand the
configuration details of each device, which typically involves the setup of different security
applications on different platforms. For non-technically savvy people, this turns out to
be an impossible hurdle to overcome. As a result, most Internet users suffer from wide
variations in their protection levels, and this problem is exacerbated as the number of
devices per user grows.
The problem scenario described above stem from a device-centric security paradigm.
The main drawbacks around this paradigm, from an end user perspective, include the
need for dissimilar installations of security applications in different devices due to their
different platforms, and the problem of non-uniform protection due to the difficulties in
the configurations needed. These, problems have motivated the research of new security
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paradigms that focus more on the user protection with a homogeneous, device agnostic
and policy like oriented security definition.
A similar problem but at a different growth scale is happening with the Internet
of Things (IoT). The explosion in the number of Internet-enabled devices (things) like
thermostats, home appliances, light-bulbs, fitness trackers, door locks and medical devices
have enabled the creation of new, added value services. However, each of these devices
represent a new target for attacks. Consider also that, in an attempt to be competitive,
IoT device manufactures seem to sacrifice security in favor of price and time-to-market.
This trade-off gets amplified as these devices lack of user-friendly security updates and
mechanisms to apply patches, as well as they are meant to last for years—they are not
replaced as often as our laptops or phones, thus users ignore their security flaws and
consequences as long as they work as expected.
The wide diversity of IoT devices in terms of their resources and capabilities influence
different surface attacks. This diversity may hinder the enforcement of security protections
at the level of device. However, we shall keep in mind that many of these devices have
specialized functions and predictable behaviors. Monitoring them in an aggregation point
would help not only to detect anomalies which hint potential attacks or compromised
devices, but also address the IoT security in a scalable approach. However, the requirement
of a gateway per each device or set of devices induces to vertical solutions, which hinders
both the security complexity and the interaction between them. The commodititation of
networking and processing virtualization at the network edge provides some advantages
and opens the possibility to better approach the verticals problem. Fog Computing and
Edge Computing propose a different network and processing architecture, which extends
them along the continuum datacenter-edge network, with the common aim to locate
their services closer to the user. We shall research these new architectures and their
advantages aligned with our purpose of providing an offloading security to IoT devices.
The above described problems reveal a clear necessity for new approaches, architectures
and solutions with the objective to better approach the Internet security continuum. We
propose a different paradigm which seeks to address inter-related vulnerabilities described
above, which ultimately seeks to better protect both the network and its players.
1.2 Objectives
The general objective of this thesis is to study the design of novel architectures and
strategies for securing different segments of the Internet under the “offloading” paradigm.
We approach this goal from two, related, perspectives: a) Internet core building blocks
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security, and b) endpoints and end users security protection. The more specific objectives
in this thesis include:
1. To analyze the BGP vulnerabilities and the up-to-date proposed solutions, while
understanding the reasons behind the lack of security in this fundamental routing
system.
2. To design and prototype a novel architecture to supports the offloading of the BGP
security with minimum changes in both the protocol and its adopters.
3. To study and propose a solution for the BGP “Route Leak” vulnerability following
the offload security protection.
4. To study the LISP protocol and its vulnerabilities in the context of End User
mobility.
5. To design and prototype an architecture that partially leverages the BGP security
to improve the LISP map registration.
6. To design and prototype an architecture that provides a user protection by offloading
the execution of common security applications from user devices into the network
edge.
7. To assess the devised architecture solution in a user case scenarios with and without
considering end user mobility.
8. To design and prototype an architecture that provides enhanced offloaded security
to resource-constrained devices at the network edge.
1.3 Adopted strategies and Contributions
1.3.1 Key Internet routing vulnerabilities
Internet vulnerabilities at its core routing system not only hinders the security of
all its players, but also jeopardizes its stability, integrity and availability as a data
communications infrastructure. BGP is the routing protocol that sustains the Internet
together, and rules how the packets are steered across the public network. It is the
standard that allows the exchange of routing information between Autonomous Systems,
enabling all the parties to create a route map for data communications. More precisely,
BGP allows an AS to share and discover routes to IP destination prefixes to/from its
neighbors, which in turn learn the information from their neighbors. This gathered
information assists the AS’s routers with the routing decision process of data traffic.
The issue here is that bogus routing information can spread easily and almost instantly
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across Internet, as BGP lacks of the mechanisms to properly validate it. This problem
stems from the BGP design assumption of trusted parties—BGP runs on the honor
system. Thus, securing it has been constant battle as its vulnerabilities enable a broad
vector of attacks, including (but not limited to) Denial of Service, traffic hijacking, or
eavesdropping.
The Internet community cognizant of BGP’s vulnerabilities have proposed a number
of solutions focused on securing the route advertisements information shared among
ASes. Past proposals such as S-BGP [44], soBGP [90], psBGP [65], and Internet Route
Verification (IRV) [34] as well as the more recent ones devised by SIDR WG—RPKI
[12], ROA [50] and BGPSEC [51]—share a similar design principal, i.e., all of them
advocate for new extensive architectures which empower ASes to validate shared routing
information, as well as the honesty of the advertisers.
However, an important non-technical consideration regarding the business interplay
between Autonomous Systems seems to be absent from these proposed BGP security
solutions, which unveil a new, apparently trivial vulnerability. The relationships between
ASes are driven by economic motivations, i.e., the cost of forwarding traffic depends on
the type of relationship between the neighboring ASes. Two relevant relationships here
are customer-provider, and settlement-free peer-peer relationships. The former represents
the formal agreement that all routes learned from the provider will be further advertised
to all provider’s neighbors (it includes its providers, customers and settlement-free peers).
In contrasts, the latter agreement dictates that all the client routes of a peer are advertised
to the other peer, and vice versa.
The violation of these policies entail a security issue, imperceptible even with the
latest security proposals in place. This thesis shows how effective this kind of attack can
be and proposes a solution to heuristically detect and prevent it by an AS using only
local information. Also, it follows the offloading security paradigm with the objective to
be the least intrusive over both the BGP protocol and its implantation.
Alongside with the vulnerabilities identified in the core routing system of Internet, we
seek to also address other problems in the BGP routing system derived from factors such
as multi-homing, and mobility. The problems introduced by them affect not only BGP,
but also IP in general. The LISP protocol has proven to be an enabler for these factors, as
it inherently enables the separation of routing concerns into two independent addressing
schemes. One of them is deemed as the core addressing scheme, which may represent
today’s core Internet routing with BGP, while the other represent the different edge
networks. These two addressing schemes are bounded together by a key LISP building
block referred as the location-identification register (i.e. the Mapping system). It allows
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not only to verify the resource allocation authorization of edge network resources, but
also to validate the new location address on the core addressing space prior accepting
the new bindings. Our strategy is to introduce a novel security LISP address allocation
and authorization for both schemes, leveraging from some BGP’s solutions, e.g. RPKI
and ROA.
The registration of an edge network (either one device or a set of them) in the mapping
register requires the specification of the current core address (location). This process
involves two parties, which might require to verify the authenticity and correct claim of
proper resource ownership, respectively. From the perspective of the mapping register,
it not only authenticates and validates the edge network registrations request, but also
might require to validate the authorization of the provided location address.
This registration process in LISP currently is secured by a shared key between the
border router and the mapping system. This key allows the validation of the claimed
resources by the originator. However, there are no mechanism to validate the authorization
of the location addresses included in the registration. Furthermore, we propose a third
party in this process, which represents a mobile end user. This new actor shall interact
with the other two in the process of registering his network resources, while also validating
the correct location at the network border representing him.
1.3.2 Endpoint devices and End User security protection
The security protection of end devices represent the first line of defense against attacks
toward other end points. The correct enforcement of security measures at them reduces
the risk of an insecure network. However, the current evolution of Internet-enabled
end points have marked a notorious tendency with respect to the hurdle the security
protection becomes. On one side, we have the group of end-user security, which considers
the current phenomena regarding the number of devices employed by a user to access
the Internet. The security protection measures available at them follow a device-centric
approach, where each device due to their specificities in terms of hardware, operating
system and others impose stringent requirements to the protection solutions. We propose
a novel change of paradigm toward a user-centric security protection, which focuses on
the enforcement of security protections in a device agnostic approach. We shall further
introduce and discuss the new network and infrastructure architectures leveraged to
achieve this approach in a security offloading fashion.
A similar problem at a different scale in terms of end points represents the security
protection of IoT devices. In this scenario, due to the wide range of dissimilar Internet-
enabled devices characteristics, their protection at the per device granularity seems a
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next to impossible hurdle. However, it is important to remark that these devices are
usually function-specific, with a predictable behavior, which can be monitored by an
external entity (e.g. a gateway). Also, these external entities can protect a group of
nearby-devices, which ultimately helps with the security protection at the scale of IoT.
1.4 Manuscript structure
This thesis is organized in four parts. The below sequel briefly describes the contents of
each part, while introducing the topics addressed in its corresponding chapters.
PART I
This section is comprised of two introductory chapters, which help position the reader
within the context of this thesis.
Chapter 1 provides a brief summary of the motivations, objectives and adopted strate-
gies.
Chapter 2 describes in short the necessary background to understand the issues ad-
dressed and the reach of the solutions proposed along this thesis. A comprehensive list of
references is provided in this part for the reader who wants to get deeper into the details
regarding the Internet vulnerabilities.
PART II
This part consists of two subparts, each dealing with BGP and LISP vulnerabilities.
First, the Internet routing vulnerabilities at present and the defense efforts proposed
by the community are addressed in Chapter 3, while Chapter 4 presents the analysis,
design and test of a novel security architecture with emphasis on a BGP vulnerability
named “Route Leak”. On the other hand, Chapter 5 describes the current LISP control
plane vulnerabilities and the proposed security measures, while Chapter 6 delineates our
analysis, design and test of a novel end-to-end map registration process.
Chapter 3 reviews the main BGP vulnerabilities from a threat model perspective.
The chapter deepens in the analysis of some of the key threats that have caused major
Internet outages. Therein, the defense efforts for securing these BGP vulnerabilities are
described, while emphasizing on an open problem regarding the export routes policy
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violations.
Chapter 4 proposes a novel solution to counter the Inter-domain “Route Leak” vul-
nerability. Therein, the advantages of our proposed solution are described, while the
techniques to offload this security protection are delineated. This chapter also reports
the results obtained from the experiments over our detection technique.
Chapter 5 reviews the main LISP control plane vulnerabilities, with emphasis on
the dynamism for end user mobility. Therein, the proposed solutions for EID-to-RLOC
registration and EID-to-RLOC lookup query are described.
Chapter 6 proposes a novel LISP Map Registration approach with emphasis in end user
mobility. Therein, the advantages and the different scenarios our solution consider are
delineated, while the technique to provide and end-to-end secure map registration with
EID and RLOC verification is described. Finally, the evaluation results from different
experiments are reported.
PART III
This part addresses the Internet security segment from the perspective of end users
and end devices. First, the device-centric protection problem is described along with our
proposed change of paradigm, which focuses more on a user-centric security protection.
Therein, the architecture design of our user-centric offloaded security protection is delin-
eated along with its main components (Chapter 7). Our proposal has been devised to
support user mobility, while maintaining the offloaded security closer to the user location.
Chapter 8 describes this use case and presents some insight from the experiments results
obtained from a real proof-of-concepts implementation. Finally, Chapter 9 describes our
offload security approach in the realm of IoT.
Chapter 7 reviews the end user vulnerabilities derived from the current device-centric
security protection. Therein, this chapter outlines our proposal for a user-centric pro-
tection approach while highlighting the main components of its architecture. It also
reviews the open challenges around the IoT security with special focus on the device
diversity, and the trade-offs imposed by the security and the consumed resources.
Chapter 8 addresses the mobile use case within the user-centric security approach.
This chapter presents the mobility considerations and the Trusted Virtual Domain
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(TVD) state migration strategies to support the user mobility. The experimental testbed
description, the results and insight obtained are fully reported.
PART IV
This final part summarizes the main achievements, insights and conclusions drawn
from this thesis and analyzes future lines of work.
Chapter 9 highlights the main conclusions and achievements drawn from this the-
sis.




This chapter objective is to introduce the general context around this thesis and our
approach to the complex “Security” concept. First, we describe the security continuum
in the Internet, and position our strategy toward the different challenges we target. Next,
the basics of two Internet network routing protocols are described, specifically the BGP
and LISP protocols, and briefly highlighting their shortcomings. Meanwhile, from the
perspective of end-points and end user Internet security, a high-level description of the
current protection models applied to them and its challenges are drawn.
2.1 Internet and the Security continuum
This section introduces the concept of Security around both the Internet and this thesis
context. A brief overview of what Security means in the context of this thesis, and which
are the threats that the Internet core as well as end-points and end-users face.
Internet security in general is a complex and broad research topic which covers a
wide security spectrum of systems, services, networks, devices and end users. Therein,
Internet security encompasses the protection of computer and network systems from
both the damage or manipulation of information, and the disruption or forgery of its
services and infrastructure.
A computer network, as the Internet, enables the interaction and exchange of infor-
mation between their members. In an ideal world, all the members in this network are
trusted and play fair, i.e., there is no greedy incentive for anyone to attack or disrupt
neither the network nor deceive their counterparts. This utopia is far from real as, by the
moment a machine is plugged in, there are an overwhelming number of ways its use might
deviate from its intended purpose. This deviation is a malfunction, which could stem
from an internal, unexpected error or accident. However, when this deviation is caused
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by an adversary through any means, this malfunction becomes a “security” problem.
The motivations behind can be wide and diverse, whether to cause harm, profit, or raise
people awareness, to mention a few (e.g., stealing relevant information, impersonation,
service disruption, protests, spread of viruses or malware, etc).
A common misconception around “security” is the understanding of being isolated
from danger, e.g., a computer system or network defined as secure wrongly suggest they
are free of dangers. On the contrary, “security” is a concept associated with the presence
of an adversary. In the Internet and computing world, there is no perfect system devised
without mistakes, vulnerabilities or errors. Thus, any detected problem only becomes a
security issue or threat if an adversary exploits it, seeking to gain something. Similarly,
this is an iterative game where the defender and the attacker improve their techniques
to protect and exploit, which might results in a never-ending process as long as the
perpetrator deems valuable the effort.
To elaborate, consider the Internet disruption over YouTube services in 2008. In an
attempt to block local access to this popular service, “Pakistan Telecommunication Co.
Ltd.” unilaterally advertised ownership of the routes destined to YouTube toward its
customers, seeking to block their access [73]. However, this (mis)configuration reached its
Internet provider, Hong Kong-based “PCCW Telecom”, and further propagated. These
new routes were believed by routers around the globe, diverting the YouTube traffic
toward the Pakistan ISP, and consequently taking YouTube off-line for a considerable
period of time. This incident was the result of a misleading configuration, which was not
properly filtered by neither the originator nor its providers. Whilst this misconfiguration
was not intentionally targeting YouTube, it can easily become a security issue if we take
the same situation and change the “misconfiguration” intention with a “hack” or “attack”
name.
Similarly, more recent incidents of country-wide Internet censorship include cases
in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. All these countries have leveraged their control over
state-run Internet service providers (ISPs) to shut down Internet connectivity. These
events have ignited technical discussions regarding the fragility of current networks. In
fact, a number of different techniques have been used to trigger these self-induced attacks,
including the withdrawal of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routes, Internet Protocol
(IP) filtering, IP prefix hijacking or domain name system (DNS) hijacking [17, 74].
Internet security principles stem from the Information Security ones, which include
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Confidentiality consists of keeping data private
and accessible only to legitimate users. This private information not only includes
personal data, but also all transactional data. The information relevance relies on its
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value to the people, thus protecting its confidentiality continues to be a paramount
goal. For example, cryptographic encryption has been the main mechanism employed to
achieve this end.
Integrity assures that the system and the data in it have not been compromised,
tampered or improperly altered by an unauthorized party. It encompasses the consistency,
accuracy and trustworthiness of data over its life cycle. Examples of integrity means
include cryptographic checksums, which ultimate end is to help a receiver to verify
whether the information was altered while in transit.
The availability principle consists on being able to use the system as anticipated. It
includes the proper maintenance of hardware and software upgrades, seeking to maximize
the system uptime. This principle becomes a security issue when an attacker exploits
the lack of availability by some mean. For example, consider the case of Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) occurred against the Dyn company [92]. Part of this attack
impacted on the availability over its DNS service, which ultimately affected some major
websites. Similarly, malware attacks known as “ransomware” [81] target to completely
block a victim system and data, threating with completely wiping them out in exchange
of a ransom payment.
The security aspects around the Internet are not only technical issues, but they extend
also from organizational, legal, economic, political and social as well. Most importantly,
any security mean has inherent limits, trade-offs, and incur on non negligible costs—not
only economically but also costs in time, convenience, capabilities, liabilities, liberties
and more. Furthermore, the responses against security threats vary according to the
type of vulnerability, which can affect the integrity, confidentiality, or availability. This
is the reason why security is so complex, costly and in constant evolution. All in all, the
naive idea of “absolute security” in Internet is a utopia.
2.1.1 Threats, Vulnerabilities and Attacks
Here, we present the definitions of some terms that shall be used throughout this
manuscript.
• Vulnerability: a vulnerability is an inherent weakness in the design, configuration,
implementation, or management of a network or system that renders it susceptible
to a threat. Vulnerabilities are what make networks susceptible to information
loss and downtime. The Internet is a complex system probe to undiscovered
vulnerabilities, as it is every network and system.
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• Threat: a threat is anything that can disrupt the operation, functioning, integrity,
or availability of a network or system. This can take any form and can be malevolent,
accidental, or simply an act of nature.
• Attack: an attack is an instantiation of a threat which is caused by a specific
attacker with a specific goal in mind and a strategy for reaching that goal.
The threats against the Internet, and any computing system, are better understood
from a threat model approach. A threat model identifies possible actors and their
motivations against a system, helping to better understand the possible vulnerabilities
as well as the defensive actions to thwart possible attacks. Therein, an attack is an
instantiation of a threat scenario which is caused by an attacker motivated by specific
goals, and prepared with strategies for attaining them. An attacker might seek to steal
data, obtain and misuse credentials, hijack resources, or disrupt services. By doing any of
them, a skilled adversary could cause a lot of damage, as the stolen data might represent
highly classified and confidential information, or by using the credentials, an escalation
of rights within a system might allow an attacker to modify code and data, access and
control of critical infrastructure. Similarly, the hijacking of resources might result in
service disruption, interception of information and spreading of rogue information (e.g.,
the Pakistan telecom case previously described.).
The vulnerabilities, threats and attacks ideas described above shall serve as the basis
concepts for the security study of this thesis, around the network protocols and the end
users and end points. Our approach to each shall include first the description of the
current vulnerabilities and threats (by a threat model), and next our proposal to tackle
some of them.
2.2 Internet Routing
The Internet is based on the idea of inter-connecting multiple, independent networks of
rather arbitrary design. It began with the ARPANET as the pioneering packet switching
network, but soon included packet satellite networks, ground-based packet radio networks
and other kind of networks. The key principle behind this diversity is rooted in an open
networking architecture, where the choice of any individual network technology is not
dictated by a particular, global network architecture.
The Internet is a packet switching network. At its core, it represents a global carrier
of information in form of packets, providing transport services between any two endpoints.
These packets bounce through different networks until they reach their destination.
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This principle along with its decentralized and layered architecture have fostered a
worldwide adoption, harmonizing the interconnection of a plethora of communication
technology-specific networks under a global name-space scheme. This scheme targets
two key challenges regarding how to identify and address endpoints, as well as how
to route the packets. The Internet Protocol IP was devised as the solution targeting
both addressing and routing. It defines a single name-space scheme and assigns to each
end-point a unique identifier (an IP address). This identifier is addressable and reachable
from any other Internet end-point.
A key building block that sustains the Internet is its global addressing and routing
scheme. The whole universe of addresses are split into subsets, each representing a
network (referred as a network prefix). These interconnected networks exchange their
network prefix information with their neighbors as well as the learned information from
other neighbors. This information allows each network to build a map of the available
and reachable networks, resulting in the construction of a routing table. This table helps
in the decision process for relaying packets across network boundaries.
2.2.1 Network Control and Packet Forwarding
A packet switching network consists of different interconnected elements (packet for-
warders), which main purpose is to relay packets following a set of rules. There is a
key subtle split of concerns regarding this process at each element. On one hand, the
forwarding process imposes the requirement to minimize the overhead introduced to the
packets passing through each element. This overhead stem from the time required to
compute the incoming packets, take a forwarding decision and relay to the next hop. On
the other hand, the process to learn and populate the forwarding rules serves as a control
mechanism over the element behavior. The former is known as the “data plane”, while
the latter as “control plane”. In this work, we shall focus on the control plane of the
Internet and the protocols that govern it.
The data plane has been designed to process packet at line-rate speeds. The forwarding
decision process reads the incoming packet address information and utilizes it to take
a decision. Therein, the decision result indicates whether the packet is forwarded or
not, and toward which output link. Fast matching tables in memory and specialized
hardware (e.g., TCAMs) have been devised to support this process at high packets rate.
The configuration and population of these decision tables are a key control element of
the network, as who has access to them can affect the network behavior at will.
The control plane of a network element consists on the process that coordinates
with its neighbors the information regarding who and how to reach other end points
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and networks. It is in charge of managing and populating the table that supports the
forwarding decision process. Thus, this is a critical component within the network as it
can directly affect how the traffic is steered.
It is important to highlight that a given network element may take decisions based on
different criteria according to its capabilities. For example, an Ethernet level-2 switch by
definition only understands and processes Ethernet frames. Thus, it uses the Ethernet
packet header to learn and forward packets. The control plane maintains an “Ethernet
address: physical port” biding table to support the forwarding decision process. At this
level, the forwarding process is within a specific network technology domain.
Similarly, a layer 3 device is a network element capable of reading and understanding
IP headers. This capability allows it to forward packets based on its IP destination
address. The control plane is in charge of configuring and maintaining an IP routing table.
This table supports the forwarding decision process, enabling the routing of packets
between IP networks. In contrast, with the previous Ethernet example, a network element
IP-capable is referred as an “IP Router”, and it can interconnect different network with
specific layer two technology (e.g., Ethernet, LoRa or WiFi). In this work, we focused
our research over some of the control protocols that govern the Internet at the IP level,
and some of their security issues.
The forwarding decision logic, its coordination and cooperation between the different
IP network elements has been designed and devised to be totally distributed. Each
network element poses its internal logic to control and govern its forwarding table. To
this end, different distributed protocols have been devised, such as BGP, OSPF and LISP.
On the other hand, there is another approach for handling and managing the forwarding
decision logic, which focuses on the idea of decoupling the control logic from the data
forwarding elements. The control and configuration of forwarding rules is concentrated
over a central controller. This controller is in a position to handle different elements of a
network at a privileged position, which enables the creation of different, isolated virtual
networks. This approach is known as Software Defined Network (SDN). Our proposal for
offloading the security out from BGP is aligned with the latter paradigm for network
virtualization, as it provides a powerful tool for dynamic traffic steering and isolation.
2.2.2 Network addressing scheme and routing
Routing within the Internet was designed under the principle of a global addressing
scheme. To this end, the Internet Protocol (IP) was devised (there are two versions:
IPv4 [42] and IPv6 [18]). In a nutshell, IPv4 defines a 32-bits long addressing space,
where each address is commonly represented as a quartet of decimal numbers separated
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by a dot, each bounded between 0 and 255, e.g., “147.83.42.130”—each number is a byte
in decimal. An IP address identifies unequivocally an end-point, and also belongs to a
network prefix, i.e., semantically it represents the end-point identity (the “who”), and
which network prefix is part of (the “where” in the IP network hierarchy and routing
terms).
The set of continuous IP addresses constitute an IP network identified by a prefix.
Conversely, an IP prefix such as 147.83.0.0/16, defines the set of IP addresses { 147.83.0.0
, 147.83.0.1 , . . . , 147.83.255.255 }, where all share the first 16 bits, i.e., 147.83 (the /16
is commonly referred as “the prefix”). IP prefixes have variable lengths, which allow
specifying networks of different sizes. For example the prefix 147.83.0.0/16 contains 28∗28
end-point addresses, while the prefix 147.83.0.0/30 only 22. Hereafter, we shall use the
term “IP-network” as the set of IP addresses with a common prefix. The characteristics
of prefix aggregation and specificity enable the definition of a hierarchical arrangement
of IP-prefixes which facilitate the network route learning process.
This addressing scheme and network segmentation pose the challenge of how to steer
network traffic exchange between IP-networks. An “IP Router” is the element in charge of
steering packets between IP-networks. This element acts as a gateway for all its connected
networks, enabling each to reach its counterpart. For example, two IP-networks seeking
to exchange traffic shall share a common “IP Router” element, which understands both
network prefixes. Aligned with this example, a full interconnection between a set of
different IP-networks can be achieved if all share only one “IP Router” element. This
creates a centralized topology with the shared routing element at the center. However,
this goes against key Internet principles: decentralization and distribution.
To foster Internet decentralization and distribution, an IP-Network can act as a
transit network between networks. To illustrate, let us consider the case of three different
IP-networks with two routing elements, where each “IP-Router” can be shared only
between two networks. This configuration arranges one middle network with two routing
elements. The edge networks can reach only the middle one, as the routers do not know
the existence of other, not directly connected networks. To achieve a total connectivity
between all networks, a coordination between routers is required. This coordination
process acts as a control system, which learns and decides how to steer the packets in
the network. Furthermore, this control plane seeks to create a logical routing map table
with the relevant information regarding how to steer the traffic based on the destination
address of packets. Thus, this table consists of a set of “IP-prefix: route to reach it”
mappings. Each route entry indicates which is the next hop to forward the traffic.
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From this addressing and routing perspective, Internet can be regarded as a set of
millions of interconnected IP-networks. Their interconnection is totally distributed, which
poses the challenge on the routing control process and its global routing table. Having
a manual and static table to all possible IP addresses is far from practical. Different
solutions have been devised to dynamically coordinate and learn how to steer the traffic.
These solutions are considered part of the control plane, as their objective is to influence
the forwarding decision process of each network element by populating and updating
their respective routing tables.
In this work, we have focused our attention into two control plane protocols, namely
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), and the Locator/Identifier Split Protocol (LISP).
The former is a key building block that sustains Internet today, while the latter is a new
proposal for routing control plane which seeks to tackle some core Internet routing issues
related with BGP and with IP itself.
2.2.3 Inter-domain routing
The Internet is comprised by a set of interconnected domains, where domains represent
large networks operated by different organizations, such as the government, a cable
TV provider, a University or a company. Similarly, a domain is a network or group of
networks autonomously operated by a single authority under a common network policy.
A network domain is also known as an Autonomous System (AS). From this perspective,
the Internet can be described as a graph, where nodes represent network domains (ASes),
and edges the links interconnecting them. This domain segmentation promotes a 1:n
relationship type among ASes and IP-networks, i.e., one AS can represent one or more
IP-networks. To illustrate these concepts, figure 2.1 depicts a set of interconnected ASes
represented by circles, each assigned an AS number (ASN). Therein, AS 32 holds the
IP-network 147.83.142.0/24, which is advertised to the AS 20. On the Internet today there
are over 40K ASes, which represent millions of IP-networks, and their interconnections
are changing and shifting over time.
This logical segmentation of the Internet in autonomous systems follows a twofold
objective. First, to define a different domain addressing space (i.e., AS numbers) for
Internet governability, business relationships and management. The second objective
targets to foster a path vector routing protocol, based on the mappings between IP-
network and the path of ASes to reach them (referred as AS-path). More specifically,
an AS-path consist of the sequence of ASes required to traverse in order to reach a
destination. These AS-paths represent the routes toward an IP-network, which are
dynamically selected by a policy-based routing decision process. Thus, an AS can




















Fig. 2.1 Inter-domain routing example.
be responsible for a set of different IP-networks, and decide to announce them to its
neighbors.
These principles define the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP is a control plane
protocol which specifies how the network elements exchange routing information, as well
as the criteria to take decisions that control the data plane. A BGP router can learn the
different routes from its neighbors, and selectively discriminate its further spread based
on local policies.
To illustrate, figure 2.1 depicts a toy example of inter-domain networking. Therein,
AS 32 is responsible for the prefix 147.83.142.0/24, and advertises it to its neighbor
AS 20. This advertisement contains not only the prefix, but also the AS-path {AS32}.
This AS-path contains the route toward the IP-network. Next, AS 20 decides to further
advertise the prefix to its neighbor AS 10 by sending the AS-path {32, 20}. Every AS
that decides to advertise an IP-network, either its own or a learned one, must append its
AS-number to the AS-path being advertised.
The collection of these announcements at each AS allows the construction of a BGP
routing table. Note that for a specific IP-network, one or more AS-paths can exist.
For example, in figure 2.1 AS 11’s route table shows two AS-path routes toward one
IP-network. The selection of the preferred AS-path route depends on an internal decision
process based on different criteria, which include the longest IP-prefix match, AS-path
length, and network policies and preferences defined by an AS network administrator.
Furthermore, the decision to propagate an IP-prefix learned from a neighbor to other
neighbors shall depend on whether the AS provides traffic transit to its peers, and be
aligned with their business relationship agreements.
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Overall, only the preferred AS-path route per IP-network are advertised by an AS.
This restriction protects an AS by disclosing only its preferred “IP-network:AS-path”
route to its neighbors out of all its possible available routes. On top of this, the set
of best routes to be propagated are selectively chosen accordingly with the targeted
neighbor, discriminated by their business relationships. The following section further
elaborates this concept.
2.2.4 Inter-domain business relationships
The interconnection between any two ASes represents an agreement to exchange traffic
under specific conditions. Based on the type of agreement and business interests, these
relationships can be classified in two broad categories: Customer-Provider (or Provider-
Customer), and Peer-Peer. Each category represents a contractual agreement between
the parties, and dictates the policies to enact by the routing control system in terms of
routes propagation.
BGP is the dynamic routing protocol controlling over an AS routing table and its
inherent decision process for routes selection. An AS collects routing information from all
its neighbors and processes it according to its internal control logic, which is influenced
by internal preference policies. This process results in the construction of a routing table
with all the learned paths and their respective IP-prefix. Out of this set of routes, only
the preferred ones form the selected set of routes available to propagate. Then, this
set is further discriminated based upon the neighbor relationship. Thus, the type of
relationship between two domains dictates the policies regarding both the preference of
routes in the learning process and the selection of routes to be exported per neighbor.
The Customer-Provider relationship consists of a Customer domain requesting
for traffic transit service to a Provider domain. Conversely, a Provider AS charges its
Customer for the service provided, i.e. for forwarding its traffic to the Internet in both
directions. This implies the traffic destined to the Customers’ networks, as well as all the
traffic coming from them towards other domains and the Internet. The Provider acts as
a transit domain, and it is in its business interests to offer the best routes to its clients
seeking to maximize the traffic exchange.
On the other hand, the Peer-Peer category establishes a reciprocal, profit-neutral
relationship among domains. Both AS parties agree to mutually transit the traffic
between their networks and their clients’ networks. This neutral settlement is commonly
agreed upon a certain traffic radio, and established between ASes of relatively equal size
(in terms of the number of clients or IP-networks).





















A is customer of B
B is provider of A
A is peer of B




Fig. 2.2 Inter-domain relationships.
To illustrate these types of relationships we refer to figure 2.2. The left part of
figure 2.2(a) shows a basic Customer-Provider relationship, where AS 20 provides transit
connectivity to AS 31, i.e., all traffic destined to AS 31’s networks (depicted as network
D) is reachable from Internet through AS 20. Similarly, all AS 31’s networks can
reach Internet through its provider AS 20. Following this idea, the right part of figure
2.2(a) shows another example of this relationship, highlighting the customer set concept.
Therein, AS 10 provides connectivity to both AS 20 and its customers networks (ASes 31
and 32).
On the other hand, the part (b) of figure 2.2 depicts a Peer-Peer relationship between
ASes 20 and 21 (left side), and ASes 10 and 11 (right side). The former depicts the case
of traffic exchanging only considering direct clients, while the latter includes also the
customers’ customers networks.
These inter-domain types of relationships have enabled the creation of a market
around network connectivity and traffic exchange. Figure 2.3 depicts from an inter-
domain hierarchical perspective a domain classification based on the type of relationships.
At the core, there are tier-1 ASes which do not require to pay any other for transit
services. They peer with all other tier-1 ASes (there are around fourteen worldwide),
covering all available networks in the Internet. Conversely, on the customer edge there
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are domains which do not provide transit services and have only Customer-Provider links.
These are referred as Stub-ASes.
Another AS category considers the number of Customer-Provider links a domain has.
A single-homed AS means it only has one Customer-Provider, whilst a multi-homed AS
has more than one. The latter allows to have multiple routes both from and toward its
networks and customers’ with respect of the Internet. For example, in figure 2.3 ASes 25
and 31 are multi-homed ASes, whereas AS 30 is single-homed.
Similarly, there is an AS category which has only Peer-Peer connections with other
ASes. Consider the case when a big content provider company, or government agency
seeks to reach a broad region of clients while having not to pay a provider for transit
services—the reasons behind might be geopolitical, economical, strategical or other. To
this end, this domain negotiates a Peer-Peer relationship with the domain(s) covering the
aimed region. For example, in figure 2.3, AS 20 maintain only Peer-Peer relationships,
which allow it to reach and be reachable only from its peers’ clients.
Inter-domain learning routes preferences
The BGP decision process considers all the learned routes from its neighbors and computes
the preferred ones based on local criteria. Each AS is in a position to unilaterally select
the best routes according to its own interests. This selection is influenced by the type
of relationship with the neighbor who advertised the route. Thus, these are the general
rules regarding the preference over learned routes:
• Routes learned from Customers are preferred over routes learned from Peers and
Providers.



















Fig. 2.3 AS classification according to their inter-domain relationships.
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Fig. 2.4 Inter-domain incoming routes selection preference from the perspective of AS
20. The IP-Network example E is originated and advertised by AS 32. This route gets
propagated by the domain ASes 21, and 10.
These rules follow a business logic. For example, let us consider the case of a Provider
AS with different Customers, Peers and Providers. Out of all learned routes, consider
the subset of routes with IP-prefixes reachable through more than one AS-Path. The
BGP decision process is in charge of selecting locally the preferred AS-path route per
each IP-network. This selection is influenced by the relationship with the next AS hop
who advertised the IP-network. More specifically, a Provider shall prefer the routes
learned from a Customer over other routes coming from a Peer or a Provider for a specific
IP-Network. It is in the interest of the Provider to attract as much as possible traffic
destined to its customers from all the other neighbors. Thus, by selecting its customer
routes as preferred, these routes are guaranteed to be considered in the export routing
process, increasing its possibilities to be further propagated to other domains. The more
neighbors accept the route as their preferred, more traffic will be attracted and transited
the Provider toward its Client, ultimately increasing its revenue.
To illustrate, figure 2.4(a) shows in a nutshell the control plane components behind
BGP [71]. There are three different Routing Information Based (RIB) entities, each
serving a specific purpose. The Adjacent RIB Incoming (Adj-RIB-in) contains all the
incoming announced routes (one adjacent table per domain). Similarly, the Adj-RIB-out
entities (one per domain) holds the reconciled export routes. Meanwhile, the Local RIB
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non valley free routes
Fig. 2.5 Inter-domain “valley-free” export routes.
(Loc-RIB) contains the superset of local learned routes along with the preferred ones.
The BGP decision process is in charge of compute the both the local and the different
output RIBs based on the local policies and relationships.
An example of how the Adj-RIB-in/out tables are populated is depicted in figure
2.4(b). Therein, the routing advertisement illustration starts from AS 32. Consider the
case of AS 20, who receives different route advertisements from all its neighbors regarding
the IP-network E. The criteria followed by these domains to further propagate the route
is discussed in the next section. Then, based on the type of relationships between AS
20 and its neighbors ASes 32, 21, and 10, the decision process selects the route with
AS-Path {10} as the preferred for the IP-Network E.
Once the Decision Process has computed the set of preferred routes for all learned
IP-Networks, the next step is to select the export routes to be announce to each neighbor
in order to announce its neighbors about its IP visibility. The next section introduces
the criteria to compute these sets of export routes.
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Inter-domain exporting routes preferences
BGP is a policy based routing protocol which enables the control of advertised (exported)
routes based on the neighbor domain and their type of relationship. Prior this process, a
network element first has to compute its local routing table and select its preferred routes
(as previously described). With this routing information, an AS can decide which routes
to advertise to which neighbor. The simplest rule would be to advertised all the local
preferred routes to all neighbors. However, from a business perspective this approach
may not only hinder the domain interests but also open the door for possible security
issues.
In an ideal Internet where all BGP domains behave properly, every one of they
should follow the “valley-free” guidelines for exporting routes proposed by [69]. From
the perspective of any AS deciding the exporting routes set per neighbor, the rules are:
• Routes learned from a Customer can be further advertised to other Customers,
Peers and Providers.
• Routes learned from a Peer can be further advertised to Customers only.
• Routes learned from a Provider can be further advertised to Customers only.
These guidelines are promoted from a business stand, as the decision of exporting
a specific route by a domain immediately positions it as a tentative transit toward the
route IP-Network. In the case of a Customer route, it is in the interest of the AS to
propagate it to all of its neighbors as it charges the customer for the traffic it transits.
To illustrate, consider the case of domain AS10 in figure 2.5. To maximize it revenue,
this domain advertises aSll the routes learned from its customer AS20 in an attempt to
attract the most traffic from its peer AS11 for the traffic destined to IP-Networks [D,E,
and F ].
In the same figure, consider the case for AS11 and the export routes toward AS13.
These routes were learned from its Peer AS10, and it attempts to propagate them toward
its Provider AS13. This goes against the “valley-free” guidelines, and most importantly,
it goes against its own interests. In the case this route is propagated, AS11 could become
a transit domain for traffic it is not getting any revenue. By the contrary, this traffic
impacts its costs, as it involves using the network resources from its provider AS13. The
figure also depicts other cases where the export of route policies is against the “valley-free”
guidelines.
The “valley-free” rules induce to some general restrictions to be considered regarding
the decision process applied over the exporting routes. These guidelines include:
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• Routes learned from a Peer should not be further advertised neither to other
Peers, nor Providers.
• Routes learned from a Provider should not be further advertised neither to
other Providers, nor Peers.
Our research over the BGP security focuses on the problem of “valley-free” export
rules violation, and their security implications over the BGP routing control. In section
3.1, we further elaborate the targeted security issues and proposed approach to address
them.
2.2.5 Locator-Identifier Addressing scheme and Routing
The Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP) [23] is a routing protocol initially
designed and devised to tackle routing scalability issues in the core Internet. However,
due to its intrinsic address semantic splitting and simple architecture, LISP was promptly
spotted as a technology with a remarkable potential in other areas in networking. As
a consequence, the focus of LISP has shifted over time and is now becoming a key
technology in areas related to network virtualization, mobility, and cloud applications.
The design principle around Internet Addressing considers a global addressing scheme
and namespace. This namespace was devised in a way that it allows both the identification
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Fig. 2.6 Locator-Identifier Addressing and Routing scheme.
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of end points, as well as the segmentation and aggregation of these addresses by groups.
Thus, this solution was engineered to form a hierarchy of addresses by aggregating more
specific addresses into more general networks. Therein, each end point address serves a
twofold purpose. On one hand, it unequivocally identifies an end point within the global
network, while in parallel it also signals the routing system the location of the end point
with respect to the addresses hierarchy. The aggregation feature enables to optimize the
routing tables, as less number of routes toward end points are required. In contrast, this
generates a rather static addressing hierarchy hindering new requirements in terms of
multi-homing and mobility.
Different factors which were not initially foreseen when the Internet addressing scheme
was designed have accelerated the growing of the core Internet routing table. These
factors include muti-homing, mobility, traffic engineering and others related with BGP
security. They require the creation and spread of more specific routes, which goes against
the address aggregation hierarchy by definition. For example, a mobile end user may
require to be able to use her address independently of the network service provider. This
implies that the user owns a part of the Internet addressing resources, and now the
routing control system should react to better steer the traffic toward her. Similar use
cases happen when we consider multi-homing or traffic engineering.
There is an inherent problem regarding the semantic meaning of an Internet IP
address. It represents not only the identification of an end-point within the network,
but also its location according to the network address hierarchy. In other words, an
IP address no only signify the “who” in an end-to-end communication (the end-point
identity) but also “where” the endpoint is located. This problem has motivated the
design of new addressing and routing solutions–one of them is the LISP protocol.
LISP tackles the semantic overload problem by decoupling the unique IP address
space into two different address spaces. One of them defines the address space of the
core network which interconnects different edge networks. This address spaces is referred
as Route LOCator (RLOC) namespace. The second namespace defines the addressing
scheme used by the edge networks and end points. This is referred as End point IDentifier
(EID) namespace.
The two address spaces enable a level of indirection where different edge addressing
schemes and routing systems can coexist over a common core addressing scheme. Encap-
sulation is a key concept that underpins this technology. On top of it, LISP defines a
Map-and-Encap routing mechanism, which supports the dynamic map resolution of end
point identifiers (EID addresses), prior the encapsulation and traffic forwarding.
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To illustrate, figure 2.6 depicts the concept separation of concerns in two independent
addressing namespaces. This splitting allows the definition of any addressing and routing
technique at each one (e.g., the core address space could be IPv4, while the edge
namespace IPv6). The RLOC namespace is defined as the core address space, which
might resemble the Internet core, as this address space could be the current IP network.
Meanwhile, the Edge address space represents the EID identifiers. A communication
from A to B requires the intervention of two Map-and-Encap elements, as they are
co-located at their corresponding edge networks. These elements are in the middle of
the communication, as they dynamically and transparently retrieve the EID-to-Locator
resolution, prior triggering the encapsulation. Once the packets are encapsulated, they
can traverse the core network until they reach the counterpart which is in charge of
decapsulate and steer them toward the final destination. Thus, LISP novelty stems
from its capacity to create and establish on the fly encapsulation tunnels between the
intermediate elements in order to handle the traffic generated between the edge networks
and their endpoints.
This dynamic map-and-encap implies that there is a control plane in charge of two
key tasks. On one hand, the process of edge-to-core address lookup, while on the other
hand a global mapping register in charge of keeping the up-to-date EID-to-Location
information. Next, we shall briefly elaborate them, and describe the issues we attempt
to address in this work.
Edge-to-Core lookup process
LISP defines the elements in charge of the encapsulation as Ingress and Egress Tunnel
Routers (ITR and ETR respectively). These elements are in charge of both handling the
end-points traffic by properly tunneling it between them, while simultaneously interacting
with the control plane for the edge-to-core translation.
The translation process involves three parties, the ITR, the Map Resolver along
with a Mapping System, and the ETR as depicted in figure 2.7. To illustrate therein,
consider the case of a communication between two endpoints at namespaces EIDA and
EIDB, respectively. The xTR at EIDA requires to learn the location of the destination
namespace EIDB, thus requests to an external element the resolution EID-to-RLOC,
i.e., the Map Resolver. This element interacts with the mapping system in an attempt to
find the current RLOC, and forwards the request to the proper Map Server. The latter is
in charge of maintaining an updated register of the current bindings between namespaces.
Finally, it forwards the request to the ETR. Once the ITR acquires this information, it
starts encapsulating the traffic and passing it toward the ETR. At the destination, the





































Fig. 2.7 LISP control and data plane split of concerns.
ETR on behalf of EIDB receives its traffic and removes the encapsulation, then forwards
it to the endpoint.
The protocol design has enabled a clear separation between data plane and control
plane, fostering their individual evolution. For example, there have been different
proposals for a global Mapping Systems. Initially, the protocol was devised with a BGP-
based mapping system called LISP+ALT [25], but it has been replaced by a DNS-like
indexing system called DDT [26].
The whole EID-to-RLOC lookup occurs when a local xTR lacks the information about
the RLOC destination of a given EID. The protocol has designed and defined this whole
procedure and its intrinsic security concerns. This is important as a rogue translation
reply may derive in the forwarding of encapsulated traffic toward an attacker. The IETF’s
working group on LISP has defined LISPSEC [55] in this regard. It provides a set of
security mechanisms that targets security concerns regarding the origin authentication,
integrity and replay protection to the control messages exchanged in the lookup process.
The messages involved in the lookup process include a Map Request and a Map
Replay messages. The former is originated to request the Map Resolver an EID-to-RLOC
lookup, while the latter contains the mapping data sent by the ETR (or the Map server
in the case of proxy mode). These security mechanism target a threat model excluding
the Mapping system, and they target to validate the lookup triggered process by means
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of a dynamic ephemeral one time key. This key enables all parties to accept only valid
lookup requests and replies.
EID Map registration
Any EID prefix (a whole network or an endpoint address) is required to register and
update its RLOC into the Mapping system. To this end, LISP defines the Map Server
as the entity in charge of handling the registration requests and location updates. It
interacts with both the ETR and ITR for the registration and lookup process. The latter
interaction only takes place when the registration includes the proxy mode, i.e. the ETR
requests the Map Server to answer the Map Requests messages on its behalf. Figure 2.7
illustrates this interaction, as the ETR at site EIDB registers this EID with its RLOC
y. The Map Server on handling EIDB is also in charge of forwarding the Map Requests
toward the specific ETR, or directly answering them in the case of proxy mode.
On one hand, the interaction between the Map Server and the ETR corresponds to the
exchange of credentials and the updated location. Thus, LISP defines the mechanisms to
authenticate and validate this registration process via a pair-wise shared key. Furthermore,
this map registration process is a static procedure based on manual configurations that
need to be set in advance. These configurations need to be done both on the border
routers in the LISP-Site, the ETR, and on the Map Server [24]. Once the manual
configurations are in place, each ETR will attempt to register its mappings with the
Map Server. The latter can verify the requests against the predefined configuration using
pre-shared keys. The pre-shared keys allow to assess the validity of the map registration,
since each ETR has its own key which is shared only with the Map Server.
Similarly, the interaction between the Map Server and the Map Resolver consists
in the exchange of location information as the result of a Map Request lookup. This
information signals to the ITR not only the availability of an EID but also the set of
RLOCs through which reach it, and their preferences. This exchange of information
is secured by a means of an ephemeral One Time Key. These keys are dynamically
generated when the lookup process is triggered by an ITR, and serves to the purpose of
validating the request [55].
These two elements abstract the Mapping system, and provides a front end interface
for both the Ingress and Egress Tunnel Routers. This removes any dependency between
them and the mapping system, fostering the proposal of new mapping systems.
It is important to notice that this existing pre-shared key security mechanism between
the ETR and the Map Server falls short of countering a number of relatively simple
attacks, such as RLOC address spoofing. Indeed, LISP lacks a procedure for ensuring
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whether a certain ETR is allowed to use a particular RLOC address for registering an
EID prefix. In addition, current LISP specifications exclude the EID prefix owner’s role
(i.e., the EID-Holder) in the map registration process, since the set of valid EID prefixes
are manually preconfigured within the ETR. With this approach, the registration process
undermines the provider independence and mobility features of the EID address space,
which are in fact main drivers for LISP. These manual and static practices are due to the
fact that LISP lacks mechanisms for global EID prefix authorization, which, as we shall
show later on, are essential for the practical feasibility of mobility and roaming scenarios
in LISP.
In a nutshell, global EID prefix authorization refers to the development of security
mechanisms through which a Map Server can determine whether a particular ETR
belonging to a particular LISP-Site is authorized to register an EID prefix on its behalf.
We shall focus our attention to these shortcomings and further elaborate them in Chapter
6.
2.3 End Users and End-points security protection
The security protection model over users and their devices follow a twofold approach. On
one hand, there is a device-centric protection paradigm which consists on the protection
of the device through the composed security from applications and the operating system
security. This approach consists on provisioning each endpoint with the application tools
and system updates to protect the end user from external threats. On the other hand,
there is a network-oriented security protection which focuses more on protecting the
user’s connections and shared information through the network interaction, i.e., a control
over the users connections and transferred data. This section describes an overview
regarding these approaches in the context of end user devices, and resource-constrained
devices.
Properly securing a user’s devices requires of many steps and efforts to accomplish.
A multi-layered computer security approach or defense in depth is recommended [16],
where additional layers of defense provide better protection in the event of a security
layer is breached. Defense in depth security is extremely important considering that the
end user is often the first line of defense, but also often referred to as the weakest link in
information security.
Table 2.1 presents a broad classification of different security protections from a layered
perspective. It considers the cases when the security is enforced either at the device or































above Firewall, IDS, IPS
IP layer VPN, Ipsec, tunnels
Access layer Wired security, Wireless Secrity (e.g., WPA),network segmentation (VLAN)
a IDS: Intrusion Detection System.
b IPS: Intrusion Protection System.
c HTTPS: HTTP Secure.
d TLS: Transport Layer Security.
e DTLS: Datagram TLS.
Table 2.1 End users and endpoints security protection from the twofold perspective: i)
end device protection, and ii) network protection.
in its network connection. Therein, we further classify between non-constrained devices
and resource constrained devices.
2.3.1 Device security protection
The security protection at the users’ devices and the things can be broadly classified in two
layers, i.e., security applications, and Operating System plus Network stack security. This
classification is shown in the top part of table 2.1. Giving the nature of the device, and its
available resources we further classify into two subgroups: a) non-constrained devices and
b) resource-constrained devices. Therein, end user devices with non-constrained resources
can select different security options from a broad catalog of security applications, ranging
from anti-virus, anti-phishing, parental control, end-to-end encryption like PGP, and
more. Furthermore, these devices support standard libraries and implementations to
foster the use of secure Layer 4 transport protocols such as HTTPS and TLS. Similarly,
each device Operating System (OS) in conjunction with its network stack support security
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protections such as Layer 3 Firewall, Virtual Private Networks (VPN) like IPSec, and
access link security such as WiFi WPA.
On the other hand, resource-constrained devices usually come enabled with optimized
versions of the security options as compared with the non-constrained devices. At the
application layer, these devices in general support HTTPS, TLS and DTLS. Lower in
the stack, the security at the OS and network access link is dependent with the security
implemented by the access technology (e.g., WPA in the case of WiFi).
2.3.2 Network security protection
The second component to enforce security to end users and devices is derived from the
protection provided by the network connection. This network-centric protection generally
focuses on the aggregated protection provided to each connected user (as shown in the
bottom part of table 2.1). In this case, the norm is to enforce security policies based
on coarse, generic user-profiles. Therein, the network can enforce security at different
layers. For example, a Layer 3 to 7 Firewall, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), or an
Intrusion Protection System (IPS). Similarly, VPN and IPSec tunnels at layer 3, while
MAC filtering, WiFi WPA and VLAN at the lower layers.
The network-centric security is decoupled from the end device, thus it can be applied
to all the devices that are connected and communicating through the network box in
charge. For example, in the case of IoT, a gateway is an external element that provides
certain services to the devices, as well as enforce the required security protection to
access and share the information gathered. This kind of security follows the offloading
paradigm. However, legacy and cumbersome equipment with support of specific network
and access technologies were required.
2.4 Summary
This chapter has reviewed the key concepts and ideas that support this thesis. First, we
introduce the problem of the Internet and the security continuum. It is key to understand
the differences between threats, vulnerabilities and attacks. These concepts shall be used
throughout the rest of this thesis.
Similarly, we describe the current state of Internet routing and address the topics
around the inter-domain routing, the different business relationships among domains,
and other relevant routing protocols such as LISP. This section provides an idea about
these key Internet components, their design principles and basic functionality.
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The final part of the chapter describes the end users and End-points security protection.
Therein, we describe the compounded protection over endpoints, which results of the
aggregated security applications provisioned at the devices, their operating system
security, and the protection at the network connection. At the end devices, we further
split and describe the distinction between non-constrained and constrained devices, each
group with their own protection applications adapted accordingly to their settings.
Part II: Internet routing
vulnerabilities
Chapter 3
Why is the Inter-domain routing
system insecure?
The Inter-domain routing system was originally designed under certain principles and
considerations which contemplated a fair-play environment among its participants. How-
ever, the widespread adoption of Internet has influenced major changes over its players’
behavior, which exposed the vulnerabilities derived from these assumptions. This has
happened mainly due to the changes in the interaction dynamics between domains and
their priorities driven by, for example, their business models. These vulnerabilities have
proven to be effective, as discussed in the introduction with the examples of Pakistan
and China incidents, and can cause serious Internet outages.
BGP “insecurity” mainly stems from the design principle of mutual trusted parties.
This implies that each party trusts its counterparts and accepts as valid all the routing
information advertised to them. Although this model proved sufficient in the early
Internet stages, it has become highly vulnerable to abuses and attacks. For example,
any AS can announce any route path containing any IP-network to any subset of its
neighbors. This vulnerability has enabled a wide range of threats, which a misbehaving
domain can exploit to affect the routing control system with or without a specific purpose.
For example, these vulnerabilities can result in an Internet outage, service disruption,
traffic hijacking or eavesdropping.
This section describes some BGP vulnerabilities within the context of a threat model.
Therein, we shall highlight the current work that address some of them while remarking
the ones that we target in this work.















Fig. 3.1 AS sub-graph example. The attacker AS is represented by “L”.
3.1 BGP threat model
Our threat model considers a single AS attacker (depicted as L in figure 3.1) seeking to
exploit BGP vulnerabilities with the objective of influencing over the routing decision
process of its direct neighbors. The considered vulnerabilities allow the spread of rogue
routes containing invalid AS-paths, non-authorized IP-networks ownership or in violation
of the valley-free export policies. These vulnerabilities affect not only to the attacker’s
neighbors, as they may change their preference routes in favor of the attacker, but also
may impact the owner of the IP-network. The implications regarding the spread of this
information beyond the attacker’s neighbors is not considered in this work.
From the attacker’s neighbor perspective (the victim AS), these vulnerabilities realize
only when the rogue route advertisements are accepted as valid and influence the domain
routing preferences, i.e. the victim selects the new route as the preferred. This selection
is crucial in the inter-domain routing system, as it determines how the traffic is steered
as well as how the routing knowledge is further advertised by a domain.
The selection of the set of best routes is subjected to private, per-domain policies.
These policies encompass the AS preferences over learned routes, as well as policies for
exporting routes. They delineate the criteria that rules the complex process of validating,
and accepting new routes into the domain routing knowledge. Based on the set of
learned routes per neighbor, each domain computes the set of best routes, one route per
IP-network. Finally, the domain has to decide on a per-neighbor basis which routes can
be advertised to each of its neighbors without violating any export policy. The whole
process takes into consideration the type of relationship with the neighbor, and should
follow the “valley free” rules. The following section describes the model for routing
policies and export policies considered.
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On the other hand, the spread of rogue routes claiming unauthorized IP-network
ownership affect also to the legitimate owners. In this case, the attacker attempts to
deceive its neighbor by announcing himself as the owner of the targeted IP-network (e.g.
the AS-path contains a set only with his ASN). If successful (quite likely as the AS-path
may be shorter than the valid route), the victims traffic transiting through the tainted
attacker’s neighbor is diverted to him. The final objective of the attacker might be to
disrupt the victim’s service by dropping its traffic, or eavesdrop it and then properly
forward it (if possible) without being noticed. This vulnerability is also subjected to
acceptance of the rogue route. Next, we describe the model for routing policies and
export policies followed in this work.
3.1.1 Routing and Export policies model
Overall, there are public guidelines that defines this BGP decision process. However, these
guidelines are overridden by the local, private policies. This fact makes it very difficult to
predict the possible outcome of a rogue advertisement. Thus, we use the routing model
described by Gao and Rexford [30] which captures the policies of a considerable number
of ASes [33]. The model defines the general set of rules and their priorities when selecting
a single route from the set of routes to a given IP-Network (this set of routes include all
the routes learned from all the neighbors):
• Local Preference: Aligned with the type of AS relationship, prefer routes from
customers over peers, and over providers (in that strict order). This policy follows
the valley-free rationale and is aligned with the business incentives, as described in
section 2.2.4.
• AS Paths: Prefer routes with shorter AS-paths over longer routes.
• Tie-Break Rule: use other criteria, such as the next-hop router-id or its geo-
graphic location to break ties among routes.
The result of this policy-based routing decision process is a list of the selected routes
(one per IP-network) preferred by the domain. Each one of them are then available to be
announced to a subset of its neighbors according to the following rule:
• Export Policy: A customer route (i.e. a route learned from a customer) can
be exported to all neighbors. Peer and Providers routes can be exported only to
customers. Similarly, as with the Local Preference directive, this rule is aligned
with the domain business incentives in terms of attracting and transiting the traffic
between two of its neighbors when at least one of them is a paying customer.
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3.2 BGP routing threats
The considered subset of threats around BGP have been classified into three subgroups.
The first one addresses the vulnerabilities regarding IP-prefixes ownership, while the
second targets the threats over AS-paths. Finally, the third group focuses on the threat
posed by the violation of “valley-free” export policies.
3.2.1 Prefix and sub-prefix ownership
Any AS in its attempt to attract traffic destined to a victim’s IP-network can originate a
route declaring itself as the owner of the prefix (or sub-prefix). For example, the attacker
AS L in figure 3.1 can advertise to its providers and peers the rogue route:
147.83.128.0/20: [L]
This vulnerability will affect not only to the victim AS 31, but also to the attacker’s
neighbors, as their routing state will be deceived. To elaborate, let us assume that the
IP-network prefix 147.73.128.0/17 has been legitimately allocated to the AS 31. In a
normal and fair BGP behavior (following the routing policies and export policies rules
described in the previous section), AS 11 shall receive the AS-path route [12,20,21,31] to
reach this network. The attacker L arbitrarily can declare as the owner of the network
and announce it to his neighbors. They quite likely shall accept this new route based on
the shortest path rule. Similarly, a more specific and effective hijack attack can consist
on the announcement of a sub-prefix such as 147.83.128.0/20 with any AS-path. The
reach of these kinds of attacks depends on how further the rogue advertisement is spread
over ASes.
The difference between prefix and sub-prefix hijacking derive from the longest-prefix
match routing preference in BGP. This rule indicates that every router identifies the
longest IP prefix that covers the destination IP address of a packet, and steers it along
the route to that IP prefix. This preference for the longest-prefix match may influence a
broader impact of the attack, regardless of the announced AS-path. For example, when
the attacker announces the sub-prefix 147.83.128.0/20 with AS-path [L,21,31], its peers
and providers shall prefer this route over the route 147.83.128.0/17: [L] even though it
has a shorter path.
3.2.2 False AS-paths
The attacker L in figure 3.1 can attempt to deceive its neighbors not by overtaking the
IP-prefix of a victim AS, but by modifying the AS-path with rogue or inexistent inter-
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domain links. To illustrate, L can announce the bogus AS-path [L,31] to its neighbors.
There is no direct link between ASes L and 31, but BGP lacks a mechanism to validate
neither the AS topology nor the agreement of each domain for this route. This threat
allows the attacker to play with the “AS-path” length advertised seeking to influence the
route preference over its neighbors routing state.
3.2.3 Export policy violation
This vulnerability appears when any AS violates the export policy over the set of learned
routes. More specifically, this threat raises when an AS does not follow the “valley-
free” guidelines regarding the selection and further advertisement of routes, which is
characterized by the type of neighbor agreements and business incentives.
For example, in figure 3.1 the attacker L can deceive the AS 11 to prefer the AS-
path [31,21,20,L] over the valid learned path [31,21,20,13] toward the IP-network
147.83.128.0/17. The former path violates the export policy guideline regarding learned
routes from a peer. From the perspective of AS 11, this new route is preferable as it
comes from a customer.
Similarly, AS 22 may be the victim of an attack if it receives the route [31,21,20,L]
from L. In this case, L is further advertising a route to a peer learned from another peer,
which violates the “valley-free” export policies. From the perspective of the victim AS
22, this new route is more attractive as it comes from its peer, as compared with the
legitimate one coming from its provider.
This particular threat has attracted our attention as it is partially addressed by the
solutions proposed in the Internet community. We shall further investigate this threat in
Chapter 4.
3.3 Defense efforts for securing BGP vulnerabilities
This section briefly describes some of the current efforts for improving the BGP security.
These efforts focus primarily on providing mechanisms to address the vulnerabilities and
threats described in the previous section.
3.3.1 Route origin authorization and validation
The prefix and sub-prefix hijack threats arise in BGP due to its lack of proper mechanisms
to validate both the allocation of Internet addressing resources—AS numbers and IP-
prefixes—as well as route origin authorization. The former consists on providing each
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domain with the capabilities to verify a resource allocation claim made by any other
domain. Meanwhile, the latter focuses on the capability to authoritatively prove what
AS(es) may announce and represent an IP-prefix. The origin validation defense provides
a trusted distributed database binding ASes to the IP-prefixes allocated to them. Any
route advertisement which violates this binding may be discarded according to the local
policy.
Notable contributions proposed to secure BGP in more than a decade of study include
Secure-BGP (S-BGP) [44], Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) [90], Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP)
[65], and IRV [34]. These proposals outline extensive support architectures for enhancing
BGP security in an effort to strengthen both the operation of the protocol, and the
validation of exchanged BGP messages. Whilst the study of each of these proposals is
out of the scope of this work, it is important to highlight their common factor: all of
them required a capability to sustain basic assertions relating to both the validation of
resources ownership and the origination of a route into the inter-domain routing system.
The current proposal by SIDR WG understood this required capability and approached
it through the use of “Resource Certificates”. These certificates contain an extension
field that lists a collection of resources, and their purpose is to attest that the certificate
issuer has granted to the certificate subject a unique “right-of-use” for the associated set
of resources.
This proposal is referred as Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)[49], and
consists of three main parts: i) a resource allocation hierarchy, ii) a set of cryptographically
protected objects, and iii) a distributed repository framework to publish these objects.
By using cryptographically verifiable statements, RPKI helps to ensure that Internet
address resource holders are certifiably linked to those resources. Also, this capability
enhances BGP entities to gather reliable route origin information and further decide to
discard advertisements which violate both the resource ownership and the proper route
origination authorizations.
Overall, RPKI mirrors the currently practiced administrative allocation hierarchy of
Internet Number Resources (INRs) for both IP addresses and AS numbers. The RPKI
hierarchy is based on the administrative resource allocation hierarchy as depicted in
figure 3.2, where resources are distributed starting from the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA), Regional Internet Registry (RIR), National Internet Registry, Internet
Service Provider and End Users. At each level in the hierarchy, the resources allocated
are matched with their respective certificates.
In the presence of X.509 certificates, each resource allocation action becomes crypto-
graphically verifiable, as the certificate attests to the allocation of a particular resource,
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either an IP-prefix or AS number. A Certification Authority (CA) corresponds to an
entity that can further sub-allocate resources and delegate authorities using resource
certificates. Figure 3.2 depicts an overview of the RPKI hierarchy, e.g., the chain of trust
starts from the IANA root, further sub-delegating the resources to RIRs. These CA
certificates enable to form a chain of cryptographically verifiable trust from IANA to a
particular AS or ISP. End Entity (EE) certificates are another type of resource certificates
which are used for delegating authorities, e.g., every Route Origin Authorization (ROA)
includes an EE certificate which enables its cryptographic verification, as shown in
figure 3.2. These certificates and authorization objects are published in the respective
RPKI repository publication point of each CA. Every CA in the RPKI regularly issues
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to revoke invalid certificates. The collection of all
such distributed repositories from all the CAs constitute the global RPKI, which is
available to Relying Parties (RP) that would want to validate an attestation or authority.
Given such security skeleton, ASes can obtain certificates for the resources they own
from the concerned resource allocation authorities. The second and third SIDR proposals,
i.e., ROA and BGPSEC, utilize these certificates to offer security to the exchanged
information, such that the receiving party could cryptographically verify the presented
credentials. Thus, both ROA and the BGPSEC extensively rely on RPKI to achieve their
goals, i.e., verifying route origin advertisements, and securing route propagation updates,
respectively. Each AS can have its own RPKI cache synchronized and regularly updated
against the global RPKI. Observe that the RPKI is a new addition in the inter-domain
routing infrastructure, and therefore, it requires extra investment for new hardware and
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Fig. 3.2 Internet Administrative resource allocation hierarchy.
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as well as best practices RFCs related to RPKI. The RFC 6480 [49] provides detailed
description of an infrastructure to support secure Internet routing, while RFC 6481 [39]
describes a standard profile for a resource certificate repository structure. A complete
list of RFCs can be found in [41].
Resource Origin Authorization (ROA)
The Route Origin Authorization (ROA) proposal of the SIDR WG targets the traffic
hijacking problem due to false route origin advertisements. The ROA proposal makes
use of RPKI to assure integrity in the route origin announcements. This is achieved by
the use of a particular signed authority, called Route Origination Authorization. The
RPKI enables the legitimate owner of an IP-prefix to produce a ROA and publish it in
the RPKI repository. This signed authority is formatted according to the Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) [37], and it binds the IP-prefix resource with its owner’s AS
number by including the corresponding EE certificate inside it (see the bottom right of
figure 3.2).
Now, when an AS announces a particular IP prefix as its owner, the Relying Party
(RP) can verify if this route origination announcement is legitimate or not with the help
of RPKI. The RP queries the RPKI to confirm whether there exists an ROA for the
announced IP resource with the advertising AS as its legitimate owner. The response of
the query from the RPKI can be used to influence the BGP decision process according to
the internal policy of the AS. In practice, instead of querying the global RPKI repository
for every route origin announcement, RPs create validation filters. The validation filters
are created using the IP prefix (including its length), and the originating AS contained in
the published ROAs, which are all available through a locally cached collection of valid
ROAs.
For example, consider the case of figure 3.3, where an attacker “L” attempts to hijack
the IP-prefix 147.83.128.0/17. To this end, “L” announces to its neighbors ASes 20 and
13 the IP-prefix reclaiming its ownership. However, as the ROA object has been properly
published, the AS victims can verify the route announcement sent by the attacker and
detect its non validity—there is no ROA stating that the IP-prefix can be announced by
AS “L”. A new protocol called Router-RPKI (Rtr-RPKI) [12], allows routers to reliably
interact with RPKI to retrieve IP prefix origin data from a trusted RPKI cache. Clearly,
the RPKI caches need to be synchronized with the global RPKI repository, and for the
moment, this is done through rsync [53]. Finally, it is important to mention that without
additional means, ROA requires minor changes to the BGP protocol itself for performing
IP-prefix origin validation. More specifically, as we shall discuss later in Chapter 4, the
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advent of Software Defined Networking (SDN) [45] could avoid the introduction of such
changes in BGP, since the origin validation can be outsourced and run as a separate
process not embedded in BGP. For further details on the procedure for validating an
ROA using RPKI, the reader is referred to [40].
3.3.2 Internet AS topology validation
The route origin authorization and validation falls short for the case when an AS modifies
the AS-path without changing the end AS. This path might be inexistent or rogue,
however is valid as long as the originating AS is not changed. To illustrate, ROA does
not stop AS L in figure 3.1 from announcing either the route 147.83.128.0/17 : [L,21,31],
or the shorter [L,31] to its neighbors. This originator of the route is the legitimately
owner of the IP-network, and every neighbor of L will be in a position to deem as valid
the route.
ROA along with RPKI fall short on validating the AS-path announced in a route
advertisement. This verification consists on checking the existence of the path within



















Fig. 3.3 Mitigation example of false IP-prefix origin advertisement using ROA.
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validation of the AS-topology. This validation ensures the existence of a path starting at
the advertising AS toward the originating AS.
Nevertheless, the verification of path existence in the AS topology does not preclude
the advertisements of existent paths by an AS, even when some of the intermediate
domains have not agreed to export the route. For example, consider the case when the
AS L announce to its neighbors the route 147.83.128.0/17 : [L,23,31] in figure 3.1. This
route exists but AS 23 may have not agreed to propagate it toward L, as it may go
against to its export route policy.
3.3.3 Path verification
The false AS-path vulnerability stems from the lack of not only the verification of the
path existence in the AS-graph, but also that each of the ASes in the path actually
participated in the route announcement (i.e. how to verify the correct route propagation).
In effect, the AS-Path contains a sequential list of all the ASes that a specific route passed
through. Thus, securing route propagation refers to securing the AS-Path attribute of a
particular route. The BGPSEC proposal provides such mechanism based on public key
cryptography and forward signing to secure.
BGPSEC allows a domain to verify the authenticity of a route announcement all
the way back to the originator domain. This implies that each domain must include
the information for the route validation received from the announcer along with its
announcement. This feature allows both the path verification plus the proper route
propagation. However, the introduction of changes in the structural and operational
aspects of BGP have made the BGPSEC proposal prone to rejection. The structural
changes are due to the need of new optional attributes, while the operational ones take
into consideration ROA validations and the signatures verification.
3.3.4 Prefix filters
All the solutions reviewed so far provide mechanism for validating the correctness of
BGP announcements. However, neither restricts the export policies an AS can use. All
the defenses described above remain vulnerable to the issue of validating routes that goes
against to the “valley free” exporting routes guidelines described in section 2.2.4.
A common practice to control the allowed IP-prefixes announced by a domain is
to enforce prefix filters. This first line of protection enables the definition of BGP
announcements whitelists. Goldberg et al. [32] have showed the effectiveness of this
technique to counter this problem. However, it falls short in the case the attacker is
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not a Stub AS. Furthermore, other main problems with filters in large domains are the
administrative overhead and the cost of maintaining them updated. The timely and
accurate maintenance of route filters becomes challenging as the number of allowed
prefixes increase up to thousands, due to the administrative burden. As a result, the
ASes prefer to rely on trust and do not maintain up- to-date prefix filters—hence saving
their high maintenance cost.
3.4 Summary and Contributions
This chapter has focused on describing the main issues and vulnerabilities around the
current inter-domain routing system. Therein, we have described different threats faced
by the BGP routing system, which affect both the protocol and the routing decision
processes at the nodes. Specifically, we have highlighted the current vulnerabilities that
are being partially solved by the Internet community. Conversely, the adoption of these
solutions have faced some resistance due to the changes involved, and the consequent
trade-off between security and its costs. While some solutions require the deployment of
new, parallel infrastructures to support and improve the security in BGP (e.g. RPKI),
others require changes to the BGP protocol itself (e.g., BGPSEC) with impact on the
routers’ hardware as it requires in-line cryptographic capabilities.
Our approach to describe the BGP vulnerabilities includes the definition of a BGP
threat model. This model considers one bad player, i.e., the attacker, who seeks to
exploit BGP in order to disrupt or disguise other players. The vulnerabilities addressed
include Prefix and sub-prefix ownership, False AS-paths and Export policy violation.
Subsequently, we describe the different efforts proposed by the community to counter
these vulnerabilities. As a result of this research, the following paper has been published:
• M.S. Siddiqui, D. Montero, R. Serral-Gracià, X. Masip-Bruin, M. Yannuzzi, “A
survey on the recent efforts of the Internet Standardization Body for securing
inter-domain routing,” Computer Networks, Volume 80, 7 April 2015, Pages 1-26,
ISSN 1389-1286. DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2015.01.017.
Contribution: I focused my efforts into researching the current BGP vulnera-
bilities and open issues. We surveyed the vulnerabilities that remain unsolved
even with the SIDR solutions in place. Furthermore, we focused our efforts into
understanding the reasons behind the slow adoption of RPKI and ROA. To this
end, we studied the impacts and obstacles faced by these proposals along with their
scalability issues and required changes over the protocol. We approached these
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problems by studying 1) the overhead incurred by the large RPKI repository in
terms of both number of objects, and synchronization time; and 2) the BGPSEC
overhead impact derived from the on-line forward signature of BGP messages and
their backward signature verification.
Chapter 4
BGP security offloading: the “Route
Leak” threat
The Inter-domain BGP protocol vulnerabilities persists, as described in Chapter 3, due
to the non-effective or unadopted solutions already proposed by the community. The
reasons behind might be influenced by how disruptive these solutions are, or the lack
of incentives to adopt them. Thus, we believe a different approach for securing the
BGP protocol with low impact over the adopting AS domains is feasible. Our proposed
approach focuses on minimal changes to the BGP control plane protocol, seeking to
decouple the security protection from the protocol. To better elaborate our idea, we shall
study a specific BGP security threat, defined as “Route Leaks”, and how we attempt to
address it in a non-invasive integration with BGP.
The offloading paradigm within BGP can be designed and devised under two different
conditions, based on the location where the BGP decision process is being executed.
Legacy BGP-enabled networking devices execute a distributed BGP control plane, where
each element takes local decisions. On the other hand, the new SDN paradigm proposes
the decoupling of the control plane from the data plane networking devices, which results
in the offloading of the whole BGP routing and decision process to a controller element.
Our security proposal seamlessly intercept the BGP control information received
by a domain and process it prior it reaches the BGP decision process. The collected
information is used for executing real-time analytics verifying possible route leaks. This
offloaded process can result in accepting the control information or denying it. Meanwhile,
the BGP routing process remains unaware of this security process. The decoupling of
the security to tackle route leaks is aligned with the new IETF SIDR proposals for BGP
security, including RPKI and ROA.
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4.1 Outline
Section 4.2 describes the “Route Leak” BGP vulnerability and our proposed technique
to detect it. This technique has been designed and devised to be self-contained, which
relies only on real-time analytics gathered by the border routers of an AS (e.g., the
Routing Information Base RIB). Next, we present the offloading architecture design for
decoupling the route leak detection from the protocol. Finally, we validate our proposal
through first exhaustive simulations and a proof-of-concept implementations.
4.2 Inter-domain “Route Leak” vulnerability
A “Route Leak” is a threat within the inter-domain routing system where an attacker
domain violates its “normal” export policy by announcing a legitimate route to too many
of its neighbors. These violations by default should not occur as they hinder the domain
business interests and the agreements with its neighbors. The guidelines recommended
for route export follow these rules (the valley-free rules [69]):
Rule 4.1. Routes learned from Customers can be further advertised to other
Customers, Peers and Providers.
Rule 4.2. Routes learned from Peers can be further advertised to Customers
only.
Rule 4.3. Routes learned from Providers can be further advertised to Customers
only.
Any exported route that violates any of these rules represent an anomaly for the
routing system, which impact could reach its directs neighbors and further propagate.
4.2.1 “Route Leaks” definition
Definition 4.1. An AS’s route announcement which is in violation of either
valley-free rules R.4.2 or R.4.3 constitutes a Route Leak.
In other words, any route advertisement by an AS which infringes the valley-free
rules R.4.2 and R.4.3 is a Route Leak. Note that rule R.4.1 cannot be infringed, since an
AS can always export customer routes independently of the business relationship with
the addressee neighbor. The above definition reveals two possible types of route leaks,
viewed from the perspective of the addressee neighbor (i.e., the victim domain receiving
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announcements). It is in its interest to be able to detect whether a specific learned route
is in concordance with the valley-free rules as well as their business relationships.
• Customer route leak: this group encompasses the case when the attacker (leaker)
is the victim’s customer.
• Peer route leak: conversely, in this group the attacker is a peer of the victim.
In both cases, the attacker attempts to deceive its neighbor by announcing non-
compliant routes learned from other providers or peers.
4.2.2 Route Leak identification
The identification of route leaks is the first step toward tackling this vulnerability. We
shall systematically analyze the different environments vulnerable to the attack and
propose a mechanism for their identification using the definition of valley free rules stated
in the previous section.
Our proposal for the identification considers the following:
• The route leak identification analysis only uses readily available data, e.g., informa-
tion obtained directly from the BGP routing system.
• A domain AS knows with complete certainty the business relationship hold with
its direct neighbors. This has direct implications when trying to infer a route leak.
• This analysis is decoupled from the BGP protocol.
• The detection of a leak implies the proper reaction over the domain’s BGP routing
system.
We particularly exclude from our study data obtained from external sources, such as
route information imported from vantage points. In this sense, our identification analysis
focuses on what can actually be inferred in a domain under realistic routing conditions
by solely examining the learned routes from its neighbors.
We start our study by defining two facts that we shall use later on while formalizing
the identification of route leaks.
Fact 4.1. An attacker can produce a route leak targeting to either its providers
or peers.












Fig. 4.1 Possible cases for an Attacker “L” to leak routes; the leaks can happen in both
directions which implies “a” and “b” can be the victims.
According to the business nature of a Provider AS, it cannot leak a route toward
its customers since it inherently has the role of providing transit to them. Thus, it can
advertise “all” its own and learned routes to them. Directly derived from fact F.4.1 and
definition D.4.1, we obtain the cases where a route leak is possible.
Fact 4.2. A route leak is considered a leak only when a legitimate route learned
by the attacker from its peers or providers is announced to its victim (i.e., the
attacker announces legit routes to too many neighbors).
Fact F.4.2 indicates that a route leak consists of an actual, valid route with respect
the prefix ownership as well as the AS-path advertised. This excludes other types of
vulnerabilities with respect of false prefix ownership and false AS-paths announcements,
as discussed in section 3.2.
To illustrate, let us assume a reference AS L as the leaker, as shown inf figure 4.1.
The attacker can leak legit routes among its neighbors, depicted as a and b, as long as
they are either providers or peers. Thus, figure 4.1(a) presents the case of route leak
between two providers of L. Likewise, the figures 4.1(b) and 4.1(c) represent the cases of
leaks between a Provider and a Peer, or between Peer neighbors, respectively.
It is worth mentioning that an AS domain victim of a route leak is only aware of the
AS relationships with its direct neighbors, and has no information about the relationships
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that its neighbors have with their respective neighbors. A BGP route contain the identity
of all the domains required to traverse in order to reach a network, however, remains
unaware of their type of relation. This is because an AS domain has limited knowledge
of the network, since the relationships and policies among ASes are kept confidential.
The challenge for a victim AS is thus to independently detect route leaks despite the
lack of information.
Let us consider a network topology scenario for generalizing the local identification
of a route leak. Figure 4.3 depicts the case where our reference AS a is the victim AS
receiving new route advertisements from its neighbors. The goal is to examine under
which conditions AS a can locally validate these advertisements prior to accept them into
its BGP routing tables RIB and FIB. Domain b represents a neighbor that is directly
connected to AS a under a customer-provider or peer-peer relationship, and it is the
suspect of leaking routes (the attacker). Furthermore, AS c is a direct neighbor of b,
which advertises valid routes to AS b of the form [c, ...] (the . . . refers to zero or mores
ASes in the AS-path route). These routes can be potentially announced by b to a , e.g.,
routeds of the form [b,c, ...]. These announcements can be identified as leaks by the
victim whether they are against the valley-free rules. However, from AS a’s perspective,
the announcements cannot be validated due to the lack of information about the type of
relationship between the suspect b and its direct neighbor c.
The leak scenarios considered so far state that a route leak occurrence contemplate
three actors: the victim, the leaker and the leaker’s neighbor (either a provider or a peer
domain) who owns the route. However, for the sake of generality, we consider the case
when the suspect b also leaks the routes learned from its neighbor’s neighbor, i.e., routes
learned by AS c of the form [c, ...,d]. Considering that the Internet is a connected graph,
it is sound to assume that before the leak occurrence, the victim has a valid route to
d, of the form [...,d]. When the suspect AS b leaks the route to reach AS d through
itself (i.e., AS b announces to a a route of the form [b,c, ...,d]), the victim will be in a
position to observe a new route advertisement for the same destination network. This
reference topology and the general assumptions that we will make next shall be used
in the remainder of this section, while formalizing the identification of route leaks in
Theorems 1 and 2.
Hypothesis 4.1. The state of the routing database of the victim AS is valley-free
valid before the route leak occurs.
Remark. The purpose of our theoretical study is to capture what the victim AS can infer
upon a route leak. Therefore, our analysis is focused on the transition from a valley-free
valid routing state to the routing state right after the leak. In summary, H.4.1 indicates











Fig. 4.2 Unlikely AS relationships: (a) hypothesis H.4.2, and (b) hypothesis H.4.3
.
that any route contained in the initial state of the RIBs at AS a is compliant with R.4.1,
R.4.2 and R.4.3.
Hypothesis 4.2. A cyclic chain of provider relationships among ASes is non-
existent.
Remark. This hypothesis means that we assume an Internet that is loop-free in terms of
provider-customer relationships. Figure 4.2(a) illustrates this case, where it is implausible
that AS x is the provider of the provider of its providers. It is a common assumption
in the literature that Internet topologies can be modeled as Directed Acyclic Graphs
(DAGs) [38].
Hypothesis 4.3. An AS does not have a peer relationship with the providers
of its provider.
Remark. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that a provider AS is much larger
than the customer AS in terms of infrastructure. As shown in figure 4.2(b), it is very
unlikely that AS x has a peer relationship with a provider of its providers, since a very
large provider z will have no economical incentives for peering with a domain x at lower
tiers of the AS hierarchy. On the contrary, the incentive will be to charge AS x for the
transit traffic.
Now, given the valley-free rules, and the hypotheses defined above, we proceed to
formalize the conditions for detecting leaks from a customer (refer to figure 4.3(a)).
Theorem 4.1. Customer Route Leak (CRL). Let the initial state of the routing
databases of an AS a contain the following:
• A direct route to a customer AS b, i.e., [b].
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• An alternative route to the customer AS b via AS b’s direct neighbor AS c,
i.e., a route of the form [. . . , c, b].
Under the hypotheses H.4.1, H.4.2, and H.4.3, if AS a receives a route from its
customer AS b with AS-path [b,c, . . . ], then AS a can identify it is a route leak.
Proof. According to rules R.4.1–R4.3, AS b could only advertise a route with AS-path
[b,c, . . . ] to a, iff, c is a customer of b. This is because if c is a peer or provider of b, then
b is not allowed to advertise routes learned from c to its provider AS a. Let us suppose
then that c is a customer of b. We know that the initial state of the routing databases at
AS a contain a route to b with AS-path [. . . , c, b]. Now, a could only receive the route to b
with AS-path [. . . , c, b], iff, a belongs to the customer cone of c. This is because according
to R.4.3, c would advertise its provider routes only to its customers. But if a belongs
to the customer cone of c, then this contradicts H.4.2, since there is a cyclic chain of
provider relationships among a, b, and c, that is, a is a provider of b, which is a provider
of c, which in turn is provider of a. We conclude that AS c cannot be a customer of AS
b. This implies that c is either a peer or a provider of b. Hence, the route announced by
AS b toward AS a with AS-path [b,c, . . . ] is a route leak.
Theorem 4.2. Peer Route Leak (PRL). Let the initial state of the routing

















Fig. 4.3 Generalized topologies for route leak detection: (a) Customer Route Leak (CRL),
(b) Peer Route Leak (PRL).
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• A direct route to a peer AS b, i.e., [b].
• An alternative route to the peer AS b via AS b’s direct neighbor AS c, i.e.,
a route of the form [. . . , c, b].
Under the hypotheses H.4.1, H.4.2, and H.4.3, if AS a receives a route from its
peer AS b with AS-path [b,c, . . . ], then AS a can identify it is a route leak.
Proof. Similarly as in Theorem 1, AS b could only advertise a route with AS-path [b,c, . . . ]
to AS a, iff, AS c is a customer of AS b. This is because if AS c is a peer or provider
of AS b, then AS b is not allowed to advertise routes learned from AS c to its peer AS
a. Let us suppose then that AS c is a customer of AS b. We know that the initial state
of the routing databases at AS a contain a route to b with AS-path [. . . , c, b]. Now, a
could only receive the route to b with AS-path [. . . , c, b], iff, AS a belongs to the customer
cone of AS c. This is because according to R.4.3, c would advertise its provider routes
through b only to its customers. But if a belongs to the customer cone of c, then this
contradicts the hypothesis H.4.3, that is, a has a peer relation with the provider of its
provider. Therefore, we conclude that AS c cannot be a customer of AS b. This implies
that c is either a peer or a provider of b, and therefore, the route advertised by AS b
toward AS a with AS-path [b,c, . . . ] is a route leak.
4.2.3 Cross-Path (CP) route lead identification technique
The Cross-Path (CP) technique is based on the theoretical route leak countering
framework described in the previous section. Algorithm 1 summarizes the Cross-Path
logic for identifying route leaks. The CP utilizes information available in the router RIBs
as well as the information about the business relationships with neighbor ASes. Observe
that, at the beginning of the detection process, the assumption is that the RIB tables
are initially correct (i.e., they are free from entries derived by neighbor route leaks).
A common solution to ensure the valley-free property of the routes is to momentarily
set up route filters for all incoming BGP updates. This is only required for an initial
bootstrapping period to ensure that the BGP routers only hold valley-free routes. Once
the CP route leak detection technique has started, the route filters can be removed—or
they can be kept though with the advantage that they neither need to be maintained
nor updated.
For every incoming route advertisement from a neighbor customer or peer AS, the
algorithm looks for an existing cross-path in the router RIBs considering the hypothesis
and conditions outlined in the previous section. In order to make the cross-path checking
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more rigorous, we can generalize the cross-path check in the form [. . . ,o, . . . , l, . . . ] in the
valley-free valid RIBs. In this case, a received route from a customer or a peer AS l of
the form [l,o, . . . ] can be declared as a route leak if the route [. . . ,o, . . . , l, . . . ] exists in
the valley-free valid RIBs. If a cross-path is found, then the received route advertisement
is considered a route leak and discarded, otherwise, it is included in the valley-free RIB.
Another particularity of our algorithm is that it uses the set of public Tier-1 ASes as
input for detecting route leaks. Specifically, we consider the route advertisement received
from a peer or customer AS a route leak if it contains a Tier-1 AS in the AS-Path. This
logic is different from [61], where the author considers a route advertisement as a route
leak only if it contains more Tier-1 ASes than a predefined threshold. Based on our route
leak identification framework, we contend that it is highly unlikely that an AS learns a
route to a Tier-1 AS or a route to any destination via Tier-1 through a neighbor customer
Algorithm 1 CP identifies whether a new route advertisement R received by AS v is a
leak.
Input: Valley-free RIBs - Routing Information Bases at AS v
Nc: Set of customer neighbors of v
Npe: Set of peer neighbors of v
Npr: Set of provider neighbors of v
T : List of Tier-1 ASes
A new route advertisement R of the form [l,o, . . . ].
Output: true if the new route received is a leak
false otherwise.
1: if AS l ∈Npe∪Nc then
2: for all ai ∈R, where 0 < i≤R.length do





8: R′← [. . . ,o, . . . , l, . . . ]
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or peer AS. In this regard, our approach is more comprehensive and encompasses the
logic used in [61].
4.3 Route Leak detection (RLD) offloading
Outsourcing the BGP security targets to decouple the security from the BGP protocol
with the aim of minimizing the impact over an AS routers’ installed based as well as
on the protocol itself. In this section, first we discuss the reasons behind our propose
to decouple and offload the Route Leak Detection, and more generally to offload the
security. Next, we present two approaches which focus on transparently improving the
BGP security, with their implications to both the routers software and the protocol
specification. The key difference between them derive from where the BGP control plane
is executed, as well as how the BGP control information is intercepted and properly
diverted to an external entity.
4.3.1 Rationale behind our offloading approach
Throughout our research we have identified resistance from the community to different
BGP security proposals that require either major changes to the protocol, or whether
their implementation would reveal confidential business information among ASes. We
believe that proposals such s-BGP, so-BGP, ps-BGP and IRV have failed to be adopted
mainly due to these reasons.
Similarly, the SIDR proposals have faced acceptance as well as resistance within
the research and industrial communities. RPKI and ROA are already standardized,
implemented and are in an adoption phase. They have been partially successful thanks
that they do not require direct changes to the protocol, and can be implemented as an
independent, parallel infrastructure. ROA supports the route origination authorization
validation, which can influence the acceptance of a route announcement. This verification
can be performed by any domain independently, without affecting other domains who
lack ROA support. More specifically, RPKI and ROA are backward compatible and do
not require a wide adoption to start enhancing the BGP security.
However, BGPSEC is still being discussed and is facing resistance, especially from
industry. The main reasons behind the strong opposition against it are related to
the induced overhead and the disclosure of sensitive information. The security data
added to each update generated by an AS’s BGP router, and consequently their on-line
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cryptographic processing overhead are strong arguments against the solution. Similarly,
the BGPSEC forward-signing approach inadvertently reveal or leak sensitive information
regarding the peering relationships between domains, at the level of BGP-speaker routers.
These issues reveal that BGPSEC seems to create problems that are worse than what it
was designed to solve.
These arguments suggest that introducing big changes to the BGP protocol, even
to enhance its security, is a daunting and challenging task. We argue that any BGP
security solution requiring disruptive changes to the BGP protocol, or that discloses
peering relationship information will face fateful resistance for its adoption. In this
regard, it is crucial to explore different ways by which a proposed security mechanism
could be integrated into the existing inter-domain routing system and foster adoption
while avoiding collateral burden.
We approach to this problem from a perspective of decoupling and offloading the
security chores from BGP. Therein, the security chores are decoupled from either the
protocol or the whole data processing elements toward and external element. This new
element in charge of the security protection is provisioned with better capabilities, and
can control a set of network elements. This idea is aligned with the concepts introduced
by Software Define Networks (SDNs). The following subsections further describe two
approaches to achieve the BGP offloaded security.
4.3.2 BGP messages intercept approach
The first approach consists on intercepting the BGP packets at the routers and diverting
them toward a decoupled, external security application by means of a remote procedure
call (e.g., through the use of an API). This decoupled application is on charge of control
and verify the validity of the BGP routing information and take a decision. If the results
is correct, the application re-inject the BGP information toward the BGP control plane
at the network element. Meanwhile, on the other case the application can drop the BGP
information, without modifying its routing and control state.
To illustrate, figure 4.4 represents the basic offloading concept by showing two
neighboring domains and the interactions between the different components. The vertical
interaction between the BGP routers and RLD application for route leak detection seeks
to enable non-disruptive control over the BGP process running on the router. This
control is achieved by intercepting the BGP information for inspection. The BGP control
process remains distributed, each controlling the BGP routing information locally, and
unaware of the security enforced.














Fig. 4.4 Route Leak detection decoupling with distributed BGP control plane.
Zooming in into a BGP router, figure 4.5 depicts the proposed architecture and
components of our proposal. The interactions and coupling between these components
aim at a seamless and non-disruptive integration with the existing routing system. Two
“entities” can be clearly identified: 1) the BGP routers and 2) the RLD layer, which
is the one on charge of executing the Cross-Path route leak detection. At the BGP
router, we split our architecture into two subcomponents, i) BGP Messages Manager,
and ii) Messages Broker. The former represents a technology-agnostic component which
handles the new BGP announcements independent of the BGP process technology used,
and interacts with the RLD layer, while the latter is the modifications within the BGP
Process to support the offloaded security (e.g., the modifications and extensions to the
Quagga BGP process).
Inside the Router Operating System
This section specifies the interactions between the RLD layer and the BGP processes
internally in the router. We describe the general architecture of our proposal, which have
been implemented by leveraging the Quagga’s router implementation [70]. Our prototype
leverages its event driven system with internal queues to optimize the BGP processing
and to schedule and prioritize different tasks.
Figure 4.6 depicts in a nutshell our approach to decouple and intercept the BGP
update messages. Next, we describe the tree main components:
• Messages Broker : This is the technology-dependent part which plugs in in into the
BGP Messages Process to intercept and divert the update messages toward the
BGP Messages Manager. Furthermore, this component also enables the re-injection

















Fig. 4.5 General view of the architecture and the interactions between the layers. The
bottom layer is provided by the BGP protocol, whereas the top layer is provided by the
RLD.
of the update messages back to the BGP process to be further processes. Note that,
the BGP decision process remain intact, and when an announcement is considered
valid by RLD, it is BGP itself which process the update.
• BGP Messages Manager : this component provides a layer of abstraction to interact
with the RLD layer. It provides the necessary APIs to the Messages Broker to be













Fig. 4.6 Offloading operation within Quagga and interaction with the external RLD.
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the RLD layer. Similarly, it processes and further re-injects the validated BGP
update messages received from the RLD layer. This component runs in a separated
process, along with the BGP process. As a security measure, if the RLD layer is
unavailable, the update messages are forwarded back to the BGP process.
• RLD layer : this component implements the route leak detection technique. This
layer interacts with the BGP Messages Manager of different routers within an AS
domain. All the recollected routing information is processed and maintained by our
RLD detection process. This knowledge shall help to process new announcements
seeking to detect whether they are route leaks. The result back to the routing
elements per each new update message is either Discard or Accept.
It is important highlighting that only minor modifications have been made to BGP
for supporting the communication and coordination between the bottom BGP layer
and the external RDL security layer. All the functions of the BGP speaking system
remain unmodified, except for the way in which BGP advertisements are controlled and
processed. Events that involve the processing of updates received from a BGP neighbor
are inspected by the RLD layer, and depending on the RLD validation result, the updates
might follow the normal BGP flow or be discarded.
4.3.3 SDN like approach
Software Defined Networks (SDN) proposed the the decoupling of the control plane
from the networking elements, and positioning it into a central controller. The controller
becomes the central coordinator of different network elements, and decides how the traffic
is steered through them. In this environment, the BGP process is an application running



















Fig. 4.7 SDN-like Route Leak detection.
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one BGP process per set of edge router. Similarly, our RLD application can be deployed
in the controller, interacting directly with the BGP process. This improves the network
control and visibility, while fostering the development of new network applications like
our RLD for example.
A realization of this approach is the “BGP LS PCEP” [66] project under the umbrella
of OpenDaylight (ODL) [57]. To illustrate, figure 4.7 depicts the SDN architecture,
which remarks the decoupling of the control plane from the network elements, while
providing a southbound API for the element–controller interaction. ODL integrates
different southbound plugins to support a range of protocols including Openflow, LISP,
BGP and Netconf. On top of the controller, the BGP control process resides alongside
with our RLD application. Furthermore, the controller also provides a northbound APIs
to interact with external applications (e.g. by exposing a standardized REST/NETCONF
API.).
4.4 Evaluation
This section describes the experimental and simulation setup used to evaluate both the
CP route leak detection technique along with the offloaded detection idea. First, we shall
address the simulation setup and the obtained results. To contrast these results, next we
delineate the experimental proof of concept along with its results for the RLD offloading
idea. In this work, we have evaluated the first offload approach described in the previous
section, i.e. the offloading of the RLD application only, and the interception of the BGP
packets. As future work, we plan to continue our efforts aligned with the Opendaylight
BGP LS PCEP project.
4.4.1 RLD simulations setup and results analysis
In order to validate the CP route leaks detection RLD technique, we have tested it
through exhaustive simulations using a scaled-down version of an actual Internet topology.
It is worth mentioning that the cost for running event-driven simulations on a complete
Internet graph is prohibitively expensive in terms of time and resources. Thus, it is a
common research practice to utilize small realistic graphs, extracted from the actual
Internet graph, to avoid excessive computational cost [19].
In our testing framework, an important consideration during topology reduction was
to preserve some of the essential properties of the complete Internet graph, e.g., average
node degree and degree distribution. This particular serves as the base for rationally
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Fig. 4.8 General representation of a harmless route leak scenario.
extrapolate the obtained results to larger, more realistic Internet topologies. Furthermore,
we assured that the scaled-down topology contains all the AS relationships considered in
our route leak detection framework with the potential to produce all different types of
route leaks. For this purpose, we obtained a subgraph of ARK’s Internet graph (2013)
[89] containing 1650 ASes and 3744 inter-domain links using graph reduction technique
presented in [46]. Observe that our approach of using a subgraph of ARK’s Internet graph
means that the topology we used in our simulations is actually part of the Internet. In
the rest of this section, we refer to the obtained scaled-down topology as “Topology-1650”.
The simulations were setup and run using the Network Simulator NS2 [64], along with
BGP++ [7] to complement NS2’s BGP support. We considered a single router per AS
and each AS’s BGP router was configured according to its policies and relationships with
its neighbors according to the extracted topology. As a result, we were able to simulate
and test the RLD techniques with BGP in an Internet-like topology for different route
leak scenarios and evaluate their impact.
For Topology-1650, we identified a total of 20,747 different possible route leak scenarios,
out of which 17,151 were harmful route leaks, i.e., the route leak poisoned the RIB of the
victim AS successfully. That is, although the remainder route leaks occurred, the leaked
routes were not chosen as they were not the best path to the corresponding destination,
thus failing to poison the BGP forwarding table of the victim AS V. One example of
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Leak scenarios Cross Path (Simulation)# Leaks # Harmful Leaks # Leaks Detected % Leaks Detected
CRL (Pr)a 4879 4773 4492 94.11
CRL (Pe)b 5714 3974 943 23.73
PRL (Pr)a 5724 5406 5044 93.30
PRL (Pe)b 4430 2998 177 5.90
a CRL/PRL cases where O is provider of L.
b CRL/PRL cases where O is peer of L.
Table 4.1 Simple Cross-Path (CP) Detection: Simulation results for different route leak
scenarios.
such a route leak scenario is depicted in figure 4.8. Even if L leaks routes of O to V,
these leaked routes will not affect the forwarding table of V. This is because on receiving
routes toward O from L and directly from O itself, the victim V, following the shorter
AS-Path criteria, prefers the direct shorter AS-Path route. It is important to note that
the reason V decides the best route based on shorter AS-Path criteria is because V has
same provider relation with both L and O. Table 4.1 shows the simulation results of CP
route leak detection technique for the harmful route leaks.
We have classified the route leaks further on the basis of the AS relationship between
the leaker AS L and its neighbor O, in order to analyze the results in depth. That is, we
divide Customer Route Leaks CRL (the leaker is a customer of the victim) cases into
two subcategories, one where O has a provider relation with L, denoted by CRL(Pr),
and other where O has a peer relation with L, denoted by CRL (Pe). Similarly, for Peer
Route Leaks PRL (the leaker is a peer of the victim), we classify them into PRL (Pr)
and PRL (Pe) cases, where O has a provider and a peer relation with AS L, respectively.
We observe that CP detects 94.11% and 93.30% of all the CRL (Pr) and PRL (Pr) route
leak cases, respectively. Whereas, for the CRL (Pe) and PRL (Pe), the CP detection rate
is low, with results of 23.73% for CRL (Pe) and 5.90% for PRL (Pe). The reason behind
better performance of CP in route leak cases where O is provider of L is that O being
the provider of L advertises L’s route to all its providers, peers and other customers,
thus increasing the chances for the possibility of cross-path observance at AS V. In the
route leak cases where O is a peer of L, the chances of observing a cross-path involving
the two consecutive peers are very low in practice, since a peer does not advertise routes
of another peer any further except to its customer cone, hence the poor performance of
the CP technique for those cases.
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Leak scenarios Cross Path (Experiment)# Leaks # Harmful Leaks # Leaks Detected % Leaks Detected
CRL (Pr)a 725 713 701 98.31
CRL (Pe)b 226 97 21 21.64
PRL (Pr)a 825 811 792 97.65
PRL (Pe)b 154 70 4 5.71
a CRL/PRL cases where O is provider of L.
b CRL/PRL cases where O is peer of L.
Table 4.2 Simple Cross-Path (CP) Detection: Experimental results for different route
leak scenarios.
4.4.2 Offloaded RLD experimental setup and results analysis
Besides the simulations, we also tested the CP technique using real-time experiments.
The main purpose of experimental evaluation is to verify the robustness of the technique
in close to real environment. In order to build an experimental setup which is with in the
computational and memory limits of our testbed infrastructure, we extracted a subgraph
of Topology-1650 containing 990 ASes and 2146 inter-domain links. We used similar
criterion for obtaining the 990 ASes topology (referred to as “Topology-990”) as we did
for Topology-1650. Our testbed consisted of a single virtual Linux Container (Docker
[20, 58]) for each AS in Topology-990 equipped with a customized BGP implementation
from the Quagga routing suite. This BGP implementation was developed by our team in
the framework of the projects Path-State Protocol (PSP) and OPENER [2, 94]. This
framework enabled the implementation and execution of the RLD application offloaded
from the Quagga BGP process. This prototype required the modification of 88 lines
of the BGP-4 code to support the interception and re-injection of BGP messages, and
thereby enabling the offloading of security.
Initially, as determined by our hypotheses, all the nodes were connected and configured
in line with the valley-free rules. This enabled the capture and learning of routes without
any route leaks. Then, for each experiment once BGP converged, a route leak was
generated, i.e., an AS (L) leaked routes of one of its neighbors (O) to another neighbor
(V ). Then, AS V enabled with the CP RLD technique performed the detection process
using the new route announcement and its prior BGP routing information. In this
topology, we were able to anticipate 951 Customer Route Leaks (CRL) and 979 Peer
Route Leaks (PRL) possible scenarios. Thus, we ran a total of 1930 different experiments,
each with one route leak occurrence. Out of the 1930 different route leak scenarios, we
were able to rule out 239 leaks that were harmless. It is noteworthy that the set of
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route leak scenarios anticipated for Topology-990 is a subset of route leak scenarios for
Topology-1650. This is because Topology-990 is a subgraph of Topology-1650. In the
remaining 1691 harmful route leaks, there are 810 CRL and 881 PRL route leaks.
Table 4.2 shows the results obtained with the CP technique for the harmful route
leak experiments. From the perspective of the extended classification of the route leaks,
we observe a similar performance trend in the experiments as well. Therein, the CP
route leak detection performance is more than 97% in both CRL (Pr) and PRL (Pr),
whereas for CRL (Pe) and PRL (Pe), it detects 21.64% and 5.71% of the route leaks,
respectively. The justification of these results is similar to the one given for the simulation
results of the CP technique. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the respective
route leaks, for different cases, that are detected in our experimental study were also
correctly detected in our simulation evaluation. This assures the behavior stability of
our technique in both modes of evaluation. The difference in success rate percentages,
for different route leak types, is due to the difference in the number of leak scenarios ran
in each mode of evaluation.
4.5 Open issues
Whilst the Route Leak Detection technique proposed can be applied in many practical
situations (e.g., the Telekom Malaysia route leak of about 179,000 prefixes incident [8]
could have been avoided), there are still some others that might neither satisfy the
hypotheses of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, nor comply with the two types of ASes relationships
considered in the valley-free model. In the remainder of this Section we discuss the
limitations of the proposed RLD technique.
4.5.1 Siblings and Hybrid relationships
The valley-free rules for exporting routes serve as a reasonable stepping stone toward
theoretically modeling the route leak problem. However, the valley-free export rules
are not necessarily satisfied under certain complex relationships between ASes, such as
siblings and hybrid ASes relationships. A sibling↔sibling relation exists between two
ASes which belong to, and are under the administration of a single organization. These
ASes typically offer customized transit to each other, which implies a different type of AS
polices among them. The proposed Cross-Path technique may fall prey to false positive
detections due to lack of prior sibling relation information. This information is required
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Fig. 4.9 Example of a Route Leak attack and further propagation. The victim AS a
unable to detect the leak route [L,b,d] to IP-network D, further announces it to its
neighbor c, which subsequently announces it to e. These two ASes have not violated the
valley-free rules, however the route leak has affected them.
as the proposed technique assumes that the two ASes in a sibling relation are separate
entities.
On the other hand, a hybrid relation type refers to cases where two large ASes have
different relationships between them at geographically different points of presence. For
example, two ASes may have a customer→provider relation in one region and a peer–peer
relation in another region. We contend that the analysis presented may even stay valid in
various hybrid scenarios, since the routing information that is relevant for the detection
is the one contained in the routers in proximity with the occurrence of the route leak,
independently of the divergence on the routing views at geographically separated areas.
However, more in-depth analysis and evaluations of these specific cases is required.
4.5.2 Route leak propagation
The proposed technique for Route Leak detection has been devised for detecting the
cases when a route leak is initiated, i.e., the victim AS is a direct neighbor of the
leaker. Furthermore, we only consider the cases when an attacker AS acts independently,
excluding the cases of coordinated leaks attacks. These considerations leave out the
detection of route leaks propagation.
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A route leak propagation refers to the scenario where the victim AS receives a rogue
route and forwards it further to its neighbors, thus increasing the impact over other
domains. The victim AS unaware of the attack may forward the route leak to its neighbors
according to the relationship it has with them, and complying with the valley-free rules.
This makes more difficult for any AS receiving the propagated rogue route to detect it as
a leak.
To elaborate, figure 4.9 depicts an example of a route leak attack and propagation.
In this case, AS a is the victim which is unable to identify the route [L,b,d] toward
IP-prefix D as a leak. Thus, AS a in comply with the valley-free rules announces the
new route learned from its customer L toward its peer c. Subsequently, AS c decides
to announce the route to its customer e. Observe that ASes c and d are affected by a
propagated leak, which makes more difficult to detect the leak. The further a AS is from
the leaker, the more complex it becomes to identify it. This highlights the importance of
detecting the leak the closest to the attacker.
4.5.3 Initial valley-free state
From an engineering perspective, the hypothesis H.4.1 is reasonably achievable by many
transit domains, since route filters can be set to that end for a short period. This will
ensure that the routes imported up to that stage are valley-free. Once the learned routes
are guaranteed, the route filters need not further maintenance and could be removed.
Observe that the reluctance of providers for using filters does not lie on their initial
configuration, but rather on keeping them updated.
This dynamic method of applying and removing route filters is challenging from the
perspective of very large providers, and without SIDR’s solutions in place (mainly RPKI
and ROA, described in 3.3), this could only be achieved through a chain of trust during
filter configuration. For instance, when a client requires to advertise a new route, this
requirement will have to be notified and accepted not only to his providers, but also to
the providers’ providers where filters are being enforced. Further research is needed on
how to ensure that the initial state at the potential victims is valley-free.
4.6 Related work on Route Leaks
There has been an arising awareness regarding the research of the route leak problem,
its definition and solutions’ proposals. Apart from the research studies, there are a few
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conventional methods, e.g., route filters, that can be used as a possible solution for the
route leak problem. In this section, we discuss the research studies and the conventional
mitigation methods that particularly target to resolve the route leak problem.
4.6.1 Research studies
There has been some discrepancies regarding a formal definition of “Route Leaks”. To
shed some light and common ground, the authors in [86] have proposed a working Route
Leak definition as: ”the propagation of routing announcement(s) beyond their intended
scope...which is in violation of the intended policies of the receiver, the sender, and/or
one of the ASes along the preceding AS path.” The intended policies are defined in terms
of the pair-wise peering business relationship between ASes. This definition as well as
the four initial types of route leaks defined therein are in concordance with our definition
and classification of route leaks scenarios.
The primary difficulty in solving the route leak problem lies in the secrecy of the
AS relationships in the Internet. There are several AS relationship inference schemes
proposed in the literature, including contributions such as [29, 19, 87]. The existing
solutions typically infer the relationships between any two ASes by analyzing the BGP
data collected at different points in the network, called vantage points. One fundamental
critique on such inference schemes is that their knowledge base for inferring the AS
relationships is partial, i.e., their view of the Internet is restricted to the data collection
points. Ager et al. [1] highlight the limited nature of such AS relationship inference
schemes, by detecting far higher number of peer-to-peer links within only one large
Internet Exchange Point (IXP), as compared to the number of peer-to-peer links in the
entire Internet discovered by well-known inference schemes.
Sriram et al.[85] examines which of the route-leak types defined in [86] are detected
and mitigated by the existing origin validation (OV). The authors propose two recommen-
dations to be followed by local AS domains seeking to prevent the creation of route leaks.
Another solution involves carrying a “1-bit” per-hop route-leak protection (RLP) field
in BGP updates. The RLP field is proposed to be carried in a new optional transitive
attribute, which targets to help with the detection and mitigation of route leaks at ASes
downstream from the leaking AS. This proposal differs from ours as it includes both the
extension of the BGP protocol with a new non-transient option, and a global adoption
and proper enforcement of their defined routing selection and processing rules. On top
of this, the RLP bit may reveal information regarding the type of relationships among
ASes in the announced AS-path. This information is not public, as each AS keeps their
business relations confidential.
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Sundaresan et al.[88] also investigate the export policy violation attacks in inter-
domain routing, calling them traffic attraction attacks. In essence, to detect export
policy violations they exploit the valley-free path feature that a particular BGP update
once traversed through a provider customer link or a peer–peer link should not go over a
customer→provider link or another peer−peer link, respectively. They propose to set a
flag in the BGP advertisement when it is sent to a peer AS or a customer AS. The flag is
contained in a new ATTEST attribute which is appended by all the ASes in the AS-Path.
Furthermore, they proposed to include the ATTEST attribute in the signed part of the
Secure BGP (S-BGP) [44] message to maintain the integrity of the flags set by each
AS in the AS-Path. In this way, any AS can determine if an update received from a
customer AS or a peer AS has violated the export policy rules by verifying the flags in the
chain of ATTEST attribute. However, according to their results, their solution becomes
effective when more than 60% of ASes deploy the scheme. The main shortcomings of
this scheme is that it requires changes in the BGP protocol to accommodate the new
ATTEST attribute. The scheme also depends on the Route Attestations (RA) and
Address Attestations (AA) mechanisms of S-BGP which incur software and hardware
burden of third party security infrastructure. Furthermore, this scheme requires high
deployment percentage in order to be effective for a certain type of route leaks. And
more importantly, the setting and signing of the flag in the ATTEST attribute discloses
AS policies more than what are already revealed by the BGP protocol at present.
Li et al.[52] have studied the routing loops effects caused by route leaks. They propose
a novel mechanism that identifies route leaks by monitoring routing loops. The loop
is detected by any AS who receives a route announcement from a peer or a customer,
whose AS number is already included in the announced AS-Path. Their solution passively
monitors BGP routes to detect route leaks. In comparison, our proposal differentiates
as our technique seeks for a cross-path in the announced routes’ AS-paths by using
only local available routing information which includes both routes with and without
loops, while their proposal rely on the observance of an AS-path loop, and uses external
information to complement their detection process.
4.6.2 Conventional methods
The conventional methods to mitigate route leaks include route filters, Internet Route
Registries (IRRs), and BGP monitoring tools. The utilization of route filters on the
BGP routers between two ASes aims at filtering out routes that are in violation or out
of the scope of the agreed policies. However, the timely and accurate maintenance of
route filters are challenging as the number of allowed prefixes increase up to thousands
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for ASes with large customer cones. The administrative and technical burdens to keep
the filters updated hinders their effectiveness. As a result, ASes tend to rely on trust
and do not maintain up-to-date prefix filters.
IRRs provide an on-line structured database of route objects that can be used to
automate the maintenance of the route filters. However, IRRs also suffer from high
maintenance cost because the route objects in the IRRs have to be defined first and
then kept up-to-date, so the route filters can be automatically maintained. Besides, IRR
records are not maintained by all ASes, and existence of duplicate, false, and incomplete
records have raised questions on the sanity of the information contained in IRRs.
Similarly, BGP monitoring tools, such as Nemecis [82], Prefix Hijack Alert System
[48], and Pretty Good BGP (PGBGP) [43] analyze BGP data collected at different
vantage points to detect irregularities. These monitoring tools have to be trained on
up-to-date policies to detect any irregularity, thus causing similar administrative burdens
as route filters and IRRs. Such monitoring tools are good as long as the irregularities are
observed at the vantage points, so strategic attacks avoiding the vantage points can still
succeed without detection. Both, BGP monitoring tools and AS relationship inference
schemes depend on BGP data collected at different vantage points. However, the former
utilize the data to detect irregularities against predefined policies, whereas the latter use
the data to infer the business relationships and type of peering among ASes.
An interesting route leak detection solution defined in [61] proposes to count the
number of predefined “Big Network” ASes in an AS-Path of a route under consideration.
The set of “Big Network” ASes is composed of mostly Tier-1 ASes. This simple technique
is based on the fact that an AS-Path should not contain more than two Tier-1 ASes in it.
Thus, if an AS-Path contains more than the fixed threshold number (default threshold is
2) of allowed “Big Network” ASes, then it is flagged as a route leak. This solution concept
is similar to the one defined in our RLD technique, that is to utilize BGP knowledge to
detect the route leaks.
4.7 Summary and Contributions
This chapter describes our proposal for addressing the BGP “Route Leak” vulnerability
following the offloading paradigm. First, we identify and define what a “Rout Leak”
vulnerability is, its possible causes and probable consequences. We have seen real cases
of “Route Leaks” reported, which denounced sudden changes on the public BGP routes
with serious consequences over the Internet. Some cases have impacted large parts of
Internet or major service providers.
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Next, we propose a novel “Route Leak” detection solution with the advantages of
relying only on the domain’s available information regarding the BGP routing announce-
ments and business relationships with its neighbors. Our security solution follows an
offloading approach which does not disrupt the BGP protocol. To validate this idea, we
have performed extensive evaluations in a simulation framework. Furthermore, we have
also evaluated our Route Leak Detection technique on an experimental setup, which
provided similar results as in the simulations. The outcomes of our work have been
published in:
• M. S. Siddiqui, D. Montero, M. Yannuzzi, R. Serral-Gracià and X. Masip-Bruin,
“Route leak identification: A step toward making inter-domain routing more reliable”
2014 10th International Conference on the Design of Reliable Communication
Networks (DRCN), Ghent, 2014, pp. 1-8. DOI: 10.1109/DRCN.2014.6816139
Contribution: I collaborated with the research and study several real cases of
Internet outages derived from abnormal exporting routing events. We approached
to the “Route Leak” problem from a theoretical perspective, and proposed our
definition of it. Therein, we defined a theoretical framework to identify a “Route
Leak” based on the observance of a “Cross-Path” singularity. This framework is
based on a set of realistic hypothesis. I also contributed with the insight obtained
from replaying and verifying the leak cases in controlled environments through
BGP simulations and testbed emulations.
• M. S. Siddiqui, D. Montero, M. Yannuzzi, R. Serral-Gracià, X. Masip-Bruin
and W. Ramirez, ”Route leak detection using real-time analytics on local BGP
information,” 2014 IEEE Global Communications Conference, Austin, TX, 2014.
DOI: 10.1109/GLOCOM.2014.7037092
Contribution: Design, implementation and evaluation of the Cross-Path Route
Leak identification technique. I also contributed with the setting up, configuration
and execution of experiments with large scale, Internet-like topologies over a
simulator and a virtual emulator. This also includes the collection and processing
of the BGP routing information for all the Route Leak scenarios. The results’
analysis and interpretation, along with the deeper research and understanding of
unforeseen cases form part of my contribution too.
• M. S. Siddiqui, D. Montero, R. Serral-Gracià, M. Yannuzzi, “Self-reliant detection
of route leaks in inter-domain routing,” Computer Networks, Volume 82, 8 May
2015, Pages 135-155, ISSN 1389-1286. DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2015.02.029
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Contribution: experiments execution and evaluations of the Route Leak identifi-
cation techniques. We used two different Internet-like topologies to test over each,
the simulator and an emulator. I contributed with the analysis, interpretation
and verification of both the simulation and the experimental results obtained from




The Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP) [23] was initially devised to tackle
routing scalability issues in the core Internet. However, due to its intrinsic address
splitting and its simple architecture, LISP was promptly spotted as a technology with
a remarkable potential in other areas in networking. As a consequence, the focus on
LISP has shifted over time and is now becoming a key technology in areas related to
virtualization, mobility, and cloud applications.
The basic idea in LISP is the decoupling of the Route LOCator (RLOC) and the End-
point IDentifier (EID) spaces in the network addressing scheme (as previously described
in section 2.2.5). LISP supports provider independent and globally unique Identifier
addresses, and employs a Map-and-Encap scheme, along with an Identifier-to-Locator
Mapping System to bind the two address spaces. Another important feature is that LISP
is address family agnostic, so the Map-and-Encap and Decap processes can handle mixes
of IPv4 and IPv6 indistinctively for example. These features have made it highly flexible,
and therefore, it is considered an enabler for a variety of applications.
In order to be able to use LISP, an edge network implementing LISP, i.e., a LISP-
Site, registers the EID prefixes on a Map Server (MS) in the Mapping System. The
registration could be done against a single or a set of RLOC addresses, thus enabling
global reachability. As currently defined in [23], this map registration process is a
static procedure based on manual configurations that need to be set in advance. These
configurations need to be done both on the border routers in the LISP-Site, called Egress
Tunnel Routers (ETRs) and on the Map Server. Once the manual configurations are
in place, each ETR will attempt to register its EID(s)-to-RLOC(s) mappings with the
Map Server. The latter can verify the requests against the predefined configuration using
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pre-shared keys. The pre-shared keys allow to assess the validity of the map registration,
since each ETR has its own key which is shared only with the Map Server.
It is important to notice that this existing pre-shared key security mechanism between
the ETR and the MS falls short of countering a number of relatively simple attacks,
such as RLOC address spoofing. Indeed, LISP lacks a procedure for ensuring whether a
certain ETR is allowed to use a particular RLOC address for registering an EID prefix.
In addition, current LISP specifications exclude the EID prefix owner’s role (i.e., the
EID-Holder) in the map registration process, since the set of valid EID prefixes are
manually preconfigured within the ETR. With this approach, the registration process
undermines the provider independence and mobility features of the EID address space,
which are in fact main drivers for LISP. These manual and static practices are due to
the fact that LISP lacks mechanisms for global EID prefix authorization, which, as we
shall show later on, are essential for the practical feasibility of mobility and roaming
scenarios in LISP. In a nutshell, global EID prefix authorization refers to the development
of security mechanisms through which a Map Server can determine whether a particular
ETR belonging to a particular LISP-Site is authorized to register an EID prefix on its
behalf.
5.1 LISP threat model
Our threat model considers a single LISP site attacker seeking to exploit a mapping
system vulnerability with the objective of provoking an impact over other LISP sites.
The considered vulnerability exploits the lack of mechanism to check the authorizations
over network resources within the locator addressing space. This problem is similar to
the BGP resource authorizations, thus we plan to leverage on the proposed solutions (e.g.
RPKI and ROA) to enhance the LISP control plane security.
The decoupling of control functionalities from data forwarding elements and its in-line
routing learning dynamic in LISP pose a great advantage for network dynamism, however
it also opens new security vulnerabilities. An extensive LISP threat analysis has been
laid out in [76], which considers a threat model with emphasis on the vulnerabilities
related with the interactions between the different LISP components. Therein, some of
the considered vulnerabilities have been partially addressed by security solutions over
the control plane. For instance, LISPSEC [55] focuses on securing the mapping discovery
of unknown EID-prefix’s locations. These queries include the Map-Request and Map-
Reply messages, which involves three specific LISP components, i.e., the Map-Resolver,
Map-Server and the ETR.
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The location update of an EID prefix is determined by a Map-Registration process,
which involves both the ETR and the Map-Server on charge of the prefix. These elements
are in charge of signaling the current location of the prefix to the Mapping-System in
terms of at which set of locator addresses the prefix is reachable. Thus, the security
implications of this process concerns to the ETR, the Mapping System and the EID-prefix
owner. The first two are considered in the current registration process, while providing
a shared-key mechanism for authentication. It contemplates that the EID-prefix and
the ETR are under the same administrative domain. However, the registration process
enables only the authentication from the Map-Server side whether a “Map-Register”
request is valid and blindly accepts the proposed set of RLOC addresses. The Map-Server
falls short in the verification of whether the proposed RLOCs are valid and authorized
to be used by the ETR.
Similarly, the verification of EID-prefixes authorizations is through this shared key.
This method works well in the case of a fixed, non-mobile end point scenario, which
holds and utilize the EID addresses for establishing end-to-end communications (i.e., the
network address the applications use). However, when we consider the mobility case of
an “EID-holder”, which requires to change its current location with a new one while
maintaining its EID address, the current registration procedure falls short.
The implications of this mobility scenario include not only the challenges on the
locator registration procedure at different ETRs (which might imply the sharing of
keys between ETRs at different administrative domains), but also on both the EID and
locator authorizations. We study the inclusion of a third player in the EID-location
registration, i.e., the EID-holder, and the impacts on the whole registration procedure.
The EID-holder represents an end user and its ability to roam through different edge
networks while maintaining its EID identifier. Other major challenge under this scenario
is the verification granted by the EID-holder to be represented by a specific ETR and
its locator address, which directly depends on the trust between the end user and the
service provider offering to intermediate and route the traffic in its behalf. We shall
further address this case aligned with the mobility use case, and investigate how this
impacts over the LISP control-plane.
5.2 LISP Control-Plane Vulnerabilities
The security vulnerabilities of LISP not only jeopardize its normal operations but also
hamper its broader reach, since they could compromise the applications for which it is
positioned as a technology enabler. In this section, we overview two of the most important
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security issues in LISP, namely, RLOC spoofing and lack of global EID authorization.
These vulnerabilities enable the registration of mapping entries in the Mapping System
that could result in the redirection of data plane traffic elsewhere, with consequences
that might range from blackholing up to traffic sniffing.
5.2.1 RLOC Spoofing
The mapping entries on the Map Server (MS) consist of EID-to-RLOC bindings. However,
a Map Register request can include an incorrect RLOC and marginalize the integrity of
the mapping entry. In order to avoid that, the MS needs to ensure that a certain ETR
is authorized to use a particular RLOC address for registering an EID prefix. Lack of
such assurance can lead to different attacks by a malicious ETR, such as DoS attacks by
traffic flooding.
Figure 5.1 illustrates an RLOC spoofing scenario. The malicious ETR from SP1
performs a registration targeting SP2 by specifying its locator RLOC2 in the registration
request. A number of such false RLOC registrations can be done to increase the impact
of the flooding which could result in a DoS at the victim. Likewise, when an RLOC is
spoofed, the mapping entries are compromised and further queries for the EIDA prefix’s
locator will retrieve the wrong RLOC2.
In summary, LISP does not define a mechanism to verify the authorization of RLOCs
to ETRs. Any ETR can claim any RLOC during the registration process, which poses a
serious concern on the dependability of the LISP control-plane. As we shall see in Section
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Fig. 5.1 RLOC Spoofing in LISP.
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6.2, by introducing a slightly adapted version of the existing Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs) [50], we can provide dynamic assessment of the RLOC ownership and effectively
avoid such attacks.
5.2.2 No Global EID Authorization
As mentioned earlier, the current map registration process completely alienates the EID-
holder role, hence making it dependent on the LISP-Site’s ETRs. With this approach,
there is no way that a Map-Server can verify if an ETR is authorized by an EID host to
perform map registrations on its behalf—this is because it is not even involved in the
process. The current shared key security mechanism for the map registration process
is a static stop-gap solution for handling the ETR registration. It requires manual
preconfigurations of the EID prefixes, both on the ETR and on the MS, and a shared
key between them. Furthermore, due to lack of recognition of the EID host as a separate
entity, it not only falls short of providing global EID authorization but also fails to
ensure an end-to-end EID-locator map registration security. A solution to address these
issues was proposed in [27], which leverages the RPKI/ROA infrastructure and defines a
signed object, called Identifier Origin Authorization (IOA). The IOA object can act as an
authorization from an EID prefix holder towards a particular set of RLOCs to populate




































Fig. 5.2 Mobility scenario with current registration process.
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the mapping database. However, this approach burdens the EID prefix holder device
with intensive cryptographic chores (i.e., signing, verifying and handling certificates).
Another noticeable observation regarding current LISP specification is its impact
on the mobility of the EID host, as it recommends exploring Mobile IP technology in
the case of mobility when an EID host moves relatively fast and requires to change its
RLOC attachment point while maintaining session continuity. Figure 5.2 illustrates this
scenario, where an EID host, EIDA, in SP1 is registered on the mapping system by
its ETR, namely xTRSP 1 (Step 1). At certain moment, EIDA starts communicating
with an EID host, EIDB in SP2 (Step 2). Later on, EIDA moves to another LISP-Site
SP3 (Step 3). In order to keep an uninterrupted communication with EIDB, EIDA will
use the shared key it has with the xTRSP 1 to authenticate its location update through
xTRSP 3 (Step 4). Once authenticated and updated, xTRSP 1 starts tunneling the traffic
coming from EIDB towards EIDA at its new location (Step 5).
The extra burden for making this possible and securely can be summarized as follows:
a) it requires handling another shared key between the xTR and the EID host; b) the
EID host needs to authenticate the new location with the ETR; and c) the latter needs
to sub-optimally forward traffic by tunneling so as to avoid losing the session. All this
can be avoided by involving the EID host in the map registration process directly. This
would enable the EID host to directly update its mapping entry in the mapping system
when it is on the move. In our proposal, we show that involving the EID host in the
map registration process, not only enables us to avoid using cross technologies in case of
mobility (LISP and Mobile IP), but also paves the way for EID authorization.
5.3 Defense efforts for securing the LISP Control
Plane
The on-demand discovery of EID locations poses the challenge on the ETRs regarding
how to verify whether the reply from the Map-Server is valid, thus utilize the locator
addresses provided. This process opens a variety of threats over the LISP control plane,
which are being discussed and addressed by different proposals. Specifically, LISPSEC
targets the security of the locator query between the Map-Resolver, the Map-Server and
the ETR.
The registration and location update of an EID prefix is also crucial for the correct
traffic encapsulation and routing within LISP. The initial shared-key approach currently
defined enables the Map-Server to verify the proper authorization of an ETR to register
5.3 Defense efforts for securing the LISP Control Plane | 87
any provided locator address. This mechanism assures that the proper ETR is authorized
to route and encapsulate the traffic of an EID-prefix site.
In this section, we shall further elaborate the previous efforts to secure the LISP
control plane, and describe their shortcomings.
5.3.1 EID-to-RLOC Authoritative registration
The LISP Mapping System defines two types of LISP-speaking devices: the Map-Resolver,
which accepts Map-Requests from an Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR) and resolves the EID-
to-RLOC mapping by queering a global mapping database. Meanwhile, the Map-Server
element [24] learns authoritative EID-to-RLOC mappings from an Egress Tunnel Router
(ETR) and publishes them in the bindings database.
When a Map Server receives a Map-Request, from either an ITR or the Mapping
System, it consults its local mapping database to find an ETR that can answer with
the set of RLOCs for the requested EID-prefixes. To publish its EID-Prefixes, an ETR
periodically register them along with the set of RLOCs that can be used to reach the
ETR. This information is conveyed in a Map-Register message sent to the Map-Server.
To secure the mapping registration of authoritative EID-to-RLOC bindings, LISP has
defined an authentication mechanism which includes the information of both EIDs, and
RLOCs involved in the registration. This security data is derived from a hash over the
Map-Reply message using a pair-wise shared key. The LISP specification recommends
the use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 and as well as the HMAC-SHA-256-128 (SHA-256 truncated
to 128 bits). This rather basic authentication mechanism has been defined as a first
approach to secure the mapping registration process by involving the ETR and the
Map-Server. However, it alienates the end user which may hinder the user mobility use
case. Aligned with this issue, we have studied alternatives which allow the inclusion of
the EID-holder in the map register process to enable EID authorization as well as to
support end-point mobility without disrupting ongoing connections.
5.3.2 EID-to-RLOC Mapping Lookup security
Data-plane triggered mappings events occur when an ITR does not know the current
locator of an EID-prefix. Thus, it initiates an EID-to-RLOC lookup process. The security
and integrity of this process outcome highly affect the entire LISP routing security.
As a first level of security, LISP [23] defines a mechanism in the ITRs to accept only
solicited Map-Replies. To this end, the Map-Request message includes a nonce field
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which objective is to authenticate the Map-Reply answer sent from either the respective
ETR (or the allocated Map-Server in case of proxy configuration).
The goal of these security mechanisms has been to prevent unauthorized insertion of
mapping data in a Map-Reply message by providing origin authentication and integrity
protection for the Map-Registration messages exchange, and by using the nonce to detect
unsolicited Map-Reply sent by off-path attackers. However, they fall short on securing
the EID-to-locator query process.
LISP-SEC [55] provides a secure mechanism to validate the EID-to-locator query
process. This DNS-like query allows the dynamic, on-demand discovery of any EID’s
locators through the assistance of the Map-Resolver, Map-Server and the ETR on charge.
The first two elements act as a broker, enabling a complete decoupling between the control
plane and the Mapping system. This has enabled the development of different mapping
system in parallel with the LISP protocol evolution. The security of the mapping system
is out of the scope of LISP-SEC and of this thesis.
LISP-SEC focuses on providing the required security over the Map-Request and Map-
Reply procedure. It provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection
to LISP’s EID-to-locator mapping data conveyed via the mapping lookup process. LISP-
SEC provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection to mapping data
conveyed via the mapping lookup process by means of an Onet-Time Key (OTK). This
security information is included in the Map-Request and Map-Reply messages. The final
goal is to verify whether the corresponding ETR is on charge of the EID-prefix as well as
to prevent the overclaiming of EID-prefixes.
5.4 Summary and Contributions
This chapter reviews some of the issues and vulnerabilities around the LISP control
plane. The threats studied hinder the dynamic and secure registration of Endpoint
Identifiers (EIDs) over the LISP Mapping Server. On one hand, the EID-to-RLOC
registration process lacks of the means to verify the proper authorization to the claimed
RLOC by an ETR. This vulnerability enables a rogue ETR to deceive its corresponding
Map Server by providing spoofed RLOCs as its current location. As a result, this
attack might end up with a traffic diversion toward the legitimate owner of the targeted
RLOC, flooding the interface and provoking a DoS. On the other hand, the current EID
registration process completely alienates the EID host role, hence making it dependent
on the LISP-Site’s ETRs. Therein, the Map Server is unable to verify whether an ETR
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is authorized by the EID host to perform a map registration on its behalf. The current
LISP specification does not include the EID host and EID owner as a decoupled element
from the ETR. As a result, the mobility of end users between LISP sites is only possible
with the help of other, cumbersome solutions like Mobile-IP.
We also review the current LISP specifications in terms of control plane security.
More specifically, we describe the EID-to-RLOC authoritative registration and the EID-
to-RLOC mapping lookup security. The former consists of a shared key between the
ETR and its corresponding Map Server. This shared key enables the Map Server to
authenticate and validate the claims made by an ETR regarding the new EIDs’ locations.
Overall, this work has been included in the following publications:
• D. Montero, M. S. Siddiqui, R. Serral-Gracià, X. Masip-Bruin and M. Yannuzzi,
“Securing the LISP map registration process,” 2013 IEEE Global Communications
Conference (GLOBECOM), Atlanta, GA, 2013, pp. 2145-2151. DOI: 10.1109/GLO-
COM.2013.6831392
Chapter 6
Offloading the LISP Map
Registration
This chapter describes our proposal for enhancing the LISP control plane security aligned
with the offloading approach. The initial LISP architecture design favors this approach
as it decouples the control plane from the data plane. We leverage this advantage and
propose new mechanisms to improve the map registration and enhance the end user
mobility support.
6.1 Outline
First, section 6.2 delineates our proposal objectives which consider two key security
challenges, i.e., RLOC verification and EID authorizations. Therein, we introduce the
concepts of EID Ownership, RLOC Authorization and the different trust scenarios for
our proposed solution. Next, section 6.2.2 describes in detail the proposed Secured LISP
Map Registration. Finally, section 6.3 provides initial results that validate our proposal.
6.2 Map Registration proposal
In this section, we present our approach toward providing end-to-end security for the
map registration process in LISP.
6.2.1 Preliminaries
Before getting into the details, we proceed to define some terms that will help to explain
our proposed solution.
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• RLOC Verification Process: The mechanism by which a Map Server in the
Mapping System is able to securely establish the fact that a particular ETR
belonging to a certain Service Provider is authorized to use a RLOC or a set of
RLOCs.
• EID Authorization Process: The mechanism by which a Map Server in the
Mapping System is able to securely establish the fact that a particular ETR is
authorized to register an EID prefix on its behalf.
With RLOC verification in place, the RLOC spoofing attacks can be completely
mitigated. In turn, EID authorization process will not only enable dynamic registrations
on the move, but would also avoid the burden of relaying on third party technologies,
such as Mobile IP.
EID Ownership
In addition to the traditional actors in a LISP ecosystem, namely, the Ingress Tunnel
Routers (ITRs) and the Egress Tunnel Routers (ETRs) in the LISP-Site, and the Map
Resolvers (MRs) and the Map Servers (MSs) in the Mapping System, we introduce a new
role, represented by the “user” or “host in the LISP-Site bearing the EID”, called the












































Fig. 6.1 Step-by-step overview of the new Map Registration Process.
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provider, which is in fact one of the main hooks of LISP. The term EID-Holder refers
to the fact that the user or host is the owner of the EID prefix. The EID prefix can be
acquired through a service provider, a broker, or directly from the respective regional
authority (e.g., RIRs), but its ownership stays with the EID-Holder. The EID-Holder
identification allows it to initiate the map registration process itself, by sending a Service
Request to the ETR of the service provider from which it plans to get the Internet service.
The ETR of the service provider forwards the request to the MS in the Mapping System.
Figure 6.1 depicts the updates proposed to the LISP architecture.
With the introduction of the EID-Holder—and emphasizing its separation from the
service provider—there are now three actors involved in the map registration process: (1)
the EID-Holder; (2) the ETR; and (3) the MS. An end-to-end secure registration process
refers to the phenomenon that the EID-Holder is able to securely register its EID along
with the RLOC of its current Service Provider on the MS, with MS making sure that:
i) the ETR requesting to register the EID is authorized to do so; and ii) the ETR is
authorized to use the RLOC given in the map registration request.
RLOC Authorization (RA)
Next, we present an extension to the ROA concept as developed by the SIDR WG, which
exploits the similarities between Route Origination in an inter-domain network with
an RLOC used by an EID in a LISP-network. To this end, we propose an extension
to legacy ROA that can be used for RLOC Authorizations. The ROA, as described
in [50], is based on cryptographically signed information that binds the IP prefix with
its legitimate owner’s Autonomous System Number (ASN), and it is accompanied with
the corresponding certificate. It assists the relying party to verify whether a particular
ASN is the legitimate owner of a certain IP prefix or not. For the purpose of RLOC
Authorization, we reuse the ROA design and structure for RLOC addresses, and thus:
“We define an RLOC Authorization (RA) as cryptographically signed infor-
mation binding the xTRID, the ASN , and the set of RLOC addresses that
are authorized to be used along with the respective certificate.”
In the above definition, the xTRID uniquely identifies a LISP border router within
an AS. In order to ensure global and timely dissemination of RAs, we will reuse the
RPKI developed by the SIDR WG. Notice that RPKI has already been implemented and
deployed by ARIN [3] and RIPE [72], and it is now under testing phase. The utilization
of RPKI, however, requires some changes in the LISP architecture. Firstly, LISP Service
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Providers and Mapping System operators require the deployment of an RPKI-Cache to
synchronize with the global RPKI. Secondly, the xTR in the LISP Service Provider and
the MS in the Mapping System have to implement a protocol, similar to the RTR-RPKI
protocol [12]. This is used for the communication with the Local RPKI Cache (LRC),
in order to complete an RA verification query in a timely manner. As for the ROAs,
a LISP Service Provider has to publish its RAs in the RPKI before conducting a map
registration involving an RLOC, so that an MS can verify the legitimate use of the RLOC
address.
Trust Scenarios
Depending on the relation among the different actors, i.e., EID-Holder, ETR, and MS,
we identify three different trust environments for dynamic and secure end-to-end map
registrations: i) completely trusted; ii) partially trusted; and iii) completely untrusted
scenarios.
The First Scenario assumes complete trust between the EID-Holder, ETR and the
MS. This scenario is possible in the case that a user requests an EID through the same
Service Provider from which it plans to request service as well. Furthermore, the Service
Provider runs its own MS. In this scenario, security may be regarded as an optional
requirement.
The Second Scenario assumes trust between the EID-Holder and the ETR only.
This means that the Service Provider does not run a MS, and thus is using the mapping
service offered by a third-party. This scenario has strong security requirements between
the ETR and the MS.
The Third Scenario assumes no trust at all among the EID-Holder, the ETR, and
the MS. This is typically the case of roaming scenarios, and requires strong security
involving the three actors. We focus on this case since it is the worst possible scenario,
which cover up the previous ones.
The rest of the section is devoted to the presentation of our dynamic and secure
end-to-end map registration proposal.
6.2.2 Secure LISP Map Registration
Our secure end-to-end map registration proposal is divided into three stages. In the
first stage, the EID-Holder initiates the Service Request towards the ETR of the Service
Provider. With this request, the Service Provider can register the new EID for the service
in its xTRs. We assume that the EID-Holder is aware of the correct xTRID of the
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Service Provider through which it plans to get the service. The EID-Holder can learn
about the xTRID through different means, e.g., in advance through certified templates
advertised by the providers, online through DHCP, by manual entry, etc. The second
stage is when the Service Provider sends a Map-Register request to the MS for Map
Registration. And the last stage is when the MS verifies and processes the registration
request.
Once the registration is validated, the Mapping System may or may not send back an
acknowledgement to the ETR or to the EID-Holder. The acknowledgement requirement
can be tuned according to the trust environment scenario. As mentioned earlier, we
focus on untrusted scenarios, thus any party can potentially be an attacker. In order
to achieve end-to-end security and EID authorization, we propose to use a shared key
between the EID-Holder and the Map Server, leaving for future research the use of Public
Key Cryptography in this part. The shared key is used as a way to validate the Map
Register request at the MS and achieve EID authorization. Although, this technique is
simple and not far from what is currently defined in LISP (i.e., a shared key between
the ETR and the MS for ETR validation), we will show that our proposal captures the
whole problem and now allows dynamic registrations while offering end-to-end security.
The overall process to secure the map registration is shown in figure 6.1. In the first
stage and prior to the Service Request, the EID-Holder must be aware of the Service
Provider Identity (xTRID) from which it plans to use the service. Then, the EID-Holder
computes α (cf. (6.1)) by first concatenating its EID, xTRID, and a timestamp TS, and
then encrypting this information with the shared key KS it has with the MS.
α =KS (EIDa∥xTRID∥TS) (6.1)
Hence, α is meant to be only visible to the corresponding MS in charge of the EID
prefix, and will be used for the EID authorization process. The EID-Holder sends α in
the Service-Request message to the ETR of the Service Provider, and it also adds in plain
text the RLOC of the target Map Server, RLOCMS , and its prefix EIDa (cf. step 1 in
figure 6.1). Note that a potential attacker within the Service Provider—or the Service
Provider itself—will not be able to change any information in α due to encryption and
lack of KS . Moreover, a replay attack is not feasible as the timestamp may be used as
a key to the registration, denying registrations with invalid timestamps. Furthermore,
the Service Provider cannot overclaim EID prefixes due to the inability to produce a
corresponding α.
Assuming that the Service Provider has already published (e.g., time ago) the
respective RAs on the RPKI for the RLOC that it plans to use during the registration,
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the ETR can send then a signed Map-Register message to the corresponding MS. The
signature in the message includes α (received from the EID-Holder), its xTRID, its
RLOCs, and the EID prefix it wants to register, EIDa (cf. step 2 in figure 6.1).
In the third stage (cf. steps 3 and 4 in figure 6.1), the MS verifies the following:
• It verifies the signature of the Map-Register message. If valid then proceed,
otherwise discard the request.
• It verifies the α and its contents using the respective shared key. If valid then
proceed, otherwise discard the request.
• It verifies if the xTRID inside the α is the same as sent in the Map-Register message.
If valid then proceed, otherwise discard the request.
• It also verifies if the requesting ETR is authorized to register against the RLOCs
present in the Map Register request using the RA and the RPKI. The MS verifies
the xTRID inside the α with the one present in the RA to complete the RLOC
verification process.
If the EID authorization and RLOC verification processes are successful, then the
MS adds this mapping entry into its records and sends back a signed acknowledgement
to the ETR. In order to avoid any Man-in-the-Middle and coordinated attack on the
acknowledgement, the MS includes in the signature of the reply message: an ACK, a
One Time Password (OTP), EIDa (for which it conducted the map registration), and β.
As detailed in (6.2), β is obtained by encrypting: the ACK, the locally generated OTP,
xTRID (against which it registered the EID in the mapping entry), and the timestamp
with the respective shared key KS (cf. step 5 in figure 6.1).
β =KS (ACK∥OTP∥xTRID∥TS) (6.2)
Then, the ETR verifies the signature of the ACK, and if successful, it forwards only
β to the EID-Holder who initiated the Service Request (cf. step 6 in figure 6.1). The
EID-Holder verifies β using the shared key and validates its contents. Note that while α
was meant for the “eyes” of the MS only, β is meant for the “eyes” of the EID-Holder
only.
If successful, the EID-Holder sends back an ACK to the ETR encrypting it with the
OTP. Finally, the ETR verifies the encrypted ACK from the EID-Holder, and completes
the secure triangle that involves the three actors required for providing end-to-end security
in the LISP map registration process. Observe that part of the steps described above
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can be avoided in the other two trust scenarios, since they are less demanding in terms
of security.
In summary, by including: (a) A shared key between the EID-Holder and the MS; and
(b) the RAs, our solution can achieve both EID authorization and RLOC verification,
thus enabling dynamic and end-to-end secure map registrations.
6.3 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the overhead that our solution imposes on the current LISP
implementation. We will first introduce the experimental testbed that we used for carrying
out the experiments. Then, we will examine the impact on the number of messages
required to achieve secure map registrations in an end-to-end fashion. And finally, we will
analyze the overheads caused by different types of signatures and encryption algorithms.
6.3.1 Testbed
The objectives of the experiments in the testbed are two-fold. First, to evaluate the
feasibility and reach of RLOC spoofings with the different LISP implementations. And
second, to analyze the information exchanged among the different actors during the map
registration process.
The testbed used for assessing and validating our map registration solution is shown
in figure 6.2. It describes the network topology, the split between three different EID-
Prefixes and a common RLOC address space. On top of this, a three nodes mapping
system with one Map Server is depicted. The testbed is built using GNS3 [31], and runs
two different implementations of LISP, one with a Cisco IOS image for the xTRs in
the LISP-Sites EID-site1 and EID-site2, and another running OpenLISP [67] on the
LISP-Site EID-site3. To complete the testbed we used the LISP-DDT Cisco IOS image
[63] for the Mapping System In order to enable the LISP control-plane functionality in
xTR3, we configured Open Control-Plane [13] on top of OpenLISP. Moreover, the MS
and the xTRs were configured with their respective EID-prefixes, including their shared
keys.
In this setting, we were able to confirm that multiple RLOC spoofing attacks are
feasible, and we were also able to asses the performance and overhead of our solution to
avoid such attacks.
























Fig. 6.2 Experimental LISP Tesbed with LISP-DDT Mapping System.
6.3.2 Overhead in the Number of Messages
As currently defined in LISP, the map registration process consists of two messages.
The first one is the Map-Register message from the ETR toward the MS. This message
includes a claimed EID prefix, a set of RLOCs (each with its attributes according to
the Traffic Engineering policy), and a block of Authentication Data (AD). The second
message is an acknowledgement from the MS to the ETR, and it is actually optional.
The Authentication Data in the first message provides a minimum level of security by
validating the entire Map-Register message payload.
Although current LISP specification deems sufficient to send only two messages for
the Map Registration, this approach provides only basic security guarantees over the
whole process. In particular, the fact that the EID-Holder is not involved in the process
makes it susceptible to a number of serious attacks, which can undermine the whole
LISP functionality. In our proposal, we require a higher amount of messages, though
offering significantly improved and adaptable end-to-end security. As shown in Figure
6.1, in the worst case our scheme requires seven messages. More precisely, messages
5–7 are required to counter Man-In-the-Middle and coordinated attacks between the
EID-Holder and the ETR, so they only apply for the untrusted scenario defined in Section
6.2. The first five messages are sufficient in partially trusted scenarios, i.e., in trusted
environments except between the ETR and the Map Server. Note that these include the
final acknowledgement from the MS, which is optional in LISP. Indeed, in a completely
trusted scenario, only the first four messages are needed to provide end-to-end security
to the map registration process.

























Fig. 6.3 Service-Request message format.
In the first stage of our proposal, the registration is initiated by the EID-Holder, which
sends a Service-Request message towards the Service Provider (cf. Step 1 in Fig. 6.1).
This is a new LISP control-plane message consisting of the following information: [ EID
prefix ∥ RLOCMS ∥ α ]. Figure 6.3 shows the proposed Service-Request LISP message
format—recall that α contains encrypted data. In the second stage, we keep the same
message format as already defined in the specification of LISP Map-Register message.
However, the AD field is replaced by α and the signature data of the message payload.
Likewise, for the third stage, the acknowledgement message, namely, the Map-Notify,
can keep its format as in the current specifications, but we insert the encrypted β and
the payload’s signature data on the AD field. Furthermore, for messages 6 and 7, we can
reuse the Service-Request message format shown in figure 6.3.
6.3.3 Overhead caused by the Security Enhancements
The proposed solution produces some overhead on LISP’s control-plane messages, in-
creasing their size due to the extra information required to improve the security. We
first analyze the new Service-Request message. This message includes the encrypted
α information, whose size depends directly on the selected encryption algorithm. To
compare the results in terms of the size necessary to encrypt the data, we encrypted
α using different alternatives of up-to-date versions of the AES encryption algorithm.
We selected AES since it is a broadly supported and an efficient algorithm; it can be
implemented in hardware, and most importantly, it is considered secure. The results
obtained are summarized in Table 6.1, which shows the overhead incurred for each
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Encryption Signature











DSA-SHA-1 1024 48 144
DSA-SHA-1 2048 72 168
DSA-SHA-256 1024 48 144
DSA-SHA-256 2048 72 168






DSA-SHA-1 1024 48 144
DSA-SHA-1 2048 72 168
DSA-SHA-256 1024 48 144
DSA-SHA-256 2048 72 168
ECDSA-SHA-1-P256 256 72 168
a AES-CBC encryption Mode.
b Counting the size of the Initialization Vector (IV).
Table 6.1 New Map Registration Process Security Overhead
message, considering the encryption type, the signature, and their sum for computing
the overall overhead.
In this evaluation, we considered an IPv6 EID-prefix (128 bits), 128 bits for xTRID
and a timestamp of 64 bits. This adds up to a total of 320 bits (40 bytes) for α. Once
encrypted, α grows to a size between 48 and 64 bytes, plus the Initialization Vector (IV)
amounting to a total between 64 and 96 bytes depending on the selected AES key depth.
On top of that, the new message has also to include the EID-prefix, and the RLOC of its
Map Server (RLOCMS). Again, assuming that we are using only IPv6 addresses, the
estimated size of the new message is 56 bytes + α (cf. Fig. 6.3 for the whole message
format). For the second message, i.e., the Map-Register, the overhead imposed by our
solution includes α plus the signature of the message payload. All this information
replaces the AD present in the legacy version. Thus, the impact on the overhead can be
addressed by analyzing the total amount of bits that α plus the signature incur. Table
6.1 shows the size of the Map-Register message’s signature data for different algorithms,
as well as the total overhead including the size of α. For this analysis, we considered
that AES-256 provides good enough strength security to encrypt α. Therefore, the
total overhead oscillates between 144 to 168 bytes depending on the selected signature
algorithm.
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As for the third change in the control-plane messages required by our proposal, i.e.,
those that need to be applied on the Map-Notify message, it is sufficient to include an
encrypted acknowledgement β destined for the EID-Holder, and the signature data of the
message itself (cf. message 5 in figure 6.1). The size of β is 328 bits (41 bytes) including:
128 bits for the OTP, 128 bits for the xTRID, 64 bits for the timestamp and 8 bits for
the acknowledgement. Thus, the size of encrypted β, analogously to the case of α, will
depend on the selected AES algorithm. Furthermore, the size of the signature is the
same as the one presented for the Map-Register message in Table 6.1.
Followed by the Map-Notify message, the ETR forwards β towards the EID-Holder in
message number 6 (cf. Fig. 6.1). The estimated size of this message, keeping in mind the
format shown in Fig. 6.3, amounts to 56 bytes + β. In the last message, the EID-Holder
confirms back the acknowledgement for the registration to the ETR. This message includes
encrypted data consisting of the EID-prefix, the timestamp and the acknowledgement bit.
The security overhead of this message is similar to the Service-Request message shown in
Table 6.1.
In summary, the total security overhead of our registration scheme fluctuates approx-
imately between 952 and 1160 bytes, as compared to the 176 to 200 bytes for the current
registration process in LISP.
6.3.4 Overhead over the Map Registration completion time
The time required for the Map Registration completion is another evaluation perspective
that can provide insightful information regarding the caused overhead. To this end,
we have implemented a proof of concept registration process which includes the whole
registration procedure described in Section 6.2, and evaluated the time required to
complete the registration considering different case scenarios.
The first evaluation considers the current map registration process which entails two
players, namely the xTR and the Map Server. Table 6.2 details the case scenarios. We
have considered two different evaluation dimensions, (i) the number of requests per second,
and (ii) the round trip time (rtt) between the xTR and the Map Server. The latter
contemplates the scenarios whether the Map Server is under the same administration
domain as the xTR. Furthermore, we have selected the AES-256 encryption algorithm.
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Case0 Case1 Case2 Case3
Execution
Time 5 min 5 min 5 min 5 min
Avg. Requests
per second 50 100 50 100
xTR to Map Server rtt 10ms 10ms 150ms 150ms
Table 6.2 Experiment cases for the current Map Registration evaluation.
These initial results reveal that the average time required to complete the registration
is between 0.014s and 0.17s according the case scenario. Table 6.3 presents an extended
summary of results per each case scenario described in Table 6.2 for the current registration
process. Furthermore, figure 6.4 depicts a box-plot of the completion time results per
each scenario. Therein, figure 6.4a shows the cases with 50 requests per second and two
different round trip times among the players. Similarly, figure 6.4b depicts the cases with
100 request per second.
The second part of the evaluation considers our proposed end-to-end Map Registration
process. As described in Section 6.2, our approach introduces a new player named the
EID Holder, thus, the number of evaluation cases increases. Table 6.4 describes the
different scenarios considered along with the dimensions for this evaluation, which include,
(i) the number of requests per second, (ii) the rtt between the EID Holder and the xTR,
and (iii) the rtt between the xTR and the Map Server. The different round trip times

















Legacy LISP Map Register completion time (50 requests/s)
(a) Case0 : 10ms xTR - Map Server rrt


















Legacy LISP Map Register completion time (100 requests/s)
(b) Case1 : 10ms xTR - Map Server rrt
Case3 : 150ms xTR - Map Server rrt.
Fig. 6.4 Current LISP Map Registration completion time per case defined at Table 6.2.
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case0 case2 case1 case3
count 14481 14487 28114 28105
mean 0.017791 0.147783 0.017458 0.14742
std 0.004595 0.004592 0.004693 0.004684
min 0.01261 0.142628 0.012554 0.142582
25.00% 0.013212 0.143237 0.012834 0.142806
50.00% 0.021799 0.144952 0.014097 0.143895
75.00% 0.022353 0.152351 0.021968 0.151923
max 0.039508 0.184077 0.086041 0.208665
Table 6.3 Results summary of the LISP Map Registration completion time in seconds
(Table 6.2 describes each case).
administration. We have selected the AES-256 encryption algorithm, and the RSA public
cryptosystem, with a 2048 bits key private key.
The obtained results shows that in average the registration completion time varies
among 0.13s and 0.5s according with the cases scenarios presented in Table 6.4. More
detailed results are described in Table 6.5. Furthermore, figure 6.5 depicts two box-plots
with the completion time results per each scenario. Therein, figure 6.5a shows the cases
with 50 requests per second and three different round trip times among the players.
Similarly, figure 6.5b depicts the cases with 100 request per second.
Overall, the initial results reveal insight regarding the overhead introduced in the
whole registration completion time. First, the time for the registration is impacted by
the network latency among the players (i.e. the EID-Holder, the xTR and the Map
Server). This has shown that in the context of this evaluation, the overhead introduced
by the security and encryption chores is lower than the network latency. For the legacy
registration process, the average time is 0.017s and 0.147s for two different scenarios
(i.e., network rtt of 10ms and 150ms between the xTR and the MS respectively).
Case0 Case1 Case2 Case3 Case4 Case5
Execution
Time 5 min 5 min 5 min 5 min 5 min 5 min
Avg. Request
per second 50 100 50 100 50 100
EidHolder - xTR rtt 10ms 10ms 10ms 10ms 150ms 150ms
xTR - Map Server rtt 35ms 35ms 150ms 150ms 150ms 150ms
Table 6.4 Experiments cases for the New LISP Map Registration process
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LISP Map Register completion time (100 requests/s)
(b) Case1, Case3 and Case5 from Table 6.4.
Fig. 6.5 New LISP Map Registration completion time per each case defined in Table 6.4.
Similarly, the results for our proposal varies from 0.13s to 0.5s in cases where the
network latency between the EID-Holder, the xTR and MS are different. The worst case
considers rtt of 150ms between the three players. These experiments exclude the time
required for RA verification.
On the other hand, the results obtained regarding the impact of concurrent registration
requests over the registration time shows no major impact at the considered rates. We
have tested two different rates of 50 and 100 requests per second in our tests. However,
evaluations with higher rates are part of our future work.
Clearly, enhancing the security has an associated cost, but the benefits obtained allow
for a broader technological reach, especially in areas requiring mobility, where the users
roam to foreign networks while keeping their original identifiers and sessions alive. With
case0 case2 case4 case1 case3 case5
count 14540 14535 14522 28286 28322 28241
mean 0.136321 0.207677 0.50058 0.138596 0.248163 0.49998
std 0.006358 0.006592 0.006688 0.007866 0.008369 0.00827
min 0.121722 0.146254 0.485457 0.124312 0.233724 0.485022
25.00% 0.132493 0.203519 0.495773 0.133022 0.243762 0.495272
50.00% 0.136235 0.206685 0.500919 0.138953 0.247043 0.499547
75.00% 0.140125 0.212899 0.504468 0.142258 0.253155 0.504726
max 0.207922 0.222357 0.566902 0.291389 0.392101 0.622083
Table 6.5 Results summary of the new LISP Map Registration completion time (in
seconds) for each case described in Table 6.4
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our lightweight solution, this can be achieved without the complexities and extra burden
of tunneling across protocols and mobile technologies.
6.4 Summary and Contributions
This chapter describes our approach for addressing the LISP control plane issues
described in Chapter 5. We propose a novel and adaptable EID-to-RLOC registration
process that works end-to-end and covers both EID and RLOC authorizations. The
inclusion of the EID holder in the registration plays a key role in the enhancement of user
Mobility. Our proposal enables an EID holder to dynamically register its current location
with the RLOCs made available by the service provider. This results in a decoupling
between the end user EID and her representing ETR. In other words, an EID holder is
enabled to verify the RLOC proposed by the service with support of her Map Server
(i.e., RLOC authorization), while the service provider in parallel verifies the proper EID
authorization.
Our approach leverages on the design and infrastructure already developed by the
IETF’s Secure InterFomain Routing (SIDR) working group for resolving the RLOC
authorization part, while presenting a potential adoption blueprint. The outcomes of our
work have been published in:
• D. Montero, M. Yannuzzi, A. Shaw, L. Jacquin, A. Pastor, R. Serral-Gracià, A.
Lioy, F. Risso, C. Basile, R. Sassu, M. Nemirovsky, F. Ciaccia, M. Georgiades,
S. Charalambides, J. Kuusijarvi, F. Bosco. “Virtualized Security at the Network
Edge: A User-centric Approach,” in IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 53, no.
4, pp. 176-186, April 2015. DOI: 10.1109/MCOM.2015.7081092
Part III: End-points and Users
security vulnerabilities
Chapter 7
End Users security and the
device-centric protection
The security of Internet end users and endpoints contemplates a wide range of threats
starting at the moment they are connected and reachable. An end user is the victim of
an attack when her device has been compromised in an attempt to steal information or
gain access to it and further escalate the attack. Similarly, an attack can consists of the
sharing of rogue information in deceitful form (e.g. a rogue attached file or link) which
seems normal, but is actually effective once locally opened or executed. In this work, we
consider the attacks that can be derived from a remote site through a network connection
(e.g., the Internet), either by directly attempting to connect and remote control it or
by sharing rogue information (e.g. a malware file or spam email). Attacks that require
physical access to the devices, for instance a virus infection via an external USB memory,
are out of the scope of this work.
This section describes a serious problem that concerns normal end-users as the number
of Internet-enabled devices utilized to access the network increases, so does their security
complexity. More devices result in more possible attack targets over a user. The security
protection over the devices are usually specialized solutions customized accordingly with
the devices characteristics, such as hardware architecture or operating system. This
device-centric security paradigm focus more on securing the specific device, while ignoring
the end user security over other devices. A lack of traversal security more focused on
the user rather than in the specific device is raising. To elaborate, a user can have
the protection software on her laptop, but no security solutions (or default protection
provided by the operating system) on her smart-phone or tablet.
From a network perspective, the network security enforced by a provider represents a
device-independent protection. However, this protection is usually not in a per-user basis
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and differs between network providers. It focuses on the aggregated protection of security
policies based on coarse, generic user-profiles. Consequently, this results in a hurdle
for a user to obtain the same level of network security protection independently of the
network attachment and location, as well as having customizable per-user security policies.
Furthermore, user devices support multiple Internet connection technologies, which foster
not only connection diversity but also mobility. The multi-connectivity of user devices
adds up to the complexity of getting similar network protections, independently of the
chosen networking connection and provider. The latter poses a major challenge as it
considers the cases when different user’s network connections are provided by either the
same provider or different providers (e.g., a public WiFi access point and a different
3/4G provider.) Different network domains mean different rules and security protection
policies, which might come along with the type of subscribed contract.
This problem is exacerbated more when we consider the Internet of Things IoT devices
a user might own. These also require security protection when directly connected to a
public network. In this case, on top of devices diversity, there are other drivers regarding
their lack of security. More specifically, due to their constrained-resources nature, the
toll for having local security protection may go in detriment with their final purpose.
Thus, many IoT manufactures prioritize the main “thing” functionalities over security.
The rest of this section describes the problems delineated above and our approach to
address them. In a nutshell, we propose a change of paradigm which consists of providing
end-user security in an offloaded manner. We shall describe the goals of a user-centric
security, and the vision of decoupling the security from the devices toward the network,
with emphasis in the network edge. We discuss the suitability of our proposal and
its alignment with current tendencies in the areas of Software Defined Network SDN,
Network Function Virtualization and Fog Computing.
7.1 The Device-Centric security paradigm
The current device-centric protection model against security threats has serious limitations.
This basically consists of installing a set of security applications on each device, such
as anti-virus software and personal firewall. An average user nowadays has multiple
terminals, including a smartphone, a smart TV, and a notebook, and in many cases
also a tablet, a desktop computer and even a game console. These devices usually have
different capabilities, architectures and operating systems (e.g. Android, MAC IOS, and
Linux). Thus, the appropriate protection tools may not be available for all platforms.
As a result, the most common practice is to install different security applications on
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the various terminals, or simply rely on the default protection means provided by the
operating systems.
Let us assume for a moment that users would like to have the same security policy and
exactly the same protection level enforced on all of their devices. In the context of this
thesis, we shall call this the “uniform security aim”. To achieve this goal, the user would
need to understand the configuration details of each device, which typically involves
the setup of different security applications on different platforms. For non-technically
savvy people, this turns out to be an impossible hurdle to overcome. As a result, most
Internet users suffer from wide variations in their protection levels, and this problem is
exacerbated as the number of devices per user grows.
We propose a user-centric model for security protection which is independent of
the device utilized. This paradigm specifically addresses the two main drawbacks of
the device-centric protection, i.e., (a) the need for dissimilar installations of security
applications in different devices due to their different platforms, and (b) the problem of
non-uniform protection to the user due to the difficulties in the configurations needed.
This proposal is not devised as a competitor for the device-centric protection model;
quite on the contrary, it is envisioned as an ally for improving the user and endpoints
security. The contributions and results from this work were aligned with the SECURED
research project [78].
To cope with the first problem, we propose a model in which the protection and
security policies are now unified and remain homogeneous for each user, independent
of the device used. This is achieved by means of a user-specific trusted virtual domain
(TVD), which is dynamically instantiated at a secure place in the network edge. As
we shall show, the TVD can be instantiated either on the user’s side (e.g., on a home
gateway) or on the provider’s side (e.g., on a next-generation broadband access site
handling the user’s connections). This concept is aligned and can leverage the concepts
of Network Function Virtualization (NFV), Edge Computing and Cloud Computing.
The second problem identified above represents a big challenge around of a user-
defined security model with emphasis at ease of use by design. There is a main importance
in how the protection policies are exposed to the average user in a high-level, alongside
the necessity to enforce the configurations required transparently. This strategy detaches
the definition of the protection policies from their corresponding configurations, thus
allowing tailored protection even by non-technically savvy users.
Moreover, the envisioned model should support multiple actors who could simulta-
neously operate on the same traffic. Each of these actors may impose its potentially
conflicting security policy. For instance, a user can decide the level of protection that

















Fig. 7.1 User-centric model paradigm: (a) Current device-centric protection, (b)offloading
security to the virtualized access network.
he needs, but the ISP may impose other limitations in order to guarantee the integrity
of its network. In turn, the Government may impose additional restrictions. In case of
conflict between the different policies in the hierarchy, our approach is to automatically
resolve such anomalies, and inform the user about the issue and its outcome.
In order to resolve such conflicts, a “Reconciliation” [56] process is required. It takes
the policies of the different actors that must be reconciled, and obtains a single set of
policies to be enforced by the user’s PSAs. The core of this process is the resolution
of contradictions among rules from different policies. Priorities and hierarchies are
some of the simplest forms to resolve contradictions (i.e., rules from higher priority
policies/actors prevail), and they typically map well to contractual frameworks. However,
custom reconciliation strategies can be defined. The user-friendly policies definitions and
reconciliations are out of the scope of this work, and further information is detailed in
[60] within the context of the SECURED project.
It is important to highlight that the offloaded virtualized security model here described
can be applied both to residential and corporate scenarios. We describe its application
in the form of a multi-tenant platform, considering the main stakeholders involved (i.e.,
service providers, infrastructure providers, security application developers, and users).
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7.2 A different Protection Paradigm
Figure 7.1 depicts the basic concepts, showing the evolution from device-specific security
to a common security framework for all devices hosted in the access network. In our
model, security applications that are commonplace today (anti-virues, firewalls, content
inspection tool, etc.) shall be called personal security applications (PSAs). Observe that
under the current protection model, the heterogeneity of devices and platforms requires
the installation of various PSAs with similar roles and functions; actually, four PSAs are
required in the example shown in figure 7.1(a). Also, observer that some devices may
remain completely unprotected, as in the case of some smart TVs.
Under our paradigm, the heterogeneous set of PSAs protecting the different devices
is now moved and consolidated into a TVD. The TVD is positioned to handle and secure
all the user’s connections and exchanged information from and to the Internet. Each one
only needs to host the minimum set of complementary PSAs required by the user (e.g.,
an anti-virus and a firewall in the example).
A TVD is a “logical container” that is instantiated per user, and is composed of the
following elements:
• The execution environments hosting the user’s PSAs.
• The required data, control and management plane interconnectivity in order to
guarantee the isolation between different users’ TVDs.
The virtual idea of a TVD enables its allocation and instantiation at either end of
the access link, as shown in figure 7.1(b). Indeed, as a logical container, a TVD may run
entirely within a single network edge device (NED), or in a distributed way involving
several network devices. In our terminology, a NED is a device with virtualization
capabilities that supports the instantiation of TVDs in a multi-tenant manner. If
the TVD is placed in a user’s premises, the NED could be either an enhanced home
gateway or customer premises equipment (CPE). Those devices may need additional
compute, storage and networking resources, and could be managed by the Internet
Service Provider (ISP). If the TVD is placed in the ISP premises, as will be the case
with the upcoming Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) based access networks [21],
or similarly in an infrastructure with Fog Computing [93], a pool of nodes belonging to
the provider infrastructure could be the NEDs devoted to host the users’ TVDs. Note
that this second deployment strategy leverages the virtualization and processing power of
commodity hardware, and the unquestionable trend toward its ubiquite at the network
edge—although it does not exclude the adoption of the first deployment strategy.
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This model has a remarkable advantage over cloud-based protection [80]. Whereas in
the latter case the virtualized resources supporting the users’ security are rarely on the
path that would naturally be followed by user traffic, in our model the TVD is always
instantiated on-path. In other words, our model avoids routing detours, which would
occur if the TVDs are located off the path between the user terminal and its traffic, e.g.,
in the cloud.
7.3 User-Centric Offloaded Security Architecture
This section introduces the envisioned architecture to support the offloading of users’
security applications to their nearest compatible NED. The architecture is specifically
devised to be heavily multi-tenanted and flexible enough to be used in scale-out systems.
From a use case point of view, it can be expanded and deployed in a variety of ways,
ranging from small set-top boxes or home gateways up to deployments on a much larger
scale in a distributed environment (e.g., in localized data centers at the edge of ISP
networks). Furthermore, it considers also the dynamic behavior of mobile users and our
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Fig. 7.2 The basic SECURED architecture showing a multi-tenant scheme on a Point of
Presence (POP).
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7.3.1 General Overview
The architecture must support the dynamic allocation and instantiation of users’ security.
The security functionality of each user can be comprised of different PSAs in a defined
arrangement through service chaining, and these PSAs can be deployed within the same
physical host or in a distributed manner. As a result, the architecture is required to
support massive multi-tenancy, which implies isolation of users, their applications, and
network traffic. A general view of the basic architecture is depicted in figure 7.2. The
figure shows a generic deployment (e.g., on an NFV POP of an ISP). It is worth noting
that, in simpler deployments (e.g., when the NED is a home gateway), the functionality
provided by some of the systems on top of figure 7.2 could be simplified and embedded in
the NED itself, or they could not be needed, such as the case of the NFV Orchestrator.
Overall, the TVD concept has been designed as an isolated environment which will
hold the security applications of a user, and will in turn process the user’s traffic. A TVD
comprises one or more Execution Environments (EEs). An EE is a lightweight and heavily
controlled environment that contains and executes one or more user PSAs—each one
operating on the principle of least-privilege. Thus, in general two levels of isolation are
defined: i) the Compartmentalization Layer, which is mainly responsible for the isolation
between user TVDs; and ii) the Containment Layer, which handles isolation between
PSAs within an EE. Thus, an EE could be either a Compartment or a Containment
layer, respectively.
A derived requirement posed by multi-tenancy is network isolation. The proposed
architecture must ensure the isolation of traffic amongst different users. More precisely,
each tenant will be configured with a dedicated and private virtual network. This network
connects the different PSAs with the end user on one side, and the Internet on the other
side. Furthermore, the architecture defines a private management network that sets
up, controls and manages the different TVDs. Both the Compartmentalization and
Containment Layers have a Control and Management component, which aims to establish
a separation between the technology independent part and the implementation-dependent
technology. Likewise, this separation is in concordance and aligned with the proposed
NFV architecture (further elaborated in section 7.3.5).
The second requirement is related to the establishment of trust between the end user’s
device and the corresponding TVD entrance point. This requirement is vital, since users
would like to establish a certain level of trust prior to requesting the instantiation of
security applications and sending their traffic. We address this requirement by leveraging
two security concepts, i.e., the establishment of virtual secure tunnels and the concept of
Remote Attestation (RA). The prior consists on the establishment of a secure channel
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between the user’s device and its access point to the TVD, while the lather focuses
on trusted computing mechanisms to measure the system software upon component
startup, where resulting measurement digests are held by a secure root of trust, e.g.
a hardware device like a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [95]. These measurements
can be cryptographically signed by the device and sent to the users whenever they
send an attestation request. The process of RA has proven to be a major challenge for
SECURED project and is out of the scope of this work. Further information on the
project’s contribution in this regard can be found at [60].
7.3.2 Main Components
Security Module: This module is the front end, which is contacted during the con-
nection establishment. It is comprised of two elements, the Attestation Agent and the
Authentication module. Prior to authenticating, the end user first attempts to establish a
secure connection with its nearest or designated NED. In parallel, a challenge request to
perform an attestation of its software configuration is submitted. A mutually Trusted
Third Party (TTP) system is involved in the attestation process. The TTP is responsible
to keep a copy of known-good measurements, and provide a secure verification service to
the user for verifying remote attestation responses. After a successful check, a secure
channel is created and the user safely sends his credentials to the Authentication module.
Authentication System: The authentication of users is a key component of the
proposed architecture. This can be implemented either using a local (standalone) au-
thentication system, or relying on an existing external authentication infrastructure (e.g.,
an AAA+ system). The result of the authentication process is to obtain tokens allowing
the interplay between the main components within a NED, and external subsystems,
such as the PSA repositories. Once the user is authenticated, the instantiation of his
security and the proper steering of her traffic must be enforced.
NED Control and Management: Once the user is authenticated, this module
retrieves the user policies and metadata related to the composition of the required
security applications. After that, the Control and Management module drives the instan-
tiation of the user TVD, including its applications and the setup of the virtual network.
More specifically, this module determines the resources required for the user TVD, and
commands the instantiations required as well as the deployment and interconnection of
the PSAs. This computation encompasses an analysis of the required compartments,
containments and virtual networks to be allocated in order to instantiate the security
applications. This analysis considers the PSA requirements along with the availability
of resources, and the required configuration on the network (physical and virtual). In
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addition, this module also manages the extension of the user data path to connect the
user’s device to the newly created TVD.
NFV Orchestration System: In an NFV POP, the NED Control and Management
module is assisted by the NFV Orchestration system, However, in simpler scenarios, the
former could entirely handle all the configurations required. In other words, when the
NED is embodied in a home gateway of a residential user, the orchestrations needed will
be handled locally without requiring and external orchestrator. In general terms, the
NFV Orchestration system should deal with the instantiations and configurations in large
distributed systems (e.g., an NFV POP), and preferably, in a “technology-agnostic” way.
The “technology-dependent” part could be managed by the Control and Management
module embedded in the NED.
Security Policy Manager: This module is in charge of handling the users’ policies
and the reconciliation process prior to performing the configuration of the user’s PSAs.
The reconciliation of policies are derived from a multi player policy definition, which
might include policies defined by different entities, for example a goverment, service
provider, or a father over his children. The policy reconciliation is a key novelty within
the SECURED project and further details can be found at [60]
PSA Repositories: The applications are retrieved from these repositories with
their respective manifest of capabilities. These are then further instantiated within an
Execution Environment context part of a TVD.
End User App: This is the only application that needs to be installed in a user
device. Its role is basically to support the secure communications with the NED, to
handle the Remote Attestations and to signal and coordinate the user mobility.
Overall, the architecture introduced in this section allows the dynamic creation of
trusted and virtualized execution environments throughout the access network. In this
framework, several actors such as users, corporate ICT managers, infrastructure providers,
security service providers, and software developers, can interplay and benefit from our
user-centric protection model. An important remark about the proposed architecture is
its alignment with the emerging NFV technology. It will be essential for guaranteeing its
scalability. The following section details the usage of NFV as the execution framework
for a distributed implementation of the proposed architecture.
The subsequent section introduces an example of a home user case scenario, which
describes the interactions among the different components.
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7.3.3 User-centric security initialization steps
This section describes a home user case scenario, which consists of a end user requesting the
offloaded security service, and its instantiation at his provider edge network. We assume
that the user previously defined his policies and required security application through
a different channel. In a nutshell, the whole process consists of a user authentication,
user profile fetch and PSA retrieval, and finally the instantiation and configuration of
the security application.
Figure 7.3 illustrates the sequence diagram of a user requesting the offloaded security
protection. This case we assume that the user’s profile has already been created. The
steps include:
1. User authentication: the NED authenticates the user using his SECURED
credentials; upon successful authentication, the SM receives the session token back.
2. Request TVD creation: the SM requests the Orchestrator to instantiate a basic
TVD for the user (and passes the session token).
3. User profile query: the orchestrator uses the session token to fetch the user
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Fig. 7.3 Sequence diagram of an end user authentication and security protection instanti-
ation.
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4. TVD creation: the NED Management allocates and configures a new the TVD
at the edge devices. This module validates the resources availability and properly
assigns the PSAs across them. The simplest case considers one NED device at the
user’s premises.
5. Fetch user’s policies: the Orchestrator fetches the policies from a Policy Repos-
itory. These policies are defined through a secondary channel by the users prior
requesting the offloaded protection.
6. Fetch user’s PSAs: The Orchestrator validates the user’s PSAs local availability,
and whether necessary fetch them from a PSA repository.
7. PSA setup: The Orchestrator sets up the TVD’s network configuration and
installs the PSAs.
8. Secure datapath channel: the secure channel from the user is extended to the
PSAs. From this point on, all the user traffic pass through its PSAs.
The virtualization of the network and of the compartmentalization enforcement
layer allows the SECURED architecture to easily scale–out to local data-centres, such
as the case of NFV POPs of telecom operators in the access network. Observe that,
independently of whether the user’s TVD is confined to a single NED or it is distributed
across the virtualized infrastructure, the functional view of SECURED for the user would
remain exactly the same.
Overall, the architecture discussed in this section creates a trusted and virtualized
execution environment at the access network, allowing different actors such as single
users, corporate ICT managers, infrastructure providers, security service providers, and
software developers to interplay, and benefit from the proposed paradigm shift in user
protection.
The next section describe the reference implementations we considered in
7.3.4 Reference Implementation
This section describes in more detail core components of our proposed architecture from
an implementation perspective. Therein, we include different technologies that could be
leveraged to implement an embodiment of the envisioned architecture.
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Trusted Virtual Domain TVD
The Trusted Virtual Domain represents a logical abstraction, agnostic of where it is
instantiated. It comprises all the executing components for handling and securing a user
traffic, including different execution environments and possibly multiple virtual switches.
The latter are in charge of properly chaining the PSAs.
Execution Environment
An Execution Environment (EE) represents the framework where a PSA is executed.
There are different options to implement an EE, which include:
• Full VM virtualization: a guest operating system running in a partition of the
physical host. The hypervisor is in charge of enforcing the isolation of EEs. This
option enables the execution of different PSAs that require the same OS.
• Lightweight virtualization: Container-based execution environment which shares
the host OS. This type of execution environment restricts the PSAs OS options.
• Language-specific VMs: this option is a higher abstraction technology specific EE
like the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Its disadvantage stems from the software
compatibility required giving the stringent language requirements.
The number and types of EEs is decided by the orchestrator according with the
user’s PSAs characteristics and available resources. The objective is to chain the PSAs
in the least number of EEs possible by grouping multiple PSAs that share the same
execution environment characteristics (e.g., all the application that run in linux). This is
a non-trivial task, which is beyond the scope of this work. We refer the reader to [60] for
more details.
PSA implementation categories
Our proposal envision different types of PSAs, which depends on their implementation
characteristics and requirements. Among the possible options:
• Standard Executable: this PSA category encompasses any security application
which is packaged as standard executable (e.g., an application running in a specific
operating system). A single Execution Environment can host different PSAs.
• Full-fledged Virtual Machine: this type of PSA runs within its own execution
environment without any compromise with other PSAs. Note that in this case, the
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PSA is coupled with the proper management and control modules to enable the
control, monitoring and configuration of the execution environment along with its
PSA.
• Container-based: the PSA is packaged in a container image, while the execution
environment is shared by the TVD.
All in all, a prototype implementation of this architecture can be found in [79]. This
implementation was the result of the joint work done during the SECURED project.
7.3.5 Mapping SECURED onto NFV
NFV is currently positioned as the main technology for building network functions by
means of virtualization techniques. In NFV, network services are built by deploying
and composing such functions on top of a virtualized infrastructure. Figure 7.4a depicts
the general architectural framework defined by NFV. The complete description of each
component can be found in [22].
The SECURED architecture, and in particular its most promising model based on the
concept of a SECURED POP, is specifically tailored to be supported by NFV. In this way,
network operators can leverage NFV plasticity and scalability when planning the provision
of SECURED-based services. Figure 7.4b shows how the SECURED architecture maps
to the NFV reference framework. Since the Operations and Business Support Systems
(OSS/BSS) and the NFV Orchestrator are the general elements for configuring the global
service operation and management of the network provider, they can act as general support
mechanisms for SECURED-enabled services. The description repositories that the VNF
architecture considers for the infrastructure and services will now contain SECURED-
specific ones, as well as application repositories. The common NFV infrastructure is used
through a virtualization layer that enforces compartmentalization and the containment
of each VNF for a single user after appropriate attestation. These actions are managed
by the interplay between the NFV Orchestrator and the NED CTRL & MGMT module.
Moreover, the PSAs are mapped into individual components of a VNF, matching
the so-called VNFCs (VNF Components). These VNFCs are the deployment units
considered by the NFV framework, which perfectly match the nature of PSAs. This is
because PSAs are modular components of the security services offered to users, and they
are dynamically instantiated according to the policies applicable to the particular user.
Also, observe that the Element Management Systems (EMSs) map to the control and
management functions of the Execution Environments in SECURED.
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(b) SECURED alignment with NFV.
Fig. 7.4 SECURED vision aligned with NFV.
Finally, the mapping of the Security Module to VNF Managers (VNFMs) becomes
a natural consequence. The VNFMs are responsible of VNF lifecycle management and























































































































































Fig. 7.5 Positioning SECURED considering some of the most common tools as well as
some of the most recent and compelling solutions in the area.
can be specialized according to VNF goals and characteristics. Thus, they could be
differentiated from other functions out of the SECURED scope, while still able to be
integrated under the general operator orchestration mechanisms.
In summary, NFV represents a perfect deployment environment for SECURED,
especially, considering that NFV will be implemented to scale up to several thousand
nodes.
7.4 Positioning SECURED within the security panorama
The offloaded security model proposed in this thesis has several distinctive factors that
make it unique. To show this, we position SECURED in the current spectrum of
protection techniques, and highlight its main differences with state-of-the-art solutions.
The spectrum of solutions designed to counter security threats is really broad. The
solutions available today can be reasonably categorized according to the table shown in
figure 7.5. As it can be observed, there are solutions that are focused on protecting the
end user device, while others propose different forms of security offloading. Moreover,
current protection schemes can be classified based on whether they are user-centric,
device-centric, network-centric, or corporate-centric. In a nutshell, figure 7.5 presents a
high-level comparison of different security protection schemes according to two general
criteria: i) the targeted protection model; and ii) where the security is enforced.
As far as our knowledge, SECURED is the only solution available nowadays that
proposes a true user-centric model, which specifically addresses the need for device-
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independent security. An important aspect to highlight is that, conversely to many of
the offloading solutions available today, which are typically deployed in the Cloud, our
solution admits a rich variety of deployments on either edge of an access link. Cloud-based
solutions provide compelling protection schemes while avoiding several of the overheads
for end-users (e.g., for corporate customers). The downside, however, is that: (a) they
require routing detours; (b) they are not really user-centric (at least not yet); (c) they
do not provide essential trust means, such as remote attestation; (d) they do not support
advanced features such as policy reconciliation techniques; and e) total or partial support
for user mobility.
7.5 Resource-constrained Devices (IoT) Security Pro-
tection
In the next few years, more and more “things” will produce and consume data in ways we
are just starting to envision. Many of these “things” will be part of much larger systems,
which will obviously require compute, network and storage capacity for processing their
data and controlling their actuation. Similarly, these devices shall come enabled with
different network connectivity technologies, which expose them to local-area or Internet-
wide interactions. These interactions may or may not include a human, enabling new
types of interactions like machine-to-human and machine-to-machine [35]. The security
implications derived from the diversity of devices and their functionalities, the types of
interactions, and the services they support remain as an open challenge.
The IoT security challenges stem from at least four dimensions: device diversity,
number of nodes, resource constraints, and system exposure. Similar to the end user
device-centric protection, the IoT device diversity poses a major challenge to provide
a consistent and general way to manage the device security. This challenge is amplified
as the number of IoT devices is expected to increase exponentially. Moreover,
as in other areas, providing security and protections over such devices already resource
constrained represents a big issue, as security is known to be a resource intensive feature.
The trade-off between protection and efficiency will highly depend on how critical the
device functionality is, and its available resources.
On top of all these issues, we believe that another major challenge derives from
the network connectivity exposure, where, IP-enabled IoT devices are reachable
from any other IP endpoint, extending the reach of the Internet to the physical world,
alongside with its vulnerabilities. These kinds of devices support the interaction cloud–
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thing (left part of figure 7.6). Meanwhile, other IoT devices with different network access
technologies depend on a gateway or a hub (right par of figure 7.6). This external
component enables a better security for the things, while also aggregating and processing
the collected information prior to publish it to the cloud. At the same time, this approach
promotes vertical, and closed IoT solutions.
7.5.1 IoT device protection
The nature of the elements in the Internet of Things (IoT) is expected to be quite
elementary, which means that they will embed the computing, storage and network
resources specifically provisioned to sustain their primal function. This design principle
has opened a wide spectrum of new devices, ranging from streamlined temperature
and air sensors, smart locks, to more processing powerful ones such as video cameras,
smart-TVs, home-hubs, etc. As a result, an innovative environment for entrepreneurship
has arisen, with emphasis on creating and providing new “smart” services based on
the spreading of Internet-capable devices. However, in an attempt to be competitive
IoT entrepreneurs and device manufactures seem to have sacrificed security in favor of
price and time-to-market. This trade-off gets amplified as these devices usually lack
of user-friendly security updates and mechanisms to apply patches, as well as they are
meant to last for years; they are not replaced as often as our laptops or phones, thus
users ignore their security flaws and consequences as long as they work as expected.
The common approach to secure the IoT devices seems to rely on the standard
protections provided by the operating systems and network protocols supported. A more
specific security protection for a specific device might hinder its functionality impacting
its computing capacity or energy consumptions. The heterogeneity of devices along with
their dissimilarities in hardware and software requirements contribute to the IoT security
complexity.
For example, recent distributed denial-of-service attacks have demonstrated the vul-
nerability of Internet of Things (IoT) systems and devices at scale. These attacks have
exploited the vulnerabilities of some IoT devices seeking to build large-scale botnets. A
botnet is a network of infected devices or bots that has a command-and-control infras-
tructure, and is used for malicious activities such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks. In September 2016, an IoT botnet built from the Mirai malware was responsible
for a 600 Gbps attack targeting Brian Krebs’s security blog (krebsonsecurity.com). The
strategy behind Mirai is rather quite simple. It had used a list of 62 common default
usernames and passwords to gain access primarily to home routers, network-enabled
cameras, and digital video recorders [6].
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Fig. 7.6 IoT vertical solutions considering two communications patterns: (a)device-cloud,
and (b) device-gateway-cloud.
The wide diversity of IoT devices in terms of their resources and capabilities influence
different surface attacks. This diversity hinders the enforcement of security protections
at the level of device. However, we shall keep in mind that many of these devices have
specialized functions and predictable behaviors. Monitoring them in an aggregation point
would help not only to detect anomalies which hint potential attacks or compromised
devices, but also enhance the IoT security in general. However, the requirement of a
specific gateway (and its hardware installation) per each device or set of devices induces
to vertical solutions. We further delve into this issue in the next section.
IoT Vertical Solutions: The Silos Problem
IoT solutions have evolved from a closed, proprietary approach where initially the
device’s communication technologies and protocols were proprietary. The reasons behind
were the specific devices’ requirements regarding their constrained resources. Thus,
the vendors’ business model consisted on providing a whole vertical solution starting
from the specialized “thing”, its streamlined communication protocol, an in-between
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application-gateway (or hub) up to a specific service at the cloud (figure 7.6) [28]. This
approach fostered a silo problem, where for each IoT solution a complete new vertical is
required. For example, a Smart City would end up with a really complex aggregated
system of different verticals solutions, each one increasing the overall complexity.
The interoperability between IoT ecosystems remain an open problem, partially
derived by their different architectures for communication. For example, the popular
RESTful architecture in web and web-based applications has resulted in the IoT spe-
cific RESTful protocol stacks, i.e., CoAP. In contrast, device-to-device communication
protocols and stacks like MQTT or DDS have existed before the popularization of IoT.
This has resulted in IoT data models tightly coupled to the protocol stacks supported by
the device. Thus, there is a lack of standard data models specifications regarding the
semantic descriptions of objects and their capabilities.
In an effort to open the IoT solutions and boost standardization regarding the commu-
nications of the Things with local-area networks or the Internet, different standardization
communities have worked on Internet-like standards and communication protocols. For
instance, low-power wireless protocols options include Bluetooth Low Energy [10], Wi-Fi
HaLow [91] (based on the IEEE 802.11ah specification [5]), Zigbee [96], Z-Wave [83] and
6LoWPAN [59] (all three based on the IEEE 802.15.4 specification [36]). These efforts’
focus has been on enabling IP-based communications to the things, while providing
interoperability at the network and communication levels.
On the other hand, the needs for building more complex and inter-operable systems
have influenced initiatives upper in the stack (e.g., at the application or service level).
For example, CoAP at the application layer, DTLS at the transport layer and CBOR
data format. As a result, two communication patterns prone to create silos have emerged,
as shown in figure 7.6, device-cloud and device-gateway-cloud. The former communication
pattern is convenient for a widely deployed radio technology in a vendor’s targeted market,
such as Wi-Fi for smart home use cases. On the contrary, the latter communication
pattern introduces a gateway that bridges the Internet with (a) a specific, optimized radio
and network technologies, as well as (b) with legacy, non-IP based devices; an application-
gateway might be necessary to intermediate, translating from one application-layer
protocol to another one.
Similarly, the continuous growth of connected “things” projected for the coming years
poses a big challenge regarding the increment of data to be processed and consumed. The
pervasiveness of these elements implies a large scale, highly distributed set of deployed
objects with limited processing, storage, power and connection capabilities. These
challenges have risen important questions such as, (i) where should the computing and
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storage be placed?, (ii) how will the plethora of things scale and inter-operate with their
environment and the cloud?, and (iii) how and where to enforce the security protection
of IoT devices. In [93], Fog computing is considered as the perfect ally along with
Cloud computing to address the three initial questions. In this work, we leverage this
architecture to propose an offloading security protection for the IoT devices.
7.5.2 Computing and protection toll over IoT devices
The resource-constrained nature of IoT devices pose the requirement of external means to
perform resource-consuming tasks such as data processing or security protection. More
specifically, the security protection enforced on the IoT devices highly depends on the
trade-offs between its impact and costs compared with their main functionality and its
criticality.
The demands for compute and storage resources will probably come from trillions of
fixed and mobile endpoints, which will span vast geographical areas and will be arranged
in various different forms, covering a plethora of different use cases and settings. Securing
these devices will require scalable security solutions optimized for the IoT ecosystem.
Following our proposed security offloading vision, we extend the user-centric protection
paradigm into the IoT realm. To this end, we present a different approach to provide
security protection to the “things” as well as to enhance the protection of the services
that rely on or consume their generated information. Our proposal leverages the Fog
Computing architecture with the purpose to extend and position dynamically these
resource consuming tasks off the endpoints.
Similarly, the commoditization of networking and processing virtualization at the
network edge provides some advantages and opens the possibility to better approach the
verticals problem in the IoT realm. Fog Computing proposes a different network and
processing architecture, which extends them along the cloud-thing continuum, with the
common aim to locate their services closer to the endpoints. Therein, these virtualized
services share a common communication bus with discoverable interfaces to exchange
information.
7.6 Toward a new IoT Protection Paradigm
This section describes the service model proposal and architecture envisioned for the
support of offloaded security within the IoT realm. Our objective for securing the IoT
ecosystems follows a twofold approach, by extending the security protection off the
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“things”, while better protecting the infrastructure and its services from malicious things
located at the network edge. Furthermore, the offloading paradigm enables the decoupling
of not only security tasks, but also others that require or consume resources, toward close
entities with better capabilities in terms of resources, scope and visibility.
Our vision leverages the Fog Computing architecture to provide a horizontal virtu-
alization environment to support the offloaded security from the things. The security
protection at the network edge enables the monitoring and detection of abnormal behav-
iors of things, as well as the processing of analytics over the devices’ gathered information.
Therein, our proposal targets to address two main IoT issues, i.e., (i) the homogeneous
security protection of heterogeneous devices, and (ii) avoid the silos problem. To this
end, we introduce two fundamental concepts and an architecture devised to support and
implement them.
To cope with the first problem, we propose a model in which the security protection is
unified and enforced in an enhanced device close to the “things”. This is achieved by means
of an “IoT Virtual Domain” (IoT-VD), which is dynamically configured and instantiated
in the network edge. This virtual domain represents the execution environment hosting
the IoT security applications, along with the proper configuration to both reach the
required things, and other input services and information. Furthermore, each IoT-VD
shall announce the new services and information it is able to support. The IoT-VD
concept is similar to the Trusted Virtual Domains (TVD) described in section 7.2.
On the other hand, to break the silos problem and foster a horizontal intercommu-
nication and interaction between tenants and ultimately things, we propose a model
driven IOT-Service approach. This model represents the “things service intention” or
the “what”, and is referred as IoT-SM (IoT-Service Model). It defines which are the
requirements in terms of input information and services, the new services and information
it shall provide (the ouputs), policies to access and consume the services, and the IoT
applications. The instantiation of an IoT-SM shall result in the creation of a IoT-VD,
alongside the creation and announcement of new services and capabilities the tenant
support.
In the remaining section, we shall further elaborate these ideas and the proposed
architecture.
7.6.1 IoT Virtual Domain definition
An IoT-VD is a logical container that is instantiated on demand per a tenant and is
composed of the following elements:
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• The execution environments hosting the IoT applications
• Access to the intercommunication devices to reach the things (e.g., access to a
WiFi or specialized network hardware)
• The required data, control and management plane interconnectivity in order to
guarantee the isolation between different tenants.
The IoT-VD, as a logical container, is envisioned to run entirely within a single
network edge device (referred as a Fog Node), or in a distributed way over a pod of
Fog nodes. In our terminology, a Fog Node is a device with virtualization capabilities
that supports the instantiation of IoT-VDs in a multi-tenant fashion. These devices are
equipped with additional compute, storage and networking resources. The latter includes
different networking access technologies to be able to communicate with the “things”,
such as BLE, Z-Wave, Zigbee or 6LoWPAN.
The proposed deployment strategy leverages the virtualization and processing power
of commodity hardware, and the unquestionable trend toward its ubiquity at the network
edge. Furthermore, it has a remarkable advantage over cloud-based IoT solutions, as
the IoT-VD is instantiated closer to the devices, while also poses location and a broader
scope for promptly processing and trimming the information as well as properly providing
the services leveraged from the things.
7.6.2 IoT Model Driven service approach
To tackle the second issue regarding the silos, we introduce the model driven service idea.
To illustrate, consider for example the case of a set of BLE noise sensors located close to
a Fog Node. The IoT-VD definition allows the specification of the IoT applications to
be instantiated along with the required interconnectivity (i.e., access to a BLE device).
In parallel, there may be other tenants who are interested in getting the information
regarding noise levels, but does not have the resources to deploy the sensors and collect
and process the data. Thus, this poses the challenge to define a horizontal communication
channel among IoT-VD in order to break the verticals problem. For example, one IoT-VD
could publish the sensor information somewhere accessible to others IoT-VDs.
The IoT-Service Model (IoT-SM) comprises the declaration of the capabilities and
services to be announced, as well as its requirements in terms of other services and input
information. These models are meant to be machine-readable and can be interpreted
and processed by an orchestration system. This orchestrator is in charge of translating
the model to the actual instantiation at the network edge, alongside the corresponding
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configuration on specific devices and exposing the services and information produced to
both granted tenants and external users (e.g., to the Cloud).
Services are deployed by combining the IoT-SM, associated images for the IoT
applications to be instantiated, configurations of the tenant network connectivity to
both the “things” and the external world, message brokers and data flows, security
policies, etc. This proposal enables the composability of services, which can leverage
other IoT-VD services models to support and further improve their service, while also
extending the services and information available. At this stage, we consider that the
services and information are available among tenants instantiations around the same Fog
Node location.
7.6.3 IoT-VD service-centric architecture
This section introduces the envisioned architecture and its position within the IoT
realm. As explained above, this architecture provides a system where IoT tenants offload
resource consuming applications off the things to their nearest compatible Fog Node.
The architecture is specifically devised to be heavily multi-tenant and flexible enough
to be used in scale-out systems. Our focus in this section is on the main architectural
components.
General Overview
The architecture must support the dynamic allocation and instantiation of tenants IoT-
VD services in a multi-tenant environment. Figure 7.7 depicts a generic deployment of
three different IoT-VD services instantiated over a Fog Node. An IoT-VD was designed as
an isolated environment that will execute the applications of a tenant. These are deployed
in different Execution Environments (EE), which are connected through an isolated
network. Each tenant will be configured with a dedicated and private virtual network.
Furthermore, the underlying virtualization supports the allocation and assignment of
specific network resources to communicate with the things.
Main Components
Node Control and Management — This module is in charge of coordinating the
deployment of the IoT-VD based on the provided service model. The model defines the
required applications as well as the requirements in terms of resources. Furthermore, it
defines the types of services this IoT-VD instance will consume and the new ones it will
support. This enables both the dynamic creation of services, APIs, and the registration
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Fig. 7.7 IoT Model-driven Architecture
to the corresponding channels to publish its messages (e.g., following a publish/subscribe
paradigm)
IoT-VD Service Models and Applications Repositories — The service models
and the IoT applications are retrieved from these repositories, and instantiated on the
specific execution environment.
Data Plane Communication Bus — This module represents the internal buses,
brokers and data policy enforcement rules required to locally share and correlate data
between IoT-VD of different tenants. This approach enables the interaction between
tenants locally at the Fog node level.
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Management and Orchestration System — This module deals with the instan-
tiations and configurations in a “technology” agnostic way. The technology-dependent
part could be managed by the control and management module embedded in the Fog
Nodes.
This architecture is envisioned to provide the flexibility to offload the security protec-
tion from the “things” to a virtual gateway located at the network edge. Furthermore, we
enable the interoperability among tenants by providing a shared communication channel.
7.7 Summary and Contributions
In this chapter we have described the “device-centric” security paradigm along with the
issues and challenges it imposes over end users’ protection. Therein, we claim that a
different approach that shifts the paradigm toward a “user-centric” model seems appealing
and necessary, as the number and diversity of end devices per user continues to increase.
This proposed paradigm focuses on providing user protection independently of the device
utilized to access the Internet. To this end, a new security architecture is proposed
which leverages the power of computing and network virtualization as well as the new
architectures for distributing and placing these resources in the network edge, closer to
the users. More specifically, we contend that with architectures such as Edge-Computing,
Fog Computing, Network Function Virtualization and Cloud Computing, the user-centric
protection paradigm proposed is feasible.
A key feature of the proposed paradigm is its versatility to adapt and leverage all
the underlying computing and networking architectures and services with the purpose of
protecting end users in a uniform manner. Furthermore, the user-centric paradigm is not
proposed as a replacement for the device-centric, but as an ally, extending and better
securing the user and his devices.
We have deemed important to highlight our proposed architecture and its alignment
with NFV. This stems from adaptability and scalability concerns. On the other hand,
we also have positioned our proposal among current security protection solutions and
remarked our novelty.
Similarly, we have discussed the security challenges around the IoT realm. IoT faces
similar security issues as the end user device-centric protection, with the augmented
complexity of removing the user from the interactions. The challenges stem from different
dimensions which include their resource-constrain nature, device heterogeneity, fast
growth and network exposure diversity. Then, we delineate our proposal to offload the
protection from the IoT devices, and locate it at the network edge. This proposal follows
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a similar approach as the user-centric protection paradigm. Finally, we describe our
envisioned architecture along with the new concept of IoT-Service Model.
Part of the results and contributions obtained from this research are presented in the
following publication:
• D. Montero, M. Yannuzzi, A. Shaw, L. Jacquin, A. Pastor, R. Serral-Gracià, A.
Lioy, F. Risso, C. Basile, R. Sassu, M. Nemirovsky, F. Ciaccia, M. Georgiades,
S. Charalambides, J. Kuusijarvi, F. Bosco. “Virtualized Security at the Network
Edge: A User-centric Approach,” in IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 53, no.
4, pp. 176-186, April 2015. DOI: 10.1109/MCOM.2015.7081092
• Yannuzzi, M., van Lingen, F., Jain, A., Parellada, O. L., Flores, M. M., Carrera,
D., Pérez, J. L., Montero, D., Chacin, P., Corsaro, A., and Olive, A. “A new era
for cities with fog computing”, in IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 21, no. 2, pp.
54–67, April 2017. DOI: 10.1109/MIC.2017.25
Contribution: research, design, development and evaluation of a fog computing
proof of concept. I contributed with the research process during the architecture
design and definition. Therein, I collaborated with different researches in the
development of the Fog Computing proof-of-concept orchestration and management




Applications to the network edge: a
Mobile User case scenario
This Chapter extends the user-centric security protection paradigm introduced in section
7.2, with emphasis in a mobile user case scenario. Our proposed model is based on
the idea of offloading the security applications from the end user device, and placing
them in a trusted network node at the network’s edge. Our research perspective is
particularly centered around three interrelated mobility challenges, i) the allocation
of the security applications “close” to the user, i.e., on network nodes with enhanced
processing capabilities, ii) seamless mobility with negligible disruption of ongoing network
connections, and iii) dynamic orchestration and management with support of security
applications migration. Based on our arguments, we expose the main requirements and
trade-offs to be considered in the attempt to support mobility in such environment.
Therein, we propose a flexible solution that leverages different key technologies such as
Software Defined Networking, Network Function Virtualization and Computing at the
Network Edge to offer a seamless on-path security protection to mobile users. Finally,
our preliminary experiments’ results considering a WiFi mobile user show that seamless
security migration and mobility are feasible in a simple real scenario. Vertical mobility
and more complex use cases scenarios are envisioned for future research.
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8.1 Positioning a Mobile User in the Current Inter-
net
User mobility in the Internet has become a common, not yet solved challenge. The
proliferation of user devices enabled with different network access technologies have
enabled the user to remain connected, even on the move. On the contrary, the Internet
mobility support remains an open issue. However, this mobility trend has fostered the
apparition of new applications and services that exploit the ubiquitous connectivity
capacity of the devices. This has resulted in a whole new set of requirements in terms of
service continuity and security protection.
In a world where a user can access the Internet via multiple devices, each equipped
with one or more network access technologies, security protection has been a relevant
and partially addressed issue. In light of this, end user security solutions traditionally
have focused on the provision of security protection by installing software applications,
e.g., firewalls and anti-viruses, on the users’ devices. However, this device-centric security
applications approach has arisen clear disadvantages, such as a per-device specific
configuration and maintenance, or impact on the battery consumption. These issues
could be alleviated by offloading the security applications to external parties, such as the
cloud. However, this draws an important routing issue, i.e., the traffic must be redirected
to the cloud facilities [80], which can cause an impact over the latency. To alleviate
this, there are solutions that provide mechanisms to bring the required computational
capabilities close to the edge of the network. Solutions such Fog Computing [93], or
Cloudlet [75] provide an ecosystem where our solution may evolve on. Most importantly,
they ultimately justify our approach, as it seems clear that in a short future, citizens
will interact with their Smart Cities in a new communications’ ecosystem that will allow
the digital interaction with the city itself [77], thus both security protection and user
mobility will play a key role.
Aligned with the smart cities’ concept, mobile end users are always looking for the
best Internet connection regardless of the network access technology used. In the context
of this thesis, we define a mobile user case scenario as the case when a user’s mobile
device connection is switched as the result of the user’s displacement. In this scenario,
we approach the mobility challenge from the networking and routing perspective, i.e.,
mobility at the TCP/IP network layer. Thus, we consider only the cases where all the
communications are IP based, regardless of the underlying connection technology (e.g.,
WiFi, WiMax or 4G).
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From this perspective, there has been some efforts in the literature to support smooth
handover between different IP networks. For example, in [54] the authors propose
“LISPmob”, a solution that leverages the LISP network protocol as a mobility enabler. Its
main advantage is the decoupling of the Identity and Location of addresses at the mobile
device level. This allows the end device to be unequivocally identified, independently of
the attached network. Also, this solution is transparent to the applications. In this work,
we leverage LISPMob as a mobility enabler for our solution prototype.
In contrast, to implement the “close to the edge computation” paradigm, a combined
orchestration and management between the network and the computational nodes is
required. Nowadays, this may be achieved by using two key technologies, i.e., Software
Defined Networking (SDN) [45] and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [21]. These
technologies allow us to abstract the processing logic applied over a user’s network traffic
into generic functions, as well as dynamically steer it. In this work, we leverage them to
provide a programmable and transparent network orchestration and management system.
8.2 Virtual Mobile Security Architecture
This section extends the envisioned architecture described in Section 7.2 to support
offloaded security at the network edge in the environment of mobile users. First, the
main building blocks and their tasks are described. Next, we dive into the essential
mobility considerations for which this architecture is devised. Therein, we address the
challenges imposed by a mobile user event with regard to switching connection points.
Figure 7.2 in Chapter 7 depicts the general proposed architecture for a user-centric
security protection, including its main components, i) Trusted Virtual Domain, ii) NED
Control and Management, iii) Resource Migrator, and iv) Orchestrator. As described
before, the Trusted Virtual Domain (TVD) is the part of the system in charge of providing
the framework for the security application (or chain of applications) as determined by the
user or administrator. One important feature that must be present in this solution is the
support for multi-tenancy. Each tenant (user) requires exclusive control and resources
dedicated to its appliance. We provide support to this by leveraging the use of a virtual
appliance, and then dynamically deploying as many instances as necessary. In fact, the
virtual instances are created upon the end-user connection. A Network Edge Device
(NED) element is the entry connection point which dynamically enforce a particular
security policy configuration, in a per-user basis.
The NED Control and Management component is responsible for configuring the
different network elements to comply with the necessary network traffic steering toward
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the TVD. The basis of this component is that it instantiates a virtual private network
for each user, providing a fully isolated data path from and toward the user, as described
in section 7.3.
The Resource Migrator is a new architecture component in charge of synchronizing
with the destination NED the state migration of a particular TVD upon request from the
Orchestrator. As we shall describe later in this section, the Resource Migrator supports
two modes of operation, full resource migration, and pure security applications’ state
migration.
One key component within our architecture is the Orchestrator. It is responsible
of coordinating all the resource allocation, network configuration, and TVD migration.
In this current proposal, the Orchestrator is a distributed entity present in each of the
domains supporting the Virtual Mobile Security Architecture. The different roles of the
Orchestrator include to provide the interfaces for dynamic configuration of the network,
to monitor the state of the Mobile Device and orchestrate the handover process, and to
manage the virtual resources’ allocation and instantiation. The proposed architecture is
specifically tailored to be supported by NFV. The aim is to leverage its scalability when
planning the provision of virtual network functions.
With respect to the end user, we propose the establishment of a secure channel
between the Mobile Device and the NED, as shown in figure 7.2. The purpose of this is
two-fold. On one hand, it provides a more secure connectivity channel with the TVD
where the user security is enforced, thus effectively avoiding potential man-in-the-middle
attacks. On the other hand, by having a mechanism on the mobile device to inform the
Orchestrator about the status of the surrounding network access points to coordinate
an eventual handover, and consequently, the migration of the security and network
connection state to the new, closest NED.
The establishment of such a channel is orchestrated by the NED itself and by an
agent running on the mobile device. Particularly, the agent requests permissions from
the Orchestrator to establish the channel, (for example an IPSec tunnel). In parallel,
the Orchestration instantiates and enforces the user security applications. An advantage
derived from this approach consists to securely validate the identity of the mobile device
by the NED, thus providing a more robust and secure solution, yet keeping the setup
simple for the end user.
8.2.1 Mobility considerations
This section introduces the challenges that the mobility of a user imposes over the
envisioned offloaded security solution. These challenges are related with maintaining the
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security state close to the user by migrating it along with him. Thus, the orchestration
system requires to promptly react to the mobility event and handle it with the minimal
impact over the user experience. This implies the reallocation, instantiation and security
state migration toward to the new user Network Edge Device (NED) connection point.
In parallel, there is also the requirement of reconfiguring the network as well as the
handover process. The objective of the orchestration system is to maintain the user
security the closest to the end user. Likewise, the second scenario considers the user
mobility in a context where the user security does not require to be reallocated and
migrated, it is maintained at the same point regardless of the user changing its connection
point. Nevertheless, like in the previous case, a handover process as well as network
reconfiguration orchestration is required.
Figure 8.1 illustrates these scenarios. For both cases, we shall discuss the mobility
requirements from the perspective of the orchestration system and the end user device.
We shall address different trade-offs regarding how seamless the mobility could be with
respect to ongoing connections as well as how the user security protection is moved or
migrated along with the user in terms of maintaining the security state. In this work, we
do not cover the legal and management issues that may arise in an inter-domain state
migration case, where different network domains are involved, as we contend that from
the technical perspective is a feasible solution. It is also important to highlight that the
case scenarios consider the mobility of only one end of the communication, i.e., only the
mobile user while the other end is fixed.
In the scenario depicted in figure 8.1a, prior the mobility event we assume that the
user’s security is already in place in the NED1, i.e., the user previously connected to
and requested the offloaded protection service. The orchestration module is in charge of
managing the allocation, instantiation, configuration and deployment of the user security
applications. Now, consider that the user moves away from the first connection point
NED1 toward a new connection point NED2. This event triggers a joint coordination
process between the end-device and the orchestration module. The expected result from
the user perspective would be to have a smooth switch between the connection points.
The smoothness of this transition imposes the following three requirements:
R.1 the user security state is correctly migrated,
R.2 the user is seamlessly disconnected and reconnected with negligible interruption of
its ongoing connections,
R.3 the orchestration system is capable to react and allocate the security protection
the closest at the destination connection point.








(a) Mobility Scenario: The user security state is migrated








(b) Mobility Scenario: The user security state is main-
tained at the origin NED.
Fig. 8.1 End User Offloaded Security Mobility scenarios.
The second scenario represented depicted in figure 8.1b shows a similar case as the
previous case with the difference that the user security applications are not required to
be migrated. This is a simpler case due to it only considers the orchestration of the
handover, proper steering of the traffic and the handling of ongoing connections, i.e., R.2
and R.3. However, the rerouting of the user’s traffic through the TVD hosted at the
initial connection NED is required.
It is important to remark that these requirements as well as the described mobility
case are not intended to be exhaustive, but rather a starting point proposal to better
understand and foster the discussion around the user mobility challenge in the context of
this work. Next, we shall describe deeper the challenges that each of the requirements
imposes.
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8.2.2 Implications of an end user mobility
This section describes in a nutshell the implications derived from an end user mobility over
the orchestration and connectivity management. Figure 8.2 depicts the sequence diagram
detailing the main steps a mobility event comprises, as well as the different components
and actors involved with respect to the mobility case scenario depicted in figure 8.1a. To
facilitate the mobility decision process, the end user application periodically announces
its available and accessible WiFi networks toward its current attached NED. This simple
approach provides the NED with enough information to take the proper decisions. Whilst
this approach serves to demonstrate the use case, it has drawbacks to be considered in
the future, like the extra resources consumed by the user application due to the periodic
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Fig. 8.2 Sequence diagram of an end user mobility migration. This diagram assumes
that the end user is already authenticated at NED1, and his security protection has been
properly instantiated. Also, the mobility use case involves an IP Layer 3 mobility.
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The initial state considered prior the user mobility assumes that the end user has
previously signed up to NED1 and his security protection was properly instantiated.
Then, the user starts moving away from NED1 toward NED2. This event is captured by
the former through the report sent by the endpoint, as the available WiFi signal strength
changes. Once a threshold is reached, the mobility process is triggered. We proceed to
elaborate these steps:
1. The end user SECURED application is periodically reporting the list of available
WiFi networks, including their signal sthrength.
2. NED1 is constantly verifying the available WiFi networks reported by the user.
Once a criteria is reached, it decides to start a mobility process.
3. NED1 triggers the Mobility request toward the Orchestration, including the end
user credentials and the network list report.
4. FindBestAP: the orchestrator determines the best AP for mobility. This selection
shall be next notified to the end user.
5. Search NED: based on the selected AP, the orchestrator determines the closer to
the user NED. This selection takes into consideration not only the location, but
also the available resources at destination; it is a multi-objective function.
6. The Orchestrator requests to the selected NED the pre-instantiation of the user
TVD. This step also considers the fetching of missing PSAs into its local repository
(step 4a in figure 8.2).
7. NED1 triggers in parallel the TVD Migration and the connection handover. The
latter is a crucial step as it involves a detachment and reattachment into a different
NED.
8. Resource Migrator decides the best approach available to migrate the PSAs to the
destination NED.
9. Once the migration is completed, the Resource Migrator notifies it to the NED1.
10. End user re-establishes the trusted channel with the PSA.
All in all, this simplified diagram captures the complexities and challenges behind the
mobility use case. In the next section, we shall elaborate the concepts regarding TVD
state migration and the end user connection handover.
8.3 TVD on the fly | 140
8.3 TVD on the fly
The idea of removing the security protection from the end user’s device leads to assume
that the protection moves dynamically along with the user. Within the context of a static
user, i.e. the user does not change of connection point, the instantiation and deployment
of the security is handled by the orchestration system in a per-request manner. However,
when the user starts moving and switching connection points while requesting the security
protection service, it results in a “follow-close-to-me” protection service. The latter case
can be addressed by promptly instantiating the user security at the closest new NED.
The problem arises when some security applications require maintaining its state in order
to function without disrupting the user experience. Thus, the system has to deal with
the security state at the initial connection point and accordingly migrate it.
Within our solution, the user protection will be enforced by security applications and
according to the application, there might be a state to be maintained while they are
executed. These applications can be broadly classified in stateless and stateful. The
stateless applications provide security independently whether they were previously being
executed (e.g. a firewall). Thus, in the case of mobility there is no state required to be
migrated. On the other hand, stateful applications initiate and maintain a state while
they are being executed (e.g. anti-virus). As a result, in the event of a user movement,
this state requires to be migrated where possible.
In order to address how to handle the latter case of applications, we foresee two
approaches: 1) pure state migration, and 2) full resource migration. In the first case,
all the burden of maintaining the application state is transferred toward the application
developers. Thus, the application should provide the APIs to save and reload its state.
Then, the orchestration coordinates the migration by properly invoking the application
methods and transferring the state. For instance, an iptables based firewall [62] would
only require the migration of the IP rules into the destination PSA.
In the second case, the migration of the user security is totally handled by the
system, i.e. the security application is unaware of it. When a migration is requested, the
orchestration system will have to deal with the stateful applications and dynamically
migrate them. To this end, we also envision the implementation of the TVD through
different techniques of virtualization, specially considering the support for resource
migration, e.g. Virtual Machine or Container migration. This option introduces an extra
overhead to the migration according to the size of the object to be moved. For instance,
a stateful Web content filter application like Squid [84] maintains the state of active
connections, which are migrated along with the whole execution environment with the
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objective to avoid their disruption. Later in section 8.5, we present state-of-the-art
technologies that can be leveraged to achieve this.
8.3.1 Virtual Resources Migration
The migration of the virtual resources is a broad topic, as it tightly depends on the used
virtualization techniques, the type of virtual machines and the status of the network. At
this stage, we consider the case of PSAs being VMs, and the migration supported by the
hypervisor, e.g., KVM.
In this type of execution environment, we can find three different kinds of resource
migration, a) Full VM Migration, b) Incremental VM Migration, c) Memory only VM
Migration. Below we further elaborate each type.
Full VM Migration
When migrating a VM to a remote location, the disk representing the virtual machine
needs to have an exact representation at the destination hypervisor. Full VM migration
has been used for a while, e.g., in [15] the authors describe the basis and some opti-
mizations for the migration. In our case, the necessary high-level steps to perform the
migration are as follows:
• Transfer and create the VM definition at the destination NED.
• Transfer the disk (or disks) composing the VM.
• Incrementally transfer the used memory pages to the destination.
• When all the pages have been transferred, stop and destroy the origin VM and
start the other at the destination.
The main issue with this alternative is that transferring the whole VM disk(s) to
the destination may take a very long time, e.g., a VM with 20GB of used virtual disk
and a connection of 100Mbps may take around 27 minutes, which is unpractical in most
situations.
Incremental VM Migration
Opposed to the full VM Migration, another feasible alternative is to leverage on the
fact that the PSA’s virtual disk are the same for all the different NED. To this end, the
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system can deploy the set of base PSAs that may be instantiated by the users demands.
Then, the instantiated PSA derives a new virtual disk from the base PSA, incrementally
writing the changes to that disk and leaving the base disk as a read-only resource to be
used when the derived disk does not have the information. With this neat solution it is
much easier to migrate the VM, now the steps are:
• Transfer and create the derived VM definition to the destination NED.
• Transfer the incremental disk (or disks) changes in the VM.
• Incrementally transfer the used memory pages to the destination.
• When all the pages have been transferred, stop and destroy the origin VM and
start the other at the destination.
This new solution provides a little configuration overhead but gives a very large
advantage as now the amount of data to transfer over the network is greatly reduced
to several seconds in the most common case. The only issue of this solution is that the
incremental disk changes, many times refer to logs, or cache files which may be discarded
in a real scenario as they are not mandatory at the destination. Then, to further optimize
this method there is also the Memory only VM Migration.
Memory only VM Migration
This option builds upon the concept of a base VM disk which is configured in read-only
mode. The execution environment creates a whole filesystem as a read-only blob, and
all the necessary write operations are performed on ram-drives. Using ram-drives for
this purpose forces a slight increase—application dependent—on the VM but permits to
avoid the transmission of the disks to the destination. Then the steps to perform the
VM migration now are:
• Transfer and create the derived VM definition to the destination.
• Incrementally transfer the used memory pages to the destination.
• When all the pages have been transferred, stop and destroy the origin VM and
start the other at the destination.
The main issue of this solution is that it imposes a great burden on the configuration
of the VM, mainly because creating a read-only filesystem requires some specially crafted
configurations that make it harder to deploy and create a new PSA.
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8.3.2 TVD Migration
The TVD Migration process consists of dynamically migrating the user PSAs along
with the TVD configuration into a new NED site. Algorithm 2 describes the migration
scheduling logic, which considers both the PSAs and the TVD configuration.
Algorithm 2 PSA Migration Scheduling logic
Input: NED Status.
P = {P0,P1, . . . ,Pi}: List of PSAs
N : Destination NED
T : TVD Configuration
Output: True: if the migration was successful.
False: Otherwise
for all p ∈ P do










return migrateConfiguration(T ,N )
The algorimth first checks if the PSA virtual image is locally available. In case the
image is not available, a Full VM migration is required. Once all the PSAs are properly
moved, then the TVD configuration is migrated.
8.4 Orchestrating the End User Mobility
A very important challenge for the orchestration system in a mobile user scenario is
twofold. In parallel, it has to decide when and where it has to allocate, instantiate,
configure and migrate the security protection of a user in movement, while continuously
coordinating with the end user device the actual connection handover. The continuity of
the service depends on the correct outcome of both tasks. In this work, we assume that
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every time a connection handover is performed, the device gets IP connectivity and all
the ongoing connections will be route accordingly to the new location of the user.
However, this connection switch may imply changing the access connection technology
in the case of a vertical handover (e.g., a switch from WiFi to 3G), or a horizontal
handover when the same access technology is used. In the latter there may be a short
connection interruption when the access technology does not support the simultaneous
connection to two access points (e.g., WiFi simultaneous connections to two access points).
In this work, we consider the second case as a proof-of-concept, and more complex cases
including the vertical handover is considered for future research.
Therein, the handover coordination challenge can be addressed either in a proactive
or reactive manner. The former takes into consideration an active interaction between
the orchestration system and the end user device via either polling the device from
the orchestrator, or the device pushing information related with mobility. Thus, the
orchestrator preemptively can allocate, instantiate and migrate the user security prior
triggering the handover.
On the other hand, the reactive approach considers the scenario when the end user
devices unilaterally decides to handover and the orchestration system has to react to
this event. This case can also consider the exchange of mobility information between
the parties, but as the end device is the one which takes the decision, the orchestration
system has to predict or get informed when the user has disconnected, and where it
potentially will reconnect prior triggering the reallocation, instantiation and migration of
the user security.
Aligned with this, Algorithm 3 describes our approach for handling a WiFi proactive
handover coordination. Therein, it evaluates the signal levels of the current access
points against a threshold δ, which serves as a simple criteria for triggering the handover.
The subsequent steps include:
• FindBestAP(L): from the list reported by the user, the Orchestrator seeks for an
available AP. In this embodiment, we have a list of predefined SSIDs. In case there
is non AP available, the handover process finishes.
• SearchNED(newAP): The orchestrator determines the best NED according with
the new selected AP. The objective is to locate the closest NED to the end user
and visible to the AP. In this embodiment, we have assigned to each AP a specific
NED.
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Algorithm 3 Seamless WiFi Handover triggering and orchestration process
Input: L: List with the surrounding wireless signal levels of the mobile device
Output: [True, AP ] if handover necessary
False otherwise.
1: C ← AssociatedAP
2: if Signal(C) ≤ δ then
3: newAP ← FindBestAP(L)
4: newNED ← SearchNED(newAP)
5: InstantiateTVD(newNED)
6: MigrateTV D(newNED)




• InstantiateTVD(newNED): The Orchestrator instructs the newNED to allocate
and pre-configure the new TVD. This also includes the fetching of PSAs to local
repositories.
• MigrateTVD(newNED): This function triggers the PSAs migration between NEDs.
In parallel, the return value contains the newAP to connect.
It is important to note that the migration is triggered in such a way that at the same
time the handover is executed. The objective is to minimize connection interruption
from the end user perspective. The biggest challenge is to maintain the active TCP
connections even after the mobility event.
This rather intuitive and simple procedure is our initial attempt for handling the
handover from the orchestrator perspective. There is plenty room for future research in
topics related with this process, including for example defining the best optimization for
selecting the appropriate NED and AP toward which the user device should handover.
Likewise, defining the intelligence behind the Orchestrator regarding how to select the
node for the reallocation of the security. In Section 8.5, we shall describe an experimental
prototype employing this proactive coordination and the initial results considering the
service interruption time induced by the mobility.
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8.5 Experimental Setup and Results
In order to analyze the capabilities and limitations of state-of-the-art technologies for
end user mobility support within the context of offloaded security, we have run a set
of experiments following the scenario illustrated in figure 8.1. In this section, first we
shall describe the setup and the technologies integrated. Then, the insights from the
experimental results are reported.
8.5.1 Experiment’s objectives
The objectives of the experiment include:
• to evaluate the impact of the user mobility over ongoing connections while being
protected by a firewall and content filter.
• to assess the time overhead incurred by the TVD migration.
The case scenario to test considers an end user watching a video while moving between
WiFi APs. Also, the user is generating ICMP messages every 50ms to a remote location.
The former experiment serves to evaluate the disruptiveness of our proposal over ongoing
TCP connections, while the latter will help us to asses the WiFi handover delay. Therein,
we shall also consider the overhead induced by the network management (i.e., the dynamic
assignment of IP and the LISP registration process). Our scenario consider mobility at
the IP level, thus the end user keeps its IP address while switches APs.
8.5.2 Testbed Setup
The testbed setup targets the WiFi mobile user case along with one offloaded security
application per user. The application is stateful and the migration is totally handled by
our solution. Our objective is to test how disruptive the mobility event may be over the
user’s ongoing network connections, considering the overhead introduced by the resource
migration and the handover.
In a nutshell, the testbed is composed by a user device, two access points at different
locations and controlled by their corresponding NEDs, and an Orchestrator. The
technologies integrated in the NED, Orchestrator and the user device are detailed next.
The NED component is where the users applications will be executed. Thus, there
is the need for multi-tenancy support, i.e., isolation of execution environments and
network programmability, and network mobility support. Multi-tenancy allows the
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secure coexistence of multiple tenants in the same physical infrastructure. We address
this by leveraging the use of Virtualization. There are two main options to consider:
Virtual Machine (VM) virtualization and Lightweight Container-based virtualization.
One key requirement in our proposal is the support of resources migration. Thus, VM
virtualization using Qemu-KVM was selected. This solution provides support for live VM
migration, enabling the migration of the security application. Nevertheless, migration
support for lightweight virtualization technologies such as Docker Containers are work in
progress, and shall be considered in the future.
Along with the virtualized computation technology, there is the need of a networking
virtualization counterpart. Network virtualization is necessary to provide extensive net-
work reconfiguration, unparalleled flexibility, and multi-tenancy. We chose OpenvSwitch
as the technology to virtualize the network in the NED. This technology provides us the
flexibility to dynamically steer the user traffic when a user moves.
Similarly, mobility support in an IP network imposes the challenge to allow the end
user to switch networks and maintain its ongoing connections, i.e., all the traffic for the
user is correctly routed to the new access connection point. To address this challenge, we
consider the Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP) [23] technology along with
LISPmob [54]. LISPmob is a mobile implementation of the LISP protocol which enables
the mobile device to switch IP network connections points without disrupting the ongoing
network connections. Along with it, the LISP control plane supports rapid changes in
the routing locators to achieve fast handovers with reduced service disruptions in terms
of efficient traffic routing.
Finally, for the Orchestration module, we consider the OpenStack project as a
key technology for managing and orchestrating the infrastructure|mainly because it has
support for SDN and is an enabler for NFV. The Network Functions Virtualization (NFV)
can be built on top of it to create a network that becomes a powerful and extensible
API, on which applications perform actions and operations by invoking virtualized
functions directly on the network. For our setup, we have simplified this component
by implementing a basic Orchestrator that directly manages the VM instantiation
and migrations through libvirt and KVM, and the network configuration through an
OpenDaylight SDN controller, leaving the adoption of OpenStack as an important part
of our future work. Furthermore, our ongoing developed orchestrator is configurable
through REST interfaces that can be automatically invoked by the network upon the
connection of a new user, or in the event of a moving user. This capability enables our
solution to be easily integrated in larger orchestration infrastructures.
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8.5.3 Experimental results
The goal of the experiments is to study the feasibility of maintaining operative the
user protection upon WiFi mobility considering two cases: with and without involving
migration of the user security TVD. The disadvantage of the latter is that it requires
traffic detours from the new location to the NED where the user’s security application
remains. On the other hand, the former avoids the traffic detour at the cost of requiring
the migration of the TVD.
As discussed above, the overall Mobility process consists of two related processes,
i) TVD migration, and ii) connection handover. Figure 8.3 depicts the involved stages
considering both. When the Orchestrator decides to execute the mobility process,
it initiates first the TVD migration. This proactive approach allows to reduce the
connection disruption time, as the PSAs remain active while being migrated. By the
time the migration progres reaches a ∆%, the Orchestrator notifies to the end user to
execute the handover. Once the end user device reconnects to the destination NED, it
requests an IP address through DHCP. Then, the end user LISPmob component registers
its new location into the mapping system.
Next, we evaluate the effects of technologies such as LISP (e.g., the refreshing delay
for updating the routing locators in the mapping system upon handovers), in conjunction
with DHCP (when routing locators are assigned dynamically), in order to understand
the lower bounds achievable for seamless mobility considering the technologies previously
covered in this section. To this end, we setup a testbed using the following elements: i) an
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Fig. 8.3 End User mobility stages with TVD migration. Stage A–B: pre-copy VM
migration with progress of ∆%; B–C: VM migration completion; C–D:TVD Configuration;
B–E: WiFi disconnect and reconnet; E–F: DHCP IP retrieval; F–G: LISP registration.
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Fig. 8.4 Comparison of the delays obtained for recovering the data plane connectivity
through the user’s security application when there are different technologies involved in
the mobility (w/ stands for with and w/o stands for without).
LISPMob for the mobile end point along with a user application for proactive reporting of
available wireless networks. Furthermore, we implemented a basic Orchestrator which is
in charge of coordinating the potential migration of the user security during the mobility.
The Orchestrator consumes information from the OpenDaylight controller through its
REST interfaces, as well as its provided services to dynamically program the virtual
network and the traffic steering.
One of the main challenges is to keep the data plane connections after the handover,
as WiFi does not allow the attachment to two access points simultaneously. The SDN
OpenDaylight controller provide us the flexibility to configure the OpenFlow rules on
the OpenvSwitches dynamically. It is worth highlighting that the data plane traffic is
enabled if and only if, the user security application is reachable from the user terminal
once the handover is successful.
In this setup, our Orchestrator deals directly with the VM migrations through libvirt
and KVM. Then, our security applications are composed by a firewall (iptables) and
Content Filtering (using the Squid Web Proxy). These applications are bundled into a
512 MB RAM VM image. At the same time, in order to assess the connection lapses
during the mobility process, we generated ICMP traffic at 50ms intervals between the
user terminal and a remote destination.
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The overall results are shown in Fig. 8.4. This figure presents the aggregated
disruption time over the user connections. The horizontal axes represent the number
of trials the experiment was executed, while the vertical axes the disruption time in
seconds. Observe that, since the Orchestrator triggers the Pre-copy live migration in
advance and coordinates the overall process, there is no significant difference between
handovers with and without VM migration. In other words, the pre-copy live migration
up to the 80% (∆ = 80) progress is negligible compared with the time required for the
WiFi disconnection and connection.
We also observe that, even in a small set up, both LISP and DHCP introduce
considerable delay, with combined effects that may produce variations between 7 seconds
up to almost 10 seconds. For the simplest handovers, i.e., no DHCP, no LISP, and no VM
migration, we surprisingly observed some cases with zero packet losses. This might be
caused due to buffering on the sender transmission queues. Clearly, this type of handover
is the one that would actually set the reference of what can be achieved without technical
tweaks, which is around 3 seconds. These results have provided us an initial insight
about the feasibility of our proposal.
8.6 Summary and Contributions
This chapter contributions focuses on extending our user-centric security protection for
the case of mobile users. Different challenges are still to overcome prior the realization of
the proposed user mobility support, as our main aim is to provide a protection to the
users independently of the device used, and maintain it deployed and instantiated the
closest network-wise. The advantages of leveraging the network edge capabilities allow
the on-path protection of the users, while also consolidates and facilitates the proper
migration of the protection when required.
Along with the advent of virtualization and computing at the edge technologies,
offloading the security and protection of the user to the network edge is becoming more
attractive. To this end, in this work we leveraged the use of virtualization and fog
computing to propose a security framework, which combined with SDN and an NFV-like
technologies is able to orchestrate a user’s security applications and their migration. To
validate our proposal, we deployed a proof-of-concept prototype considering a WiFi mobile
user. The obtained results provide an initial insight regarding the impact introduced by
the handover and migration processes over the ongoing connections. Challenges such as
scalability of users, other network access technologies and vertical handover, and new
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lightweight container-based migration technologies are part of our future work. As a
result of this research, the following paper has been published:
• D. Montero and R. Serral-Gracià, “Offloading personal security applications to
the Network Edge: A mobile user case scenario,” 2016 International Wireless
Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC), Paphos, 2016, pp.
96-101. DOI: 10.1109/IWCMC.2016.75770409
• M. Yannuzzi, R. Milito, R. Serral-Gracià, D. Montero and M. Nemirovsky, “Key
ingredients in an IoT recipe: Fog Computing, Cloud computing, and more Fog
Computing,” 2014 IEEE 19th International Workshop on Computer Aided Modeling
and Design of Communication Links and Networks (CAMAD), Athens, 2014, pp.
325-329. DOI: 10.1109/CAMAD.2014.7033259
Contribution: research and evaluation of current technologies to support mobility
of endpoints and process migration. I configured and executed different experiments
of a case scenario to demonstrate the IP mobility of endpoints while the traffic
was inspected by a process located at the network edge. This experimentation
also included the migration of the process along with the endpoint movement
toward a closer location. Technologies like live virtual machine migrations and
container/process live migration were studied and tested.




This thesis has studied a different approach to enhance the security protection in
the Internet, with special focus on the design and development of pragmatic solutions
aimed at improving the security of both core Internet building components and end
users and devices. In a nutshell, we addressed this problem from the perspective of
an offloading security paradigm. Its main objective seek to provide an attractive and
compelling solution in order to foster its adoption. Throughout our research work,
there were a lot of lessons learned on regard the vulnerabilities of the Internet and
all the complexities blocking already proposed security solutions by the community.
Similarly, we have addressed a really sensitive topic driven by the growing awareness
around cyberspace security of Internet core players, but more prominently end users.
The continuous discoveries of new and more sophisticated threats and attacks over the
Internet has contributed to get the attention of more people.
The first part of the thesis addressed main Internet vulnerabilities that affect key
core networking components. More specifically, we focused on the vulnerabilities of the
BGP and LISP Internet routing protocols. We have identified current open issues and
proposed novel solutions to tackle them with the objective to improve their security and
have a positive impact over the Internet security in general.
Current Inter-domain BGP vulnerabilities have proven to be exploitable at large scale
with unpredictable outcomes. Cases of large Internet disruptions have been denounced
and investigated. The motivations behind them range from inadvertent mis-configurations,
to possible attacks seeking a benefit against adversaries or to self-induced censorship.
The Internet community cognizant of the BGP shortcomings have been working in this
direction proposing different solutions to enhance the BGP security. However, we have
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focused over the “Route Leak” vulnerability, which remains open even in the presence of
the latest solutions proposed by the IETF SIDR WG: RPKI, ROA and BGP-SEC.
Our study around Route Leaks presented a basic theoretical framework including
realistic hypotheses and theorems, under which an AS is able to detect route leak
initiation autonomously. A main concern that drove our proposal was the impact it
would have over the BGP protocol. Thus, we devised our solution following the offloading
paradigm. Therein, we discussed the different possibilities to enhance the BGP security
while reducing the impact over its current deployment. The main advantages of our
approach include, (a) no reliance on third party information (e.g., vantage points), and
(b) offloading of the leak detections, thus, no changes required to control-plane protocols.
Therein, we proposed a novel Route Leak Detection technique name Cross-Path (CP),
which seeks to infer whether new advertisements are leaks based on the current BGP
information. To prove the feasibility and effectiveness of our technique, we have tested it
with the help of large scale simulations. The initial insights obtained from the results
showed different detection success rates. These differences are highly related with the
topological location of the domains, and their Internet routes visibility in term of paths
diversity.
The second key Internet component we studied in this thesis was the LISP protocol
vulnerabilities. Therein, we proposed a novel and adaptable approach for secure the map
registrations in LISP. Our proposal works end-to-end and covers both EID and RLOC
authorizations, thus providing a framework to counter a variety of attacks against the
control-plane, including RLOC spoofing. In our solution we introduced a new, separate
role in the registration process named as EID-Holder. This new player enabled secure
and dynamic EID authorization, while enhancing a dynamic registration to support
mobility. As we have shown, even in a completely untrusted environment, our security
scheme requires only a few messages and produces low overhead. Furthermore, our
approach leverages on the design and infrastructure already developed by the IETF’s
Secure Inter-domain Routing (SIDR) WG for resolving the RLOC Authorization part.
The second part of this thesis focused over the security and protection vulnerabilities
of end users and end devices. More specifically, we focused on the current issues faced by
end users due the current device-centric security protection, as well as the main security
issues and challenges faced by the IoT realm. Our approach and proposed solutions
followed the offloading paradigm.
From the end user perspective, we have argued that for the large majority of Internet
users, the current protection model against security threats is broken. Users typically
have multiple devices, but achieving the same level of protection irrespective of the
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device used has become “mission impossible”. We have proposed a paradigm shift in user
protection through a user-centric model that also decouples security from user terminals.
The protection model we envision is based on the setup of a trusted virtual domain per
user, placed in the access network.
The uniform security demanded by users within an “always connected” world en-
vironment unveils a great opportunity for innovation. Different devices and network
access technologies enable users to access ubiquitously and remain connected, even when
a user is on the move. In this scenario, both security and mobility remain important
research topics. On top of this, the current security paradigms and how mobility is
addressed have been probed to fall short in fulfilling the current and future end users
requirements. To this end, we have proposed a novel architecture able to overcome most
of the issues present in a mobile user-centric scenario with offloaded security. In this work
we leveraged the use of virtualization and fog computing to propose a security framework,
which combined with SDN and an NFV-like technologies is able to orchestrate a user’s
security applications and their migration at the network edge. To validate our proposal,
we deployed a proof-of-concept prototype considering a WiFi mobile user. The obtained
results provide an initial insight regarding the impact introduced by the handover and
migration processes over the ongoing connections. Challenges such as scalability of
users, other network access technologies and vertical handover, and new lightweight
container-based migration technologies are part of our future work.
Finally, in the IoT realm we have discussed the current security challenges around the
fast growing adoption of resource-constrained devices and the services they support. We
argued the different dimensions that complicates the security of IoT, which include device
diversity, geographical distribution, scalability, and resource-constrained capabilities.
Therein, our contributions focus on extending the proposed user-centric security protection
along the IoT realm. Different challenges remain to overcome prior the realization of
the proposed IoT and service protection at scale, while instantiating the IoT-VD the
closest to the things. The advantages of leveraging the fog computing architecture allow
the on-path protection of the “things” while also consolidates and facilitates the proper
management and control of the different devices.
Chapter 10
Future Work
This chapter describes the different research directions that remain open and represent
potential lines of future work.
10.1 Offloaded security of core Internet components
In this thesis, we studied a systematic and analytical approach to leverage locally
available information from the BGP routing system to enhance its security. Our proposed
framework enables the decoupling from the protocol of all this information processing,
offloading it to an external entity. In this thesis, the offloaded Route Leak Detection
algorithm proposed is based only on the local BGP control plane information of one
router. However, the framework enables for new detection proposals to be investigated,
while extending the number of BGP speakers per domain consider. We plan to continue
our research around further extending and improving the detection algorithm, while
scouting in other fields such as Kalman filters, Bayesian models and machine learning.
Aligned with this, we plan to continue our efforts to deploy our solution leveraging the
Opendaylight BGP LS PCEP project.
Similarly, this thesis studied a different routing protocol which is based on the semantic
split of the addressing spaces, i.e., LISP. Our proposed solution foster user mobility over
a rather static Internet. Open issues we plan to pursue include further evaluation of
our end-to-end map registration in real scenarios, while also research the impacts of
the deployment of the RLOC authorization over the RPKI repository, and study its
propagation impact over the registration process.
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10.2 User-centric security protection
The user-centric security protection proposed in this thesis offers a compelling and
attractive solution with benefits at the user end. However, there are open issues around
management and orchestration as well as of scalability. The former issue poses the
requirement to further investigate solutions for managing such a hybrid architecture for
the allocation and instantiation of security applications at the network edge. Proposals
like NFV, and more specifically the Management and Organization architecture (MANO)
are in under our radar. On the other hand, the scalability issue may be affected by
the virtualization technology employed. Full VMs for security applications per user
might become a problem, thus we plan to investigate on more lightweight virtualization
technologies (e.g., containers).
Other open challenge regarding the user-centric offloaded security consists on the
allocation and instantiation of a compound TVD along different computing nodes. A
compound TVD consists of a graph of various Execution Environments EE (each hosting
a security application). Hence, this declarative graph will be the input the orchestrator
processes to decide where to instantiate each EE, and the proper configuration to connect
them.
Similarly, in this thesis we have partially addressed the user mobility with offloaded
security case. Internet User Mobility by itself remain an open challenge. We plan to
further investigate on new techniques to better support seamless mobility of end user
from a twofold perspective: (a) maintaining the user security close to the user, and
(b) reduce the impact due to the changes at the IP communications. The former is
closely related with the research line at the management and orchestration level describe
above. Further research around coordination, resource allocation and security migration
in heterogeneous infrastructures remain open challenges. On the other hand, the later is
related with the Internet mobility traversal challenge, and its implications to the network
routing at the edge and the core.
10.3 IoT security challenges
Our proposed IoT security protection targets to protect both the devices and the services
that leverage them. However, there are open challenges which were not covered in
this work, and are considered for our future work. The areas we plan to continue our
research include: IoT model definition, model-driven construction service graphs, and
the management and orchestration of elements over heterogeneous infrastructures.
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